officials as well as an overall Olympics-related clampdown on negative news coverage. 19 In January 2009, 21 defendants were convicted for their roles in the production
and sale of melamine-tainted products, including two melamine producers, who
received death sentences, and the former Sanlu chairwoman, who was sentenced to
life imprisonment. 20
As 2008 progressed, the Chinese government demonstrated a perceptible shift in its
media-control policies in order to better manage the handling of negative news
reports, which continued to spread with incredible speed and intensity on the Internet. This approach involves the government responding more actively and rapidly to
fast-breaking news events, primarily by attempting to set the agenda for coverage
rather than suppress it. 21 With lessons learned about the upsides of transparency and
timeliness from the early Sichuan earthquake coverage and other emergencies, the
central government reportedly began allowing local governments to disclose information about unrest and protests in an apparent attempt to ‘‘control the news by
publicizing the news.’’ 22 However, despite gestures toward broader openness with the
media, the government clearly did not intend to relinquish control. 23 This tactic often
resulted in the same delivery of ‘‘authoritative’’ facts, with state news agencies such as
Xinhua and the People’s Daily benefiting over commercial media from this selectively
enhanced coverage. 24 In February 2009, the official China News Service announced
that it would create a blacklist of journalists engaged in ‘‘unhealthy professional conduct,’’ and those found breaking rules would be prohibited from engaging in news
reporting and editing work. 25
Coming off of these perceived triumphs and devastating crises, the Chinese government warned that extra vigilance was needed in 2009. The potential for increased
social instability triggered by the global financial crisis increased anxieties in a year
already punctuated by powerful anniversaries of events tainting the legacy of the
CCP, which will also commemorate 60 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China: 20 years since the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square crackdown; 50 years
since the Tibetan uprising that led to the Dalai Lama’s exile; and ten years since the
Falun Gong spiritual movement was banned quickly after their 10,000-strong flash
protest in front of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese central leadership.
Thus, officials repeatedly issued reminders that ‘‘stability preservation work’’ 26 would
be a top priority. At a media forum in January, an official in China’s Internet affairs
bureau said, ‘‘You have to check the channels one by one, the programs one by one,
the pages one by one. . . . You must not miss any step. You must not leave any
unchecked corners.’’ 27 Efforts to enforce stability preservation have resulted in predictable crackdowns on media reporting; for example, in March 2009, reporters were
detained, turned back, or had their recordings confiscated when trying to visit Tibetan
areas in three provinces ahead of the first anniversary of the unrest in Tibet. 28
452
China
and sale of melamine-tainted products, including two melamine producers, who
received death sentences, and the former Sanlu chairwoman, who was sentenced to
life imprisonment. 20
As 2008 progressed, the Chinese government demonstrated a perceptible shift in its
media-control policies in order to better manage the handling of negative news
reports, which continued to spread with incredible speed and intensity on the Internet. This approach involves the government responding more actively and rapidly to
fast-breaking news events, primarily by attempting to set the agenda for coverage
rather than suppress it. 21 With lessons learned about the upsides of transparency and
timeliness from the early Sichuan earthquake coverage and other emergencies, the
central government reportedly began allowing local governments to disclose information about unrest and protests in an apparent attempt to ‘‘control the news by
publicizing the news.’’ 22 However, despite gestures toward broader openness with the
media, the government clearly did not intend to relinquish control. 23 This tactic often
resulted in the same delivery of ‘‘authoritative’’ facts, with state news agencies such as
Xinhua and the People’s Daily benefiting over commercial media from this selectively
enhanced coverage. 24 In February 2009, the official China News Service announced
that it would create a blacklist of journalists engaged in ‘‘unhealthy professional conduct,’’ and those found breaking rules would be prohibited from engaging in news
reporting and editing work. 25
Coming off of these perceived triumphs and devastating crises, the Chinese government warned that extra vigilance was needed in 2009. The potential for increased
social instability triggered by the global financial crisis increased anxieties in a year
already punctuated by powerful anniversaries of events tainting the legacy of the
CCP, which will also commemorate 60 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China: 20 years since the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square crackdown; 50 years
since the Tibetan uprising that led to the Dalai Lama’s exile; and ten years since the
Falun Gong spiritual movement was banned quickly after their 10,000-strong flash
protest in front of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese central leadership.
Thus, officials repeatedly issued reminders that ‘‘stability preservation work’’ 26 would
be a top priority. At a media forum in January, an official in China’s Internet affairs
bureau said, ‘‘You have to check the channels one by one, the programs one by one,
the pages one by one. . . . You must not miss any step. You must not leave any
unchecked corners.’’ 27 Efforts to enforce stability preservation have resulted in predictable crackdowns on media reporting; for example, in March 2009, reporters were
detained, turned back, or had their recordings confiscated when trying to visit Tibetan
areas in three provinces ahead of the first anniversary of the unrest in Tibet. 28
452
China