allow them to operate and offer proxy tools and other services that are technically
forbidden. 69 In addition to requirements that screenshots be taken every five minutes
and that records of Internet usage be sent to Myanmar Info-Tech every two weeks, cafe ´
owners are told to arrange computer monitors for easy public viewing and to ensure
that only state-run e-mail providers are used. 70 Operators of PACs must also record
the names, identification numbers, and addresses of their customers. 71 However, it is
widely reported that, despite regular crackdowns, most PAC owners largely ignore
these regulations and provide customers with proxy servers and alternative means of
accessing blocked Web sites. 72
Surveillance
In Burma, the fear of surveillance is pervasive and embedded in daily life. 73 Offline,
the state can effectively monitor its citizens through a dragnet that functions with the
assistance of various civilian organizations it directly controls. These overlapping
organizations include mass organizations such as the USDA, which imposes mandatory
membership on citizens in specific professions and is being cultivated as a ‘‘future
military-controlled civilian government in Burma,’’ with President Gen Than Shwe as
a primary patron. 74 State and local Peace and Development Councils (PDCs) are also
effective tools of social control. For example, all households must provide their local
ward PDCs with a list and photographs of all persons residing in the household and
register any overnight guests before dark, a policy that is reinforced by regular midnight checks of homes. 75 Another mass-based organization, known as the Swan Arr
Shin, pays its members to conduct routine neighborhood surveillance and police assistance, delegating others to engage in violence against opposition figures for higher
remuneration. 76 During the Fall 2007 protests, intelligence officials videotaped and
photographed protesters, and security forces relied on the information to enlist PDCs,
the USDA, and local law enforcement authorities in identifying individuals in order to
immediately begin making arrests in the ensuing crackdown. 77
Until it was disbanded in 2004, the Defense Services Computer Directorate (DSCD)
had become focused on information warfare operations such as monitoring telephone
calls, faxes, and e-mails focused on military communications, while the computer center
of the intelligence agency Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) under the
Ministry of Defense monitored opposition groups. 78 After the DSCD was reformed as the
Military Affairs Security (MAS), it presumably took over information warfare duties. 79
While the government’s aptitude at conducting online surveillance is not entirely
clear, it certainly appears to be pursuing a combination of methods to monitor the
small proportion of its citizens that access the Internet. Despite the reported widespread lack of compliance, at the most popular Internet access point—Internet
cafe ´s—owners and operators, as mentioned earlier, are required to record users’ per438
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