tional order, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Russian political, economic
and social stability, the unconditional ensuring of legality, law and order, and the development of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation.’’ 16
The intent of the doctrine was as much international as it was domestic, establishing
demarcated borders in cyberspace, at least in principle. The international intent of the
doctrine appears to have been driven by a growing concern that Russia was falling behind its major adversaries in developing a military capability in cyberspace; efforts by
countries such as the United States, China, India, and others to develop covert computer network attack capabilities risked creating a strategic imbalance. 17 Domestically,
the doctrine was aimed at the use of the Internet by militant groups to conduct information operations, specifically the Chechen insurgency. Within a few years, most
other CIS countries had followed suit, adopting variations of the Russian doctrine.
ONI Tests for Internet Controls in RUNET
The controls outlined previously are qualitatively different from the usual types of controls for which the ONI tests. Establishing empirical evidence of the effects of policies
like SORM and the Doctrine of Information Security is challenging, since their application is largely contextual, their impact at times almost metaphysical. Such controls do
not yield a technological ‘‘fingerprint’’ in the way that a filtering system blocking access to Internet content does. However, they may be just as effective, if not more so,
in achieving the same outcomes. In its 2007 study of the policy and practice of Internet filtering, the ONI found that substantial and pervasive attempts to technically filter
content on RUNET did not begin until 2004, and even then were isolated to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with lesser attempts at filtering found in most other CIS countries
(see Table 2.3) 18
These reports have remained consistent in more recent rounds of ONI tests. And yet
persistent anecdotal reports, as well as special monitoring efforts mounted by the ONI,
reveal in the majority of CIS countries that information denial and access shaping is
occurring, and on a significant scale, especially around critical events such as elections.
The ONI carried out a number of special investigations, including mounting monitoring efforts during the 2005 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan 19 and the March
2006 Belarus presidential elections. 20 These efforts yielded the first technically verified
results that the RUNET was being deliberately tampered with to achieve a political
effect.
The results obtained by ONI in the CIS are unique, and they differ significantly
from the results obtained in ONI’s global survey. They demonstrate that information controls in the CIS have developed in different ways and using different techniques than those found in other areas of the world. They suggest a much more
sophisticated approach to managing networks through denial that is highly selective
and event based, and that shapes access to the sources of information and means of
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
21
and social stability, the unconditional ensuring of legality, law and order, and the development of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation.’’ 16
The intent of the doctrine was as much international as it was domestic, establishing
demarcated borders in cyberspace, at least in principle. The international intent of the
doctrine appears to have been driven by a growing concern that Russia was falling behind its major adversaries in developing a military capability in cyberspace; efforts by
countries such as the United States, China, India, and others to develop covert computer network attack capabilities risked creating a strategic imbalance. 17 Domestically,
the doctrine was aimed at the use of the Internet by militant groups to conduct information operations, specifically the Chechen insurgency. Within a few years, most
other CIS countries had followed suit, adopting variations of the Russian doctrine.
ONI Tests for Internet Controls in RUNET
The controls outlined previously are qualitatively different from the usual types of controls for which the ONI tests. Establishing empirical evidence of the effects of policies
like SORM and the Doctrine of Information Security is challenging, since their application is largely contextual, their impact at times almost metaphysical. Such controls do
not yield a technological ‘‘fingerprint’’ in the way that a filtering system blocking access to Internet content does. However, they may be just as effective, if not more so,
in achieving the same outcomes. In its 2007 study of the policy and practice of Internet filtering, the ONI found that substantial and pervasive attempts to technically filter
content on RUNET did not begin until 2004, and even then were isolated to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with lesser attempts at filtering found in most other CIS countries
(see Table 2.3) 18
These reports have remained consistent in more recent rounds of ONI tests. And yet
persistent anecdotal reports, as well as special monitoring efforts mounted by the ONI,
reveal in the majority of CIS countries that information denial and access shaping is
occurring, and on a significant scale, especially around critical events such as elections.
The ONI carried out a number of special investigations, including mounting monitoring efforts during the 2005 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan 19 and the March
2006 Belarus presidential elections. 20 These efforts yielded the first technically verified
results that the RUNET was being deliberately tampered with to achieve a political
effect.
The results obtained by ONI in the CIS are unique, and they differ significantly
from the results obtained in ONI’s global survey. They demonstrate that information controls in the CIS have developed in different ways and using different techniques than those found in other areas of the world. They suggest a much more
sophisticated approach to managing networks through denial that is highly selective
and event based, and that shapes access to the sources of information and means of
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
21