Public outrage over the law led to a significant revision in September 2008, and a
number of wide-ranging surveillance permits were repealed. 61 Among the compromises were requirements that court orders be issued before monitoring individuals,
that no communications inside Sweden would be logged, and that the FRA could only
work on behalf of the government and the military. The FRA thus monitors all ‘‘external threats,’’ not just ‘‘foreign military threats.’’
Almost all telecommunication from Finland to the rest of the world passes through
Sweden, leading to fear of the FRA-law in Finland. Both Swedish and Norwegian legal
organizations have filed petitions at the European Court of Human Rights challenging
the Swedish wiretapping law. 62 In neighboring Denmark, citizens scrambled to assess
whether they needed to change ISP and telephone companies in order to avoid being
monitored. The Danish Federation of Industries, the largest commercial organization
in the country, issued an elevated security warning, fearing commercial espionage by
Sweden, and published guidelines on how to avoid surveillance of data by foreign governments at the end of 2008. 63
The law regulating the Norwegian intelligence agency establishes the rules for military Internet surveillance in Norway. 64 It gives the Intelligence Services under the ministry of defense (Forsvarets Etterretningstjeneste, FO/E) a very broad mandate to collect
information that ‘‘serves the interests of Norway in relation to foreign states, organizations and individuals.’’ They must, however, refrain from collecting information about
Norwegian citizens or legal entities, but there seem to be no restrictions as far as foreigners are concerned. 65
This broad mandate empowers the FO/E to perform electronic surveillance on communications originating from foreign individuals and organizations at the border, in a
manner similar to the more explicit Swedish FRA-law. However, it is unknown how the
FO/E currently exercises its surveillance mandate.
The legal framework with regard to Internet surveillance by the Norwegian police
is the same as for all communications. The existing legal framework 66 for telephone wiretapping has simply been extended. To intercept e-mail or to tap an Internet line requires a court order, and a person under surveillance must be suspected
of involvement in a serious crime punishable with ten years or more in prison (e.g.,
espionage).
Perspectives
All over Europe censorship and surveillance initiatives are promoted, like the French
‘‘three strikes’’ HADOPI law against piracy that introduced online snooping on suspected file sharers. 67 The law, which has already inspired clones in other EU countries,
will be challenged because of a recent declaration by the European Parliament that it is
illegal for an EU country to sever Internet access from anyone without the approval of
332
Nordic Countries
number of wide-ranging surveillance permits were repealed. 61 Among the compromises were requirements that court orders be issued before monitoring individuals,
that no communications inside Sweden would be logged, and that the FRA could only
work on behalf of the government and the military. The FRA thus monitors all ‘‘external threats,’’ not just ‘‘foreign military threats.’’
Almost all telecommunication from Finland to the rest of the world passes through
Sweden, leading to fear of the FRA-law in Finland. Both Swedish and Norwegian legal
organizations have filed petitions at the European Court of Human Rights challenging
the Swedish wiretapping law. 62 In neighboring Denmark, citizens scrambled to assess
whether they needed to change ISP and telephone companies in order to avoid being
monitored. The Danish Federation of Industries, the largest commercial organization
in the country, issued an elevated security warning, fearing commercial espionage by
Sweden, and published guidelines on how to avoid surveillance of data by foreign governments at the end of 2008. 63
The law regulating the Norwegian intelligence agency establishes the rules for military Internet surveillance in Norway. 64 It gives the Intelligence Services under the ministry of defense (Forsvarets Etterretningstjeneste, FO/E) a very broad mandate to collect
information that ‘‘serves the interests of Norway in relation to foreign states, organizations and individuals.’’ They must, however, refrain from collecting information about
Norwegian citizens or legal entities, but there seem to be no restrictions as far as foreigners are concerned. 65
This broad mandate empowers the FO/E to perform electronic surveillance on communications originating from foreign individuals and organizations at the border, in a
manner similar to the more explicit Swedish FRA-law. However, it is unknown how the
FO/E currently exercises its surveillance mandate.
The legal framework with regard to Internet surveillance by the Norwegian police
is the same as for all communications. The existing legal framework 66 for telephone wiretapping has simply been extended. To intercept e-mail or to tap an Internet line requires a court order, and a person under surveillance must be suspected
of involvement in a serious crime punishable with ten years or more in prison (e.g.,
espionage).
Perspectives
All over Europe censorship and surveillance initiatives are promoted, like the French
‘‘three strikes’’ HADOPI law against piracy that introduced online snooping on suspected file sharers. 67 The law, which has already inspired clones in other EU countries,
will be challenged because of a recent declaration by the European Parliament that it is
illegal for an EU country to sever Internet access from anyone without the approval of
332
Nordic Countries