In February 2005, Google Germany, Lycos Europe, MSN Germany, AOL Germany,
Yahoo, and T-Online agreed to self-regulate their search results under the head of the
Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter (FSM, Voluntary Self-Regulation of
Multimedia Service Providers). 31 The FSM is a self-regulatory body for multimedia service providers funded by several Internet companies in 1997. One of the FSM’s policies
is to exclude Web sites that have been blacklisted by the BPjM from the search indices
of its members. The current BPjM blacklist is regularly transferred to a hidden server;
the search engines then download the list and automatically remove the relevant
entries.
A number of cases have been brought to public attention. One in particular involves
bmezine.com, a Web site that ‘‘serves to document the activities of the body modification community.’’ 32 In 2005, after BPjM judged the Web site to be a host of content
harmful to minors, it required Google.de to remove BMEzine from its search results. 33
A second incident occurred in late 2007, when German adult content providers sued
several ISPs in various German states to block several Web sites that contained pornographic content. 34 The pages in question were hosted abroad and thus lacked a strict
age verification system. The district court of Frankfurt ordered the respective defendant
to block all relevant DNS addresses, while other courts dismissed the actions. 35 In particular, a request to block Google was dismissed. 36 Furthermore, the Oberlandesgericht
Frankfurt (Higher State Court) confirmed another dismissal of a court of first instance,
judging that ISPs could not be held liable for content that they only transmit. 37
Surveillance
Although Internet access remains mostly unrestricted in Germany, Internet users have
recently been subject to state action. Germany’s Criminal Procedure Code specifies in
Section 100a that ‘‘the telecommunication of an individual may be monitored and
recorded if:
1. Specific facts substantiate the suspicion that somebody was the perpetrator or participant in a serious crime as listed in paragraph 2 or, in cases where the attempt is
liable to persecution, has attempted to commit such crime, or has prepared such crime
by means of a criminal offense
2. The alleged crime would weigh heavily even taken individually
3. Investigating the act or determining the suspected person’s location by other means
would be significantly impeded or futile without surveillance’’
Since January 2008, ISPs and online service providers in Germany have been
required to retain certain data without initial suspicion of illegal activity (Vorratsdatenspeicherung). 38 The parliament passed the relevant law in November 2007, 39 which
implements a European Union (EU) directive 40 ; prior to its implementation, ISPs were
Germany
311
Yahoo, and T-Online agreed to self-regulate their search results under the head of the
Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter (FSM, Voluntary Self-Regulation of
Multimedia Service Providers). 31 The FSM is a self-regulatory body for multimedia service providers funded by several Internet companies in 1997. One of the FSM’s policies
is to exclude Web sites that have been blacklisted by the BPjM from the search indices
of its members. The current BPjM blacklist is regularly transferred to a hidden server;
the search engines then download the list and automatically remove the relevant
entries.
A number of cases have been brought to public attention. One in particular involves
bmezine.com, a Web site that ‘‘serves to document the activities of the body modification community.’’ 32 In 2005, after BPjM judged the Web site to be a host of content
harmful to minors, it required Google.de to remove BMEzine from its search results. 33
A second incident occurred in late 2007, when German adult content providers sued
several ISPs in various German states to block several Web sites that contained pornographic content. 34 The pages in question were hosted abroad and thus lacked a strict
age verification system. The district court of Frankfurt ordered the respective defendant
to block all relevant DNS addresses, while other courts dismissed the actions. 35 In particular, a request to block Google was dismissed. 36 Furthermore, the Oberlandesgericht
Frankfurt (Higher State Court) confirmed another dismissal of a court of first instance,
judging that ISPs could not be held liable for content that they only transmit. 37
Surveillance
Although Internet access remains mostly unrestricted in Germany, Internet users have
recently been subject to state action. Germany’s Criminal Procedure Code specifies in
Section 100a that ‘‘the telecommunication of an individual may be monitored and
recorded if:
1. Specific facts substantiate the suspicion that somebody was the perpetrator or participant in a serious crime as listed in paragraph 2 or, in cases where the attempt is
liable to persecution, has attempted to commit such crime, or has prepared such crime
by means of a criminal offense
2. The alleged crime would weigh heavily even taken individually
3. Investigating the act or determining the suspected person’s location by other means
would be significantly impeded or futile without surveillance’’
Since January 2008, ISPs and online service providers in Germany have been
required to retain certain data without initial suspicion of illegal activity (Vorratsdatenspeicherung). 38 The parliament passed the relevant law in November 2007, 39 which
implements a European Union (EU) directive 40 ; prior to its implementation, ISPs were
Germany
311