sites (inter alia, content criticizing the president), local NGOs, sites of religious organizations, and terrorist groups. Interestingly, a large number of sites (including forum
sites, media sites, and others) remain inaccessible for the user even though they are
not blocked outright.
Conclusion
Through investment and legal mechanisms, the government has demonstrated its
willingness to promote ICT in Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan maintains
the most extensive and pervasive filtering system among the CIS countries. Although
expressly banned in Uzbek law, filtering is widespread and apparently growing. A large
number of sites with political and human rights content sensitive to the government
remain inaccessible to Internet users. The security forces in Uzbekistan manually check
Internet access at ‘‘edge locations’’ (such as Internet cafe ´s) and monitor users’ activities.
The regulatory framework is so intricately woven that in most cases ISPs and Internet
publishers are unaware of the governing law. To avoid sanctions from the authorities,
Internet users frequently commit themselves to self-censorship.
Notes
1. During the most robust of such actions in 2005, hundreds of people were killed. (Government
statistics mention 190 people, while unofficial sources suggest that as many as 750 people—the
majority of them civilians—lost their lives in the clash with the police forces.)
2. Among those expelled from Uzbekistan in 2006 was the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, which had helped to relocate refugees from the Andijan events.
3. Two liberal oppositional parties remain banned in the country: Unity (Birlik) and Uzbekistan
Liberty Democratic Party (O’zbekistan Erk Demokratik Partiyasi).
4. In 2004, Internews Network Uzbekistan was accused of failing to register a logo and forced on
these grounds to suspend its operations, halt its training of media lawyers, close its media resource
center in the Ferghana Valley, and take its two highly popular TV news programs off air.
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Legal Transition Program: Comparative
Assessment of the Telecommunications Sector in the Transition Countries: Assessment Report Uzbekistan,
December 2008, http://ebrd.com/country/sector/law/telecoms/assess/uzbek.pdf.
6. Infocom.uz, ‘‘Informationno-communicationnie Technologii Uzbekistana’’ [Information and
Communication Technologies of Uzbekistan], April 27, 2009, http://www.infocom.uz/post/
?id=4391.
7. Uzbekistan has over 1,900 km of trunk fiber-optic line and over 1,000 km of trunk radio relay
line.
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Uzbekistan
sites, media sites, and others) remain inaccessible for the user even though they are
not blocked outright.
Conclusion
Through investment and legal mechanisms, the government has demonstrated its
willingness to promote ICT in Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan maintains
the most extensive and pervasive filtering system among the CIS countries. Although
expressly banned in Uzbek law, filtering is widespread and apparently growing. A large
number of sites with political and human rights content sensitive to the government
remain inaccessible to Internet users. The security forces in Uzbekistan manually check
Internet access at ‘‘edge locations’’ (such as Internet cafe ´s) and monitor users’ activities.
The regulatory framework is so intricately woven that in most cases ISPs and Internet
publishers are unaware of the governing law. To avoid sanctions from the authorities,
Internet users frequently commit themselves to self-censorship.
Notes
1. During the most robust of such actions in 2005, hundreds of people were killed. (Government
statistics mention 190 people, while unofficial sources suggest that as many as 750 people—the
majority of them civilians—lost their lives in the clash with the police forces.)
2. Among those expelled from Uzbekistan in 2006 was the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, which had helped to relocate refugees from the Andijan events.
3. Two liberal oppositional parties remain banned in the country: Unity (Birlik) and Uzbekistan
Liberty Democratic Party (O’zbekistan Erk Demokratik Partiyasi).
4. In 2004, Internews Network Uzbekistan was accused of failing to register a logo and forced on
these grounds to suspend its operations, halt its training of media lawyers, close its media resource
center in the Ferghana Valley, and take its two highly popular TV news programs off air.
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Legal Transition Program: Comparative
Assessment of the Telecommunications Sector in the Transition Countries: Assessment Report Uzbekistan,
December 2008, http://ebrd.com/country/sector/law/telecoms/assess/uzbek.pdf.
6. Infocom.uz, ‘‘Informationno-communicationnie Technologii Uzbekistana’’ [Information and
Communication Technologies of Uzbekistan], April 27, 2009, http://www.infocom.uz/post/
?id=4391.
7. Uzbekistan has over 1,900 km of trunk fiber-optic line and over 1,000 km of trunk radio relay
line.
272
Uzbekistan