those impacts will be of paramount importance for Internet governance at all levels in
years to come.
Probably the most important norm is the ‘‘security first’’ orientation toward Internet
governance, driven in part by the fear of terrorism and in part by concerns of protecting vulnerable populations (particularly children) from exploitation. Across the OSCE,
communities of practice in law enforcement, intelligence, and the private sector are
working, often in uncoordinated, discrete, but like-minded ways, leading to a normalization of Internet surveillance and censorship across all sectors of cyberspace. It is perhaps ironic that these norms so antithetical to basic rights and freedoms are being
propagated from many countries that just over a decade ago were responsible for the
expansion of liberal democratic principles and market capitalism across the globe.
And yet upon closer consideration such trends conform to what have been called ‘‘governmentality practices’’ in general that characterize these societies, as techniques of
control become progressively more refined, technologically rigorous, and bureaucratically complex. Although not ‘‘socially sinister,’’ as David Lyons puts it, what he calls
‘‘everyday surveillance’’ has routinized itself into ordinary life in so many myriad
ways that it has become the taken-for-granted context within which modern industrialized society operates. 10 The security-first norm around Internet governance can be
seen, therefore, as but another manifestation of these wider developments. Internet
censorship and surveillance—once largely confined to authoritarian regimes—is now
fast becoming the global norm.
But there is a second characteristic of this newly emerging normative terrain that is
unique to cyberspace and the speed with which such changes are being wrought, in
particular to the long-standing pillars of modern citizen-state relations. The ‘‘social
contract’’ that has set the basic framework for citizen-state relations in the modern
industrialized period has been shaped by decades of technological and social change
and institutional innovations. One must be careful, therefore, to ascribe to contemporary events unique and epochal challenges. However, the way in which citizen-state
relations are being upset in a very compressed time frame is worth noting, and may
be comparable only to that which happened at the height of the industrial revolution
itself. In such a context of rapid technological and social change, the margin for error
and unintended consequence around laws and regulations is enormous as path
dependencies open up around fast-moving developments that only in hindsight can
be identified as such.
The salience of such impacts can be seen in the practices surrounding the distributed
ownership infrastructure of cyberspace. Today, peoples’ everyday lives are mediated not
only through the state per se, but dispersed through clouds of digital-electronic telecommunications owned and operated by private entities. Each of these clouds—often
spanning multiple national jurisdictions—represents potential, and often actual, loci
of private authority. As shown throughout each of the chapters in this volume, the
Beyond Denial
11
years to come.
Probably the most important norm is the ‘‘security first’’ orientation toward Internet
governance, driven in part by the fear of terrorism and in part by concerns of protecting vulnerable populations (particularly children) from exploitation. Across the OSCE,
communities of practice in law enforcement, intelligence, and the private sector are
working, often in uncoordinated, discrete, but like-minded ways, leading to a normalization of Internet surveillance and censorship across all sectors of cyberspace. It is perhaps ironic that these norms so antithetical to basic rights and freedoms are being
propagated from many countries that just over a decade ago were responsible for the
expansion of liberal democratic principles and market capitalism across the globe.
And yet upon closer consideration such trends conform to what have been called ‘‘governmentality practices’’ in general that characterize these societies, as techniques of
control become progressively more refined, technologically rigorous, and bureaucratically complex. Although not ‘‘socially sinister,’’ as David Lyons puts it, what he calls
‘‘everyday surveillance’’ has routinized itself into ordinary life in so many myriad
ways that it has become the taken-for-granted context within which modern industrialized society operates. 10 The security-first norm around Internet governance can be
seen, therefore, as but another manifestation of these wider developments. Internet
censorship and surveillance—once largely confined to authoritarian regimes—is now
fast becoming the global norm.
But there is a second characteristic of this newly emerging normative terrain that is
unique to cyberspace and the speed with which such changes are being wrought, in
particular to the long-standing pillars of modern citizen-state relations. The ‘‘social
contract’’ that has set the basic framework for citizen-state relations in the modern
industrialized period has been shaped by decades of technological and social change
and institutional innovations. One must be careful, therefore, to ascribe to contemporary events unique and epochal challenges. However, the way in which citizen-state
relations are being upset in a very compressed time frame is worth noting, and may
be comparable only to that which happened at the height of the industrial revolution
itself. In such a context of rapid technological and social change, the margin for error
and unintended consequence around laws and regulations is enormous as path
dependencies open up around fast-moving developments that only in hindsight can
be identified as such.
The salience of such impacts can be seen in the practices surrounding the distributed
ownership infrastructure of cyberspace. Today, peoples’ everyday lives are mediated not
only through the state per se, but dispersed through clouds of digital-electronic telecommunications owned and operated by private entities. Each of these clouds—often
spanning multiple national jurisdictions—represents potential, and often actual, loci
of private authority. As shown throughout each of the chapters in this volume, the
Beyond Denial
11