that lists are accurate and do not contain collateral filtering problems or categorization
mistakes common to filtering software. Nart Villeneuve’s chapter provides a historical
overview of online child pornography controls and examines the range of policy
responses that have been employed. As Villeneuve explains, many governments have
adopted national filtering policies rather than developing international informationsharing arrangements that would involve police cooperation and the removal of information at its source.
Another example of next-generation information controls prominent among the
countries of the OSCE is the extensive use and application of surveillance. As Hal Roberts and John Palfrey outline in their chapter, surveillance can happen at numerous
points throughout the infrastructure of cyberspace and can be collected by a variety
of public and private actors who have access to those choke points. States’ intelligence
and law enforcement agencies are increasingly extracting precious information flows
through the installation of permanent eavesdropping equipment at key Internet choke
points, such as Internet exchanges, ISPs, or major international peering facilities, and
combining such information with new tools of reconnaissance drawn from data
sources such as CCTVs, satellite imagery, and powerful systems of geo-locational mapping. To be sure, electronic surveillance is nothing new, having a long history
shrouded with secrecy. Throughout the cold war, both superpowers assembled globespanning electronic surveillance systems that operated in the most highly classified
realms. However, today’s surveillance systems are much more extensive and penetrating, and are legitimized by permissive antiterror legislation that removes many previous operational constraints. They are also increasingly operated and controlled not by
the state but by private actors. As with just-in-time blocking, surveillance eludes the
ONI’s methods and is generally quite difficult to monitor using technical means. It is,
however, a very powerful force of information control and can create a stifling climate
of self-censorship.
Another control beyond denial that is profiled in Access Controlled relates to the
growing and widespread prevalence of cyberspace as a communications environment,
and the ways in which third-party intermediaries, including private companies and
public institutions, host, service, and ultimately control that environment. At one
point in time, it might have been fair to characterize cyberspace as largely a separate
and distinct realm—something people ‘‘enter into’’ when they turn on their computers or play video games. Today, however, with always-on portable devices that are
fully connected to the Internet, and much of society’s transactions mediated through
information and communication technologies—including business, work, government,
and play—cyberspace is not so much a distinct realm as it is the very environment we
inhabit. Our lives have been digitally disassembled, disaggregated, and dispersed into
multiple digital domains. Our ‘‘private’’ information now traverses through cables and
spectrum owned and operated by numerous private and public institutions located in
Beyond Denial
9
mistakes common to filtering software. Nart Villeneuve’s chapter provides a historical
overview of online child pornography controls and examines the range of policy
responses that have been employed. As Villeneuve explains, many governments have
adopted national filtering policies rather than developing international informationsharing arrangements that would involve police cooperation and the removal of information at its source.
Another example of next-generation information controls prominent among the
countries of the OSCE is the extensive use and application of surveillance. As Hal Roberts and John Palfrey outline in their chapter, surveillance can happen at numerous
points throughout the infrastructure of cyberspace and can be collected by a variety
of public and private actors who have access to those choke points. States’ intelligence
and law enforcement agencies are increasingly extracting precious information flows
through the installation of permanent eavesdropping equipment at key Internet choke
points, such as Internet exchanges, ISPs, or major international peering facilities, and
combining such information with new tools of reconnaissance drawn from data
sources such as CCTVs, satellite imagery, and powerful systems of geo-locational mapping. To be sure, electronic surveillance is nothing new, having a long history
shrouded with secrecy. Throughout the cold war, both superpowers assembled globespanning electronic surveillance systems that operated in the most highly classified
realms. However, today’s surveillance systems are much more extensive and penetrating, and are legitimized by permissive antiterror legislation that removes many previous operational constraints. They are also increasingly operated and controlled not by
the state but by private actors. As with just-in-time blocking, surveillance eludes the
ONI’s methods and is generally quite difficult to monitor using technical means. It is,
however, a very powerful force of information control and can create a stifling climate
of self-censorship.
Another control beyond denial that is profiled in Access Controlled relates to the
growing and widespread prevalence of cyberspace as a communications environment,
and the ways in which third-party intermediaries, including private companies and
public institutions, host, service, and ultimately control that environment. At one
point in time, it might have been fair to characterize cyberspace as largely a separate
and distinct realm—something people ‘‘enter into’’ when they turn on their computers or play video games. Today, however, with always-on portable devices that are
fully connected to the Internet, and much of society’s transactions mediated through
information and communication technologies—including business, work, government,
and play—cyberspace is not so much a distinct realm as it is the very environment we
inhabit. Our lives have been digitally disassembled, disaggregated, and dispersed into
multiple digital domains. Our ‘‘private’’ information now traverses through cables and
spectrum owned and operated by numerous private and public institutions located in
Beyond Denial
9