though these measures may have the same aim as Chinese-style filtering, they reflect a
maturation of methods resulting from a growing colonization of cyberspace by states
and other actors. They emerge from a desire to shape and influence as much as tightly
control national and global populations that are increasingly reliant on cyberspace as
their main source of information. These next-generation controls raise important and
sometimes troubling public policy issues—particularly for the relationship between
citizens and states.
Chapter Overview
Second- and third-generation controls are carefully defined in our subsequent chapter
in this volume, Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace. Second-generation controls create a legal and normative environment and technical capabilities that enable
actors to deny access to information resources as and when needed, while reducing
the possibility of blowback or discovery. These controls have an overt and covert track.
The overt track aims to legalize content controls by specifying the conditions under
which they can be denied. Instruments here include the doctrine of information security as well as the application of existent laws, such as slander and defamation, to the
online environment. The covert track establishes procedures and technical capabilities
that allow content controls to be applied ‘‘just in time,’’ when the information being
targeted has the highest value (e.g., during elections or public demonstrations), and to
be applied in ways that assure plausible deniability.
Third-generation controls take a highly sophisticated, multidimensional approach to
enhancing state control over national cyberspace and building capabilities for competing in informational space with potential adversaries and competitors. The key characteristic of third-generation controls is that the focus is less on denying access than
successfully competing with potential threats through effective counterinformation
campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize opponents. Third-generation controls also focus on the active use of surveillance and data mining as means to confuse
and entrap opponents.
We argue that while the countries of the CIS are often seen as lagging behind Europe, North America, and the technological tigers of Asia, they may be leaders in the
development of next-generation controls. Some of the first, and most elaborate, forms
of just-in-time blocking, terms-of-usage policies, surveillance, and legal takedown notices occurred among the countries of the CIS over the last several years. Examining that
region in detail may give us insight into the future of information controls elsewhere.
Computer network attacks and exploitation—what we called ‘‘just-in-time’’ blocking
in Access Denied—are perhaps the starkest of examples of next-generation techniques.
Computer network attacks describe the range of controls that target and ‘‘take down’’
strategically important sources of information or services at key moments in time
Beyond Denial
7
maturation of methods resulting from a growing colonization of cyberspace by states
and other actors. They emerge from a desire to shape and influence as much as tightly
control national and global populations that are increasingly reliant on cyberspace as
their main source of information. These next-generation controls raise important and
sometimes troubling public policy issues—particularly for the relationship between
citizens and states.
Chapter Overview
Second- and third-generation controls are carefully defined in our subsequent chapter
in this volume, Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace. Second-generation controls create a legal and normative environment and technical capabilities that enable
actors to deny access to information resources as and when needed, while reducing
the possibility of blowback or discovery. These controls have an overt and covert track.
The overt track aims to legalize content controls by specifying the conditions under
which they can be denied. Instruments here include the doctrine of information security as well as the application of existent laws, such as slander and defamation, to the
online environment. The covert track establishes procedures and technical capabilities
that allow content controls to be applied ‘‘just in time,’’ when the information being
targeted has the highest value (e.g., during elections or public demonstrations), and to
be applied in ways that assure plausible deniability.
Third-generation controls take a highly sophisticated, multidimensional approach to
enhancing state control over national cyberspace and building capabilities for competing in informational space with potential adversaries and competitors. The key characteristic of third-generation controls is that the focus is less on denying access than
successfully competing with potential threats through effective counterinformation
campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize opponents. Third-generation controls also focus on the active use of surveillance and data mining as means to confuse
and entrap opponents.
We argue that while the countries of the CIS are often seen as lagging behind Europe, North America, and the technological tigers of Asia, they may be leaders in the
development of next-generation controls. Some of the first, and most elaborate, forms
of just-in-time blocking, terms-of-usage policies, surveillance, and legal takedown notices occurred among the countries of the CIS over the last several years. Examining that
region in detail may give us insight into the future of information controls elsewhere.
Computer network attacks and exploitation—what we called ‘‘just-in-time’’ blocking
in Access Denied—are perhaps the starkest of examples of next-generation techniques.
Computer network attacks describe the range of controls that target and ‘‘take down’’
strategically important sources of information or services at key moments in time
Beyond Denial
7