ister of Communications, signed an order that essentially restated the obligations of
ISPs under SORM-II to allow monitoring of users’ Internet activities.
Under SORM-II, ISPs are required to provide the FSB with statistics on all Internet
traffic that passes through their servers. In addition, ISPs are required to install monitoring devices on their servers and route all transmissions in real time through the
FSB’s local offices, which would allow the FSB to track all users’ transactions, e-mail
communications, and online browsing. Even though the FSB still needs to obtain a
warrant to read the contents, many doubt that they would obtain the warrant beforehand consistently, since there is no mechanism to prevent the FSB from having unauthorized access. Providers must also provide the FSB with information on users’ names,
telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, one or more IP addresses, key words, user identification numbers, and users’ ICQ number (instant messaging client), among others.
Under Putin, Minister of Communications Reiman entered an order stating that the
FSB officials shall not provide information to the ISPs either on users who are being
investigated or regarding the decision on the grounds of which such investigations
are made. 69 Consequently, this Order offered a ‘‘carte blanche’’ to the Special Services
to police the activities of Internet users without supplying any further information to
the provider or any other interested party.
Only a few days after assuming office, President Putin expanded the list of state
agencies that can monitor communications under SORM to include the tax police,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, Kremlin Security Service, Presidential Security Service, parliamentary security services, and Foreign Intelligence Service.
SORM places the substantial financial burden of installing routers on the FSB servers
on the balance sheets of ISPs, with minimal benefit to them for the technology. The
cost of equipment at the time the regulation was adopted was close to USD 25,000. 70
This expense has caused many small and independent ISPs to shut down. In one
recorded case a small regional ISP in Volgograd, Bayard-Slaviya Communications,
resisted the new law and refused to install the required equipment. As a result, the
Ministry of Communications suspended the provider’s license. However, when the ISP
brought the question to court, the ministry renewed its license.
SORM-II drastically expanded the ability of the FSB to carry out surveillance of operators and individuals. Some reports reveal that ISP owners prefer to negotiate their own
confidential agreements with the FSB office rather than take on the cost of complying
with SORM-II or risk losing their licenses. 71
In reality, however, many doubt that the FSB possesses the capability of monitoring
all Internet traffic. 72 Increased Internet traffic renders ubiquitous surveillance practically impossible. Unless the authorities know ahead of time what they are searching
for, random surveillance is unlikely to produce any meaningful results. 73 Nevertheless,
as there is no independent authority that controls or supervises the FSB, their activities
are not publicly known.
Russia
219
ISPs under SORM-II to allow monitoring of users’ Internet activities.
Under SORM-II, ISPs are required to provide the FSB with statistics on all Internet
traffic that passes through their servers. In addition, ISPs are required to install monitoring devices on their servers and route all transmissions in real time through the
FSB’s local offices, which would allow the FSB to track all users’ transactions, e-mail
communications, and online browsing. Even though the FSB still needs to obtain a
warrant to read the contents, many doubt that they would obtain the warrant beforehand consistently, since there is no mechanism to prevent the FSB from having unauthorized access. Providers must also provide the FSB with information on users’ names,
telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, one or more IP addresses, key words, user identification numbers, and users’ ICQ number (instant messaging client), among others.
Under Putin, Minister of Communications Reiman entered an order stating that the
FSB officials shall not provide information to the ISPs either on users who are being
investigated or regarding the decision on the grounds of which such investigations
are made. 69 Consequently, this Order offered a ‘‘carte blanche’’ to the Special Services
to police the activities of Internet users without supplying any further information to
the provider or any other interested party.
Only a few days after assuming office, President Putin expanded the list of state
agencies that can monitor communications under SORM to include the tax police,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, Kremlin Security Service, Presidential Security Service, parliamentary security services, and Foreign Intelligence Service.
SORM places the substantial financial burden of installing routers on the FSB servers
on the balance sheets of ISPs, with minimal benefit to them for the technology. The
cost of equipment at the time the regulation was adopted was close to USD 25,000. 70
This expense has caused many small and independent ISPs to shut down. In one
recorded case a small regional ISP in Volgograd, Bayard-Slaviya Communications,
resisted the new law and refused to install the required equipment. As a result, the
Ministry of Communications suspended the provider’s license. However, when the ISP
brought the question to court, the ministry renewed its license.
SORM-II drastically expanded the ability of the FSB to carry out surveillance of operators and individuals. Some reports reveal that ISP owners prefer to negotiate their own
confidential agreements with the FSB office rather than take on the cost of complying
with SORM-II or risk losing their licenses. 71
In reality, however, many doubt that the FSB possesses the capability of monitoring
all Internet traffic. 72 Increased Internet traffic renders ubiquitous surveillance practically impossible. Unless the authorities know ahead of time what they are searching
for, random surveillance is unlikely to produce any meaningful results. 73 Nevertheless,
as there is no independent authority that controls or supervises the FSB, their activities
are not publicly known.
Russia
219