still under consideration, but if it is approved, it is expected that it might follow the
Russian Law on Surveillance (SORM).
Moldova has established two departments responsible for overseeing the activities of
participants in the ICT sector. The first structure, within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, is charged with prevention of interregional and informational infringements.
The other body, within the Center on Prevention of Economic Crimes and Corruption,
has special powers to prevent infringements in the IT and other fields.
Moldova also possesses a comprehensive centralized database of information on all
its citizens. This system, called registru (registry), has been heavily criticized by human
rights groups for being too comprehensive and lacking oversight. Privacy rights are
poorly developed in Moldova, and not yet defined in law. The information held by
registru is extremely comprehensive and brings together data collected by all state
agencies. Consequently, human rights groups fear that it represents unwarranted and
unprecedented surveillance. The system has proven highly successful, and it is a model
for governments in the CIS. It has been exported to several other countries in the
region. The current Moldovan president, a former internal ministry general, supports
registru—in part because it was originally developed within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative carried out testing on three first-tier ISPs
in Moldova: Moldtelecom, Telemedia, and DNT SunCommunications. Results did not
reveal any filtering carried out on the Internet backbone.
In Internet cafe ´s, access is limited more by surveillance than by direct filtering.
Specific content is prohibited, and, if it is accessed, the user is fined. Approximately
56 percent of Internet cafe ´s’ administrators surveyed by ONI admitted to filtering and
surveillance activities in 2006. Other administrators stated that they noted that some
Web sites were inaccessible, but would not confirm that they used any specific filtering
system in the Internet cafe ´s.
Conclusion
Moldovan authorities have recognized the political and social importance of the Internet. State authorities have interfered with mobile and Internet connections in an
attempt to silence protestors and influence the results of elections. Generally, the Internet remains largely unfettered. Previous research by ONI revealed that at ‘‘edge’’ locations, such as Internet cafe ´s and some enterprises, monitoring or filtering of certain
content and services occasionally occurs. Research also suggests that Moldovan security forces have developed mechanisms to monitor Internet content. Given the low
206
Moldova
Russian Law on Surveillance (SORM).
Moldova has established two departments responsible for overseeing the activities of
participants in the ICT sector. The first structure, within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, is charged with prevention of interregional and informational infringements.
The other body, within the Center on Prevention of Economic Crimes and Corruption,
has special powers to prevent infringements in the IT and other fields.
Moldova also possesses a comprehensive centralized database of information on all
its citizens. This system, called registru (registry), has been heavily criticized by human
rights groups for being too comprehensive and lacking oversight. Privacy rights are
poorly developed in Moldova, and not yet defined in law. The information held by
registru is extremely comprehensive and brings together data collected by all state
agencies. Consequently, human rights groups fear that it represents unwarranted and
unprecedented surveillance. The system has proven highly successful, and it is a model
for governments in the CIS. It has been exported to several other countries in the
region. The current Moldovan president, a former internal ministry general, supports
registru—in part because it was originally developed within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative carried out testing on three first-tier ISPs
in Moldova: Moldtelecom, Telemedia, and DNT SunCommunications. Results did not
reveal any filtering carried out on the Internet backbone.
In Internet cafe ´s, access is limited more by surveillance than by direct filtering.
Specific content is prohibited, and, if it is accessed, the user is fined. Approximately
56 percent of Internet cafe ´s’ administrators surveyed by ONI admitted to filtering and
surveillance activities in 2006. Other administrators stated that they noted that some
Web sites were inaccessible, but would not confirm that they used any specific filtering
system in the Internet cafe ´s.
Conclusion
Moldovan authorities have recognized the political and social importance of the Internet. State authorities have interfered with mobile and Internet connections in an
attempt to silence protestors and influence the results of elections. Generally, the Internet remains largely unfettered. Previous research by ONI revealed that at ‘‘edge’’ locations, such as Internet cafe ´s and some enterprises, monitoring or filtering of certain
content and services occasionally occurs. Research also suggests that Moldovan security forces have developed mechanisms to monitor Internet content. Given the low
206
Moldova