On a few isolated occasions, the government has attempted to track down the IP
addresses of users accessing forums or chats.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative conducted testing from various access points
on four main first-tier ISPs: AsiaInfo, Elcat, KyrgyzTelecom, and Saima Telecom. The
ONI could not officially detect filtering by the providers at the time testing was carried
out.
In 2008 and 2009, ONI observed a number of Web sites periodically unavailable
on KyrgyzTelecom and Saima Telecom, such as http://www.kyrgyzpress.com, http://
www.prezident.kg (a site containing materials derisive to Kyrgyz state officials), and
http://www.24.kg (a media site). The reasons why these sites were targeted have not
been clarified, although these observations are consistent with second-generation controls. In 2005, during the parliamentary elections, ONI documented the extensive use
of DDoS attacks against opposition and media Web sites and Kyrgyz ISPs. 20
Filtering by upstream providers (upstream filtering) was also detected in early 2009,
with a number of Web sites blocked by the Kazakh state Internet provider, which included http://www.livejournal.com (a popular blogging site), http://www.internews.fr,
http://www.posit.ru, and others. Access to these sites was inaccessible for the majority
of users in Kyrgyzstan because of filters implemented by the main Kazakh telecommunication operator, which sells its services to KyrgyzTelecom. Filtering also exists at the
enterprise level (i.e., NGOs, corporate clients) in order to block access to content
deemed irrelevant and to economize on Internet traffic.
Conclusion
The Kyrgyz government has implemented policies aimed at fostering the development
of the communications sector, which is seen as an instrument for attracting foreign investment. Potential limits in Internet freedom are posed by generally poor access and
‘‘upstream filtering’’ resulting from dependence on Kazakh and Chinese connections.
There is also evidence of emerging second-generation methods, which are employed
during periods of heightened political tension in the country. While the Kyrgyz government has shown determination in opening up the market to competition and abolishing measures leading to state-controlled access, much remains to be done in order to
establish stable mechanisms guaranteeing media freedom and freedom of information.
Kyrgyzstan is unlikely to follow the example of its neighbors that have introduced
first-generation controls on Internet access, but second- and third-generation controls
are likely to continue to evolve as the government grapples with the increasing significance of the Internet in domestic politics.
Kyrgyzstan
197
addresses of users accessing forums or chats.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative conducted testing from various access points
on four main first-tier ISPs: AsiaInfo, Elcat, KyrgyzTelecom, and Saima Telecom. The
ONI could not officially detect filtering by the providers at the time testing was carried
out.
In 2008 and 2009, ONI observed a number of Web sites periodically unavailable
on KyrgyzTelecom and Saima Telecom, such as http://www.kyrgyzpress.com, http://
www.prezident.kg (a site containing materials derisive to Kyrgyz state officials), and
http://www.24.kg (a media site). The reasons why these sites were targeted have not
been clarified, although these observations are consistent with second-generation controls. In 2005, during the parliamentary elections, ONI documented the extensive use
of DDoS attacks against opposition and media Web sites and Kyrgyz ISPs. 20
Filtering by upstream providers (upstream filtering) was also detected in early 2009,
with a number of Web sites blocked by the Kazakh state Internet provider, which included http://www.livejournal.com (a popular blogging site), http://www.internews.fr,
http://www.posit.ru, and others. Access to these sites was inaccessible for the majority
of users in Kyrgyzstan because of filters implemented by the main Kazakh telecommunication operator, which sells its services to KyrgyzTelecom. Filtering also exists at the
enterprise level (i.e., NGOs, corporate clients) in order to block access to content
deemed irrelevant and to economize on Internet traffic.
Conclusion
The Kyrgyz government has implemented policies aimed at fostering the development
of the communications sector, which is seen as an instrument for attracting foreign investment. Potential limits in Internet freedom are posed by generally poor access and
‘‘upstream filtering’’ resulting from dependence on Kazakh and Chinese connections.
There is also evidence of emerging second-generation methods, which are employed
during periods of heightened political tension in the country. While the Kyrgyz government has shown determination in opening up the market to competition and abolishing measures leading to state-controlled access, much remains to be done in order to
establish stable mechanisms guaranteeing media freedom and freedom of information.
Kyrgyzstan is unlikely to follow the example of its neighbors that have introduced
first-generation controls on Internet access, but second- and third-generation controls
are likely to continue to evolve as the government grapples with the increasing significance of the Internet in domestic politics.
Kyrgyzstan
197