the basis of Security Council resolutions. There are several recorded cases of journalists
and Web site owners that have been prosecuted under broad media and criminal provisions. 21 Oppositional and independent media sites have been permanently suspended, allegedly for providing links to publications concerning corruption among
senior state officers and the president. 22
In 2004, the chairs of the National Security Committee and the Agency for Informatization and Communications approved Rules Providing for Mechanisms for Monitoring the Telecommunications Operators and Networks. These rules prescribe full
collaboration and information sharing between the government agencies. This system
is similar to that of the Russian SORM, introduced to monitor activities of users and
any related information. The rules oblige ISPs to register and maintain electronic
records of customer Internet activity. Providers are required to install special software
and hardware equipment in order to create and store records for a specified amount of
time, including log-in times, connection types, transmitted and received traffic between parties of the connection, identification number of the session, duration of
time spent online, IP address of the user, and speed of data receipt and transmission.
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative conducted testing on two main ISPs: KazakhTelecom and Nursat. KazakhTelecom blocks opposition groups’ Web sites, regional media sites that carry
political content, and selected social networking sites. A number of proxy sites providing anonymous access to the Internet have also been blocked. The ONI suspects that
filtering practices in Kazakhstan are evolving and are performed at the network backbone by KazakhTelecom, which filters traffic it provides to downstream operators. Consequently, Kazakh ISPs may unknowingly receive pre-filtered content. At the same
time, not all incoming and outgoing traffic passes through KazakhTelecom’s centralized network, resulting in inconsistent patterns of blocking.
The majority of Internet users are on ‘‘edge’’ networks, such as Internet cafe ´s and
corporate networks. Kazakhstan companies apply filtering mechanisms at the user
level to prevent employees from accessing pornography, music, film, and dating Web
sites. However, ONI testing found that Kazakhstan does not block any pornographic
content or sites related to drug and alcohol use.
Conclusion
The Kazakh government has harnessed efforts to modernize the IT sector, promote
ICTs, and encourage e-government in order to spur social development. Nevertheless,
the lack of a competitive fixed-line market and the partial market liberalization leaves
the growing demand unsatisfied and slows down development of the IT sector in the
188
Kazakhstan
and Web site owners that have been prosecuted under broad media and criminal provisions. 21 Oppositional and independent media sites have been permanently suspended, allegedly for providing links to publications concerning corruption among
senior state officers and the president. 22
In 2004, the chairs of the National Security Committee and the Agency for Informatization and Communications approved Rules Providing for Mechanisms for Monitoring the Telecommunications Operators and Networks. These rules prescribe full
collaboration and information sharing between the government agencies. This system
is similar to that of the Russian SORM, introduced to monitor activities of users and
any related information. The rules oblige ISPs to register and maintain electronic
records of customer Internet activity. Providers are required to install special software
and hardware equipment in order to create and store records for a specified amount of
time, including log-in times, connection types, transmitted and received traffic between parties of the connection, identification number of the session, duration of
time spent online, IP address of the user, and speed of data receipt and transmission.
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative conducted testing on two main ISPs: KazakhTelecom and Nursat. KazakhTelecom blocks opposition groups’ Web sites, regional media sites that carry
political content, and selected social networking sites. A number of proxy sites providing anonymous access to the Internet have also been blocked. The ONI suspects that
filtering practices in Kazakhstan are evolving and are performed at the network backbone by KazakhTelecom, which filters traffic it provides to downstream operators. Consequently, Kazakh ISPs may unknowingly receive pre-filtered content. At the same
time, not all incoming and outgoing traffic passes through KazakhTelecom’s centralized network, resulting in inconsistent patterns of blocking.
The majority of Internet users are on ‘‘edge’’ networks, such as Internet cafe ´s and
corporate networks. Kazakhstan companies apply filtering mechanisms at the user
level to prevent employees from accessing pornography, music, film, and dating Web
sites. However, ONI testing found that Kazakhstan does not block any pornographic
content or sites related to drug and alcohol use.
Conclusion
The Kazakh government has harnessed efforts to modernize the IT sector, promote
ICTs, and encourage e-government in order to spur social development. Nevertheless,
the lack of a competitive fixed-line market and the partial market liberalization leaves
the growing demand unsatisfied and slows down development of the IT sector in the
188
Kazakhstan