connects many of the country’s schools. Its director claimed that the decision to filter
content on the GRENA was taken by its leadership, and not a result of any government
orders or pressure. Filtering was also detected on Caucasus Online, the largest ISP in the
country.
During the conflict, Georgian authorities alleged that the Russian government
supported DoS attacks by Russian hackers and cyber criminals against Georgian ISPs
and Web sites. An investigation carried out by the Information Warfare Monitor, a sister project of the ONI, detected attacks against a variety of Georgian Internet resources,
including Web sites belonging to the government, media, blogs, and Internet forums.
This cyberwar received significant attention in the Western media, which implied
Russian government involvement, noting that the cyber attacks occurred at the same
time as Russian troops crossed the border and deployed in South Ossetia. In the aftermath of the conflict, independent experts did not find conclusive evidence that the
Russian government was directly involved in planning or carrying out cyber attacks
on Georgia. At the same time, it is clear that the Russian government did little to
curtail the activity of pro-government hackers and activists who used Russian online
forums and Web sites to coordinate denial-of-service attacks against Georgian Web sites
and Internet infrastructure. 22
Surveillance
Article 20 of the Constitution of Georgia provides for the inviolability of private
records, correspondence, and telephone and other kinds of communications conducted through technical means. These rights can be restricted only with an appropriate court warrant, except for urgent cases as provided in certain statutes. Government
authorities have been reported to engage in the conduct of targeted and selective surveillance. Allegations in the press point to illegal surveillance that is said to include
interception of mobile phones, landline phones, and e-mails.
ONI Testing Results
Despite existing legal restrictions, filtering and monitoring of the Internet has been
documented at Georgian ISPs. Evidence of filtering has also been documented on
academic networks. In addition to the blocking of Web sites during the conflict with
Russia in August 2008, the media reported that some Russian sites hosted on ‘‘.ru’’
were blocked again after the state-of-emergency was lifted. 23
Limited cases of filtering in Georgia were detected by ONI. Over the course of several
months during 2007 and 2008, ONI tested the main ISPs: Caucasus Online, GRENA,
and Iberiapac. Several international gambling sites are filtered by most Georgian ISPs.
In addition, a global blogging site has been blocked. Sporadic filtering has also been
Georgia
179
content on the GRENA was taken by its leadership, and not a result of any government
orders or pressure. Filtering was also detected on Caucasus Online, the largest ISP in the
country.
During the conflict, Georgian authorities alleged that the Russian government
supported DoS attacks by Russian hackers and cyber criminals against Georgian ISPs
and Web sites. An investigation carried out by the Information Warfare Monitor, a sister project of the ONI, detected attacks against a variety of Georgian Internet resources,
including Web sites belonging to the government, media, blogs, and Internet forums.
This cyberwar received significant attention in the Western media, which implied
Russian government involvement, noting that the cyber attacks occurred at the same
time as Russian troops crossed the border and deployed in South Ossetia. In the aftermath of the conflict, independent experts did not find conclusive evidence that the
Russian government was directly involved in planning or carrying out cyber attacks
on Georgia. At the same time, it is clear that the Russian government did little to
curtail the activity of pro-government hackers and activists who used Russian online
forums and Web sites to coordinate denial-of-service attacks against Georgian Web sites
and Internet infrastructure. 22
Surveillance
Article 20 of the Constitution of Georgia provides for the inviolability of private
records, correspondence, and telephone and other kinds of communications conducted through technical means. These rights can be restricted only with an appropriate court warrant, except for urgent cases as provided in certain statutes. Government
authorities have been reported to engage in the conduct of targeted and selective surveillance. Allegations in the press point to illegal surveillance that is said to include
interception of mobile phones, landline phones, and e-mails.
ONI Testing Results
Despite existing legal restrictions, filtering and monitoring of the Internet has been
documented at Georgian ISPs. Evidence of filtering has also been documented on
academic networks. In addition to the blocking of Web sites during the conflict with
Russia in August 2008, the media reported that some Russian sites hosted on ‘‘.ru’’
were blocked again after the state-of-emergency was lifted. 23
Limited cases of filtering in Georgia were detected by ONI. Over the course of several
months during 2007 and 2008, ONI tested the main ISPs: Caucasus Online, GRENA,
and Iberiapac. Several international gambling sites are filtered by most Georgian ISPs.
In addition, a global blogging site has been blocked. Sporadic filtering has also been
Georgia
179