Belarus does not have systems monitoring Internet traffic analogous to the Russian
SORM-II. However, it is likely that the Belarusian and Russian special services cooperate
in this sphere. More than 70 percent of Belarusian Internet traffic goes through Russia,
and part of it is processed through the Russian system SORM-2. Nonetheless, some providers confirm that the authorities have unofficially requested that all user IDs be kept
for a few months and be turned over to the security services on demand.
On November 21, 2005, the leader of one of the opposition parties (Anatoliy
Lebedko) was called to the prosecutor’s office in relation to material published on his
party’s Web site (ucpb.org). 27 Lebedko was subsequently interrogated about the source
of the information posted online and the person responsible for the article’s content.
Such examples of surveillance over Internet activities are not isolated.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the ONI tested seven main ISPs: Atlant, Aichyna, BASNET, Belinfonet, Belpak (Beltelecom), BN, and Solo. The testing confirmed blocking by almost
all ISPs. Many Web sites tested on the academic network BASNET were inaccessible
in Belarus, among which were opposition Web sites and local and global freedom-ofexpression Web sites, including a number of Web sites of international organizations,
some dedicated to Belarus. International social networking, hosting, e-mail, P2P, and
translation and multimedia Web sites were also filtered on BASNET, in addition to
Web sites containing information on drug and alcohol consumption, as well as terrorist activities. Anonymizer Web sites were blocked on commercial ISPs and on the academic network. Several LGBTQ Web sites have been filtered openly since the
beginning of 2005, on the basis that they contain pornographic material. 28 Interestingly, these Web sites were inaccessible on some ISPs but accessible on the state-owned
Beltelecom. Some erotic Web sites were blocked as well. Access to U.S. military Web
sites appears to be restricted through reverse filtering. 29
Since April 2008, an association focused on promoting freedom of expression among
ISPs has started gaining popularity in Belarus. 30 Nonetheless, most of the large operators are limiting access to the Internet when necessary to serve specific objectives. A
study carried out in the spring of 2008 compiled a list of Web sites that are currently
blocked by Belarusian companies. The results of this local survey are presented in the
following table. 31
Internet access is forbidden in military and national security agencies, as well as in
the banking sector. Beltelecom’s monopoly control over international connections
provides the state with an effective and enforceable system for regulating and restricting Internet traffic. During presidential elections, access to opposition and independent media Web sites was temporarily blocked. During the February 2006 presidential
Belarus
167
SORM-II. However, it is likely that the Belarusian and Russian special services cooperate
in this sphere. More than 70 percent of Belarusian Internet traffic goes through Russia,
and part of it is processed through the Russian system SORM-2. Nonetheless, some providers confirm that the authorities have unofficially requested that all user IDs be kept
for a few months and be turned over to the security services on demand.
On November 21, 2005, the leader of one of the opposition parties (Anatoliy
Lebedko) was called to the prosecutor’s office in relation to material published on his
party’s Web site (ucpb.org). 27 Lebedko was subsequently interrogated about the source
of the information posted online and the person responsible for the article’s content.
Such examples of surveillance over Internet activities are not isolated.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the ONI tested seven main ISPs: Atlant, Aichyna, BASNET, Belinfonet, Belpak (Beltelecom), BN, and Solo. The testing confirmed blocking by almost
all ISPs. Many Web sites tested on the academic network BASNET were inaccessible
in Belarus, among which were opposition Web sites and local and global freedom-ofexpression Web sites, including a number of Web sites of international organizations,
some dedicated to Belarus. International social networking, hosting, e-mail, P2P, and
translation and multimedia Web sites were also filtered on BASNET, in addition to
Web sites containing information on drug and alcohol consumption, as well as terrorist activities. Anonymizer Web sites were blocked on commercial ISPs and on the academic network. Several LGBTQ Web sites have been filtered openly since the
beginning of 2005, on the basis that they contain pornographic material. 28 Interestingly, these Web sites were inaccessible on some ISPs but accessible on the state-owned
Beltelecom. Some erotic Web sites were blocked as well. Access to U.S. military Web
sites appears to be restricted through reverse filtering. 29
Since April 2008, an association focused on promoting freedom of expression among
ISPs has started gaining popularity in Belarus. 30 Nonetheless, most of the large operators are limiting access to the Internet when necessary to serve specific objectives. A
study carried out in the spring of 2008 compiled a list of Web sites that are currently
blocked by Belarusian companies. The results of this local survey are presented in the
following table. 31
Internet access is forbidden in military and national security agencies, as well as in
the banking sector. Beltelecom’s monopoly control over international connections
provides the state with an effective and enforceable system for regulating and restricting Internet traffic. During presidential elections, access to opposition and independent media Web sites was temporarily blocked. During the February 2006 presidential
Belarus
167