Surveillance
In Armenia, there are no express provisions to conduct monitoring of online content.
Furthermore, ISPs and companies providing Web hosting services are not obliged to
monitor the content of transmitted and stored content. In addition, under Armenian
law it is necessary to prove gross negligence or actual knowledge in order to impose
liability upon an Internet hosting company or ISP for hosting illegal content. However,
ISPs must block access to particular content on request from law enforcement agencies
for the purposes of crime prevention.
Following the February 2008 elections, widespread protests led the outgoing president, Robert Kocharyan, to sign a state-of-emergency decree imposing severe restrictions upon mass media and Internet publications for a 20-day period. 36 Consequently,
Armenia faced both media censorship and Internet blocking for the first time since
its independence. This blockage targeted Armenia-based sites, as well as YouTube after
a video showing clashes between protesters and police was uploaded. The blocked
Web sites included news portals, opposition Web sites, foreign media, and blogging
services. The blocking was not extended beyond the original 20-day term because of
international pressure. The media and Internet blackout created an unprecedented opportunity for bloggers to provide alternative viewpoints on the situation in Armenia, as
during this period they were one of the few information outlets available.
Internet censorship has been implemented in two ways. First, the Armenian Internet
Community simply froze several subdomains in the ‘‘.am’’ domain (such as aravot.am,
hzh.am, echannel.am, azatutyun.am, and others). Thus, the Web sites were accessible
only through their IP addresses. Only one week later, the Armenian Internet Community announced that this measure was to be enforced by the National Security Service
(NSS). After the order from the NSS, some ISPs blocked access to a number of Web sites
on a preselected blacklist.
Second, surveillance is regulated through the Code of Criminal Procedure of Armenia. The code provides that surveillance should be carried out only pursuant to a court
warrant when applied to restrict legally guaranteed rights and freedoms (Article 284).
The warrant must indicate grounds for the measures, the data that are being obtained,
and the venue and duration of the surveillance and accompanying data substantiating
the necessity for the warrant.
There are some exceptions to the need for a warrant—for instance, when a delay in
the implementation of the search could lead to a terrorist attack or threats to national
security, military, or environmental interests. The court has to be notified within 48
hours of the measures being taken. If the court finds that the grounds for the implementation of the search are insufficient, surveillance shall be immediately stopped,
and the materials and data obtained deemed inadmissible as evidence.
Armenia
143
In Armenia, there are no express provisions to conduct monitoring of online content.
Furthermore, ISPs and companies providing Web hosting services are not obliged to
monitor the content of transmitted and stored content. In addition, under Armenian
law it is necessary to prove gross negligence or actual knowledge in order to impose
liability upon an Internet hosting company or ISP for hosting illegal content. However,
ISPs must block access to particular content on request from law enforcement agencies
for the purposes of crime prevention.
Following the February 2008 elections, widespread protests led the outgoing president, Robert Kocharyan, to sign a state-of-emergency decree imposing severe restrictions upon mass media and Internet publications for a 20-day period. 36 Consequently,
Armenia faced both media censorship and Internet blocking for the first time since
its independence. This blockage targeted Armenia-based sites, as well as YouTube after
a video showing clashes between protesters and police was uploaded. The blocked
Web sites included news portals, opposition Web sites, foreign media, and blogging
services. The blocking was not extended beyond the original 20-day term because of
international pressure. The media and Internet blackout created an unprecedented opportunity for bloggers to provide alternative viewpoints on the situation in Armenia, as
during this period they were one of the few information outlets available.
Internet censorship has been implemented in two ways. First, the Armenian Internet
Community simply froze several subdomains in the ‘‘.am’’ domain (such as aravot.am,
hzh.am, echannel.am, azatutyun.am, and others). Thus, the Web sites were accessible
only through their IP addresses. Only one week later, the Armenian Internet Community announced that this measure was to be enforced by the National Security Service
(NSS). After the order from the NSS, some ISPs blocked access to a number of Web sites
on a preselected blacklist.
Second, surveillance is regulated through the Code of Criminal Procedure of Armenia. The code provides that surveillance should be carried out only pursuant to a court
warrant when applied to restrict legally guaranteed rights and freedoms (Article 284).
The warrant must indicate grounds for the measures, the data that are being obtained,
and the venue and duration of the surveillance and accompanying data substantiating
the necessity for the warrant.
There are some exceptions to the need for a warrant—for instance, when a delay in
the implementation of the search could lead to a terrorist attack or threats to national
security, military, or environmental interests. The court has to be notified within 48
hours of the measures being taken. If the court finds that the grounds for the implementation of the search are insufficient, surveillance shall be immediately stopped,
and the materials and data obtained deemed inadmissible as evidence.
Armenia
143