tural, and scientific potential. No specific laws explain satisfactorily the meaning behind such notions as ‘‘public order.’’ By referring to broadly defined values, the text apparently leaves leeway for authorities to prosecute users for any type of content that it
considers ‘‘illegal.’’
In some cases, government officials have demanded that the ISPs—formally or
informally—temporarily suspend sites detrimental to ‘‘public order’’ (Tajikistan).
Some of these sites remain suspended for an indefinite period of time (Kazakhstan).
Restrictions Envisioned in the Internet Service Agreements between the ISPs and their
Customers Meant to be an open medium encouraging freedom of speech and expression, the Internet has increasingly become a target for strict regulation. Governments
are frequently expanding the scope of content that is not to be allowed on the Internet. At times, ISPs are setting strict rules for the users, which, if not complied with,
can lead to the termination of service agreements. Some providers set broad restrictive rules as preconditions in the contract with the user (e.g., TurkmenTelecom,
Kazakhstan); others may decide to limit access if they subsequently decide that the
accessed content is ‘‘inappropriate’’ (Uzbekistan). Such ‘‘inappropriate’’ content is not
strictly defined and open to broad interpretations and arbitrary decisions by the ISPs,
or state authorities.
In some cases, ISPs are part of the state administration and are directly instructed by
the government to introduce such restrictive legal provisions in the customer agreement. One such example is TurkmenTelecom, which cautions its users that Internet is
not a ‘‘place for unconsidered behavior’’ and provides an extensive list of types of content that users are forbidden to access or disseminate online, such as violent behavior,
foul language, and defamatory remarks, among others. 12 On other occasions, ISPs have
been directly instructed by the state to envision restrictions to accessing online content. In Kazakhstan, for example, ISPs prohibit their customers from disseminating
pornographic, extremist, or terrorist materials or ‘‘any other information not in accordance with the country’s laws’’ over the Internet. 13 Such vague categorization opens
the door for authorities to prosecute online journalists and bloggers on a broad range
of issues. Such uncertainty contributes to growing self-censorship.
In a third category of cases, ISPs may not have been instructed by authorities to
apply measures against certain online behavior or types of content posted on the Internet, but based on the repressive climate encouraging self-censorship, these ISPs are
attempting to anticipate what the authorities may find objectionable and act accordingly in order to avoid losing their license, as is the case in Russia.
Registration Requirements for Internet Web Sites
CIS states are increasingly requiring Web sites to register as mass media, making them
subject to national legislation governing content, defamation, and copyright, criminal
offense to the state and officials, and others. Officials increasingly speak in favor of
CIS Overview
125
considers ‘‘illegal.’’
In some cases, government officials have demanded that the ISPs—formally or
informally—temporarily suspend sites detrimental to ‘‘public order’’ (Tajikistan).
Some of these sites remain suspended for an indefinite period of time (Kazakhstan).
Restrictions Envisioned in the Internet Service Agreements between the ISPs and their
Customers Meant to be an open medium encouraging freedom of speech and expression, the Internet has increasingly become a target for strict regulation. Governments
are frequently expanding the scope of content that is not to be allowed on the Internet. At times, ISPs are setting strict rules for the users, which, if not complied with,
can lead to the termination of service agreements. Some providers set broad restrictive rules as preconditions in the contract with the user (e.g., TurkmenTelecom,
Kazakhstan); others may decide to limit access if they subsequently decide that the
accessed content is ‘‘inappropriate’’ (Uzbekistan). Such ‘‘inappropriate’’ content is not
strictly defined and open to broad interpretations and arbitrary decisions by the ISPs,
or state authorities.
In some cases, ISPs are part of the state administration and are directly instructed by
the government to introduce such restrictive legal provisions in the customer agreement. One such example is TurkmenTelecom, which cautions its users that Internet is
not a ‘‘place for unconsidered behavior’’ and provides an extensive list of types of content that users are forbidden to access or disseminate online, such as violent behavior,
foul language, and defamatory remarks, among others. 12 On other occasions, ISPs have
been directly instructed by the state to envision restrictions to accessing online content. In Kazakhstan, for example, ISPs prohibit their customers from disseminating
pornographic, extremist, or terrorist materials or ‘‘any other information not in accordance with the country’s laws’’ over the Internet. 13 Such vague categorization opens
the door for authorities to prosecute online journalists and bloggers on a broad range
of issues. Such uncertainty contributes to growing self-censorship.
In a third category of cases, ISPs may not have been instructed by authorities to
apply measures against certain online behavior or types of content posted on the Internet, but based on the repressive climate encouraging self-censorship, these ISPs are
attempting to anticipate what the authorities may find objectionable and act accordingly in order to avoid losing their license, as is the case in Russia.
Registration Requirements for Internet Web Sites
CIS states are increasingly requiring Web sites to register as mass media, making them
subject to national legislation governing content, defamation, and copyright, criminal
offense to the state and officials, and others. Officials increasingly speak in favor of
CIS Overview
125