like the Fair Labor Association, or third-party verification processes, such as Social Accountability 8000, social audits currently enjoy only limited credibility among external
stakeholders.’’ 35 With the credibility of the GNI, and the importance of accountability
for learning and behavior change, the GNI spent a great deal of energy examining diverse voluntary initiatives and industry practices, and developing its own regime.
Taking inspiration from researchers 36 and practitioners 37 who have identified the
limits to accountability and proposed a more integrated model, the GNI has sought
not to be an organization that is primarily based on accountability, but one that
integrates a strong regime alongside and in conjunction with other activities. Only
as reports and information are generated, however, will we learn what this means in
practice.
Beyond the more common challenges of nonexistent metrics (although relevant
ones are perhaps now on offer), 38 various needs for confidentiality, and resistant corporate culture, the process is made more complex by GNI’s particular characteristics and
the unique attributes of the risks it seeks to mitigate—these include the tension between evaluating aspiration and implementation, the scale and scope of the Internet,
and the expectation that responsible companies will sometimes need to resist the law,
rather than comply with it. (Companies will choose to comply on some occasions,
based on the context, implications, and likelihood of success.) Moving forward, these
issues will remain in discussion, because the solutions—whether best or only good
practices—do not yet exist. Thus, the accountability process cannot only compare behavior with the model, but must go deeper to separate company implementation of
the Principles from the outcome, because the former may have limited efficacy.
As the structure that undergirds the GNI by informing learning and earning public
trust, the accountability regime has rightly received a good deal of attention. Indeed,
it is complex and important enough that discussions are ongoing within the GNI and
will likely be a significant internal focus for years to come. There are specific critiques:
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Amnesty International, and Reporters Without Borders have publicly questioned whether a company will have undue influence
on its assessment teams and whether the companies will withhold potentially damaging information from assessors. The companies are uncomfortable, concerned with the
prospect of allowing outsiders to access and share intimate secrets, and eager to find
trustworthy and competent assessors. There is broad consensus that it will not be a
‘‘gotcha’’ process, wherein the assessors are trying to ‘‘catch’’ the company, but one in
which they work together to identify and address issues over time to keep the company
in compliance. The current approach seeks to achieve balance by having the board set
independence criteria for the assessors and the GNI assist in resolving concerns, likely
along with an elaborate contracting and compensation scheme, but only in implementation will fears be deemed justified or overblown. Indeed, at present, nobody has ever
Protecting Privacy and Expression Online
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stakeholders.’’ 35 With the credibility of the GNI, and the importance of accountability
for learning and behavior change, the GNI spent a great deal of energy examining diverse voluntary initiatives and industry practices, and developing its own regime.
Taking inspiration from researchers 36 and practitioners 37 who have identified the
limits to accountability and proposed a more integrated model, the GNI has sought
not to be an organization that is primarily based on accountability, but one that
integrates a strong regime alongside and in conjunction with other activities. Only
as reports and information are generated, however, will we learn what this means in
practice.
Beyond the more common challenges of nonexistent metrics (although relevant
ones are perhaps now on offer), 38 various needs for confidentiality, and resistant corporate culture, the process is made more complex by GNI’s particular characteristics and
the unique attributes of the risks it seeks to mitigate—these include the tension between evaluating aspiration and implementation, the scale and scope of the Internet,
and the expectation that responsible companies will sometimes need to resist the law,
rather than comply with it. (Companies will choose to comply on some occasions,
based on the context, implications, and likelihood of success.) Moving forward, these
issues will remain in discussion, because the solutions—whether best or only good
practices—do not yet exist. Thus, the accountability process cannot only compare behavior with the model, but must go deeper to separate company implementation of
the Principles from the outcome, because the former may have limited efficacy.
As the structure that undergirds the GNI by informing learning and earning public
trust, the accountability regime has rightly received a good deal of attention. Indeed,
it is complex and important enough that discussions are ongoing within the GNI and
will likely be a significant internal focus for years to come. There are specific critiques:
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Amnesty International, and Reporters Without Borders have publicly questioned whether a company will have undue influence
on its assessment teams and whether the companies will withhold potentially damaging information from assessors. The companies are uncomfortable, concerned with the
prospect of allowing outsiders to access and share intimate secrets, and eager to find
trustworthy and competent assessors. There is broad consensus that it will not be a
‘‘gotcha’’ process, wherein the assessors are trying to ‘‘catch’’ the company, but one in
which they work together to identify and address issues over time to keep the company
in compliance. The current approach seeks to achieve balance by having the board set
independence criteria for the assessors and the GNI assist in resolving concerns, likely
along with an elaborate contracting and compensation scheme, but only in implementation will fears be deemed justified or overblown. Indeed, at present, nobody has ever
Protecting Privacy and Expression Online
99