But given the complexity of the current situation—that it is not simply about companies following the law (or divesting), but also about companies understanding when
and how to challenge the law and avoiding conflicts and mitigating risk in the first
place—increased expectations alone would have limited impact. Gaining a deeper and
wider understanding of the pressures, developing supportive internal process and
structure, advancing global transparency, and engaging other stakeholders were judged
equally important—and best accomplished collectively. The perspective was not based
simply on altruism, but established by recognizing the broader business case, including
the fundamental social obligations of which companies have been clearly reminded by
human rights organizations, academics, investors, shareholders, and U.S. and European policymakers through protest, legislation, shareholder resolutions, and public
criticism. Ultimately, the companies recognized that they faced a serious business
problem with profound implications for all human rights.
Conversations about developing a response began in early 2006, with a consensus
emerging that underscored the importance of collaboration across sectors, each recognizing that it required the other for understanding, implementation, legitimacy, experience, access, and so on. There was consensus that law and regulation were not
currently attending to the challenges that individual companies confronted in seeking
to respond responsibly to government requests. An unlikely family was born, including
former colleagues, current competitors, and long-time critics, and in which each group
needed the other to accomplish its goals and across which there was (perhaps) surprising overlap. There was also a great diversity of views, in particular, on how best to
achieve those goals, what to take as givens, and so on.
Beginnings
As the group moved from research and brainstorming to drafting, clear questions
emerged. What was the proper balance between aspiration (as manifest in documents
and language) and realistic, operational, and evaluable results? How high should the
bar be set? How would the noncompany partners (and the world) know whether the
company partners were implementing (and maintaining) their commitments? What
was the scope of the effort, in terms of company types, technologies, and business
models? Should focus go beyond freedom of expression and privacy, extending to
other rights, or to rule of law? What were the primary activities in which the group
could begin to see results in the near term and create value over time?
The group was able to exploit its institutional and individual differences, using them
to flesh out alternatives and implications, and to identify the intersections of ambitious, realistic, meaningful, and sustainable solutions, based on interests and compromise, rather than positions and claiming. Many of these key tensions are discernible
within the structure and letter of the GNI, some largely resolved, others to be informed
by future learning—an expectation built into the GNI. While the participants brought
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Colin M. Maclay
and how to challenge the law and avoiding conflicts and mitigating risk in the first
place—increased expectations alone would have limited impact. Gaining a deeper and
wider understanding of the pressures, developing supportive internal process and
structure, advancing global transparency, and engaging other stakeholders were judged
equally important—and best accomplished collectively. The perspective was not based
simply on altruism, but established by recognizing the broader business case, including
the fundamental social obligations of which companies have been clearly reminded by
human rights organizations, academics, investors, shareholders, and U.S. and European policymakers through protest, legislation, shareholder resolutions, and public
criticism. Ultimately, the companies recognized that they faced a serious business
problem with profound implications for all human rights.
Conversations about developing a response began in early 2006, with a consensus
emerging that underscored the importance of collaboration across sectors, each recognizing that it required the other for understanding, implementation, legitimacy, experience, access, and so on. There was consensus that law and regulation were not
currently attending to the challenges that individual companies confronted in seeking
to respond responsibly to government requests. An unlikely family was born, including
former colleagues, current competitors, and long-time critics, and in which each group
needed the other to accomplish its goals and across which there was (perhaps) surprising overlap. There was also a great diversity of views, in particular, on how best to
achieve those goals, what to take as givens, and so on.
Beginnings
As the group moved from research and brainstorming to drafting, clear questions
emerged. What was the proper balance between aspiration (as manifest in documents
and language) and realistic, operational, and evaluable results? How high should the
bar be set? How would the noncompany partners (and the world) know whether the
company partners were implementing (and maintaining) their commitments? What
was the scope of the effort, in terms of company types, technologies, and business
models? Should focus go beyond freedom of expression and privacy, extending to
other rights, or to rule of law? What were the primary activities in which the group
could begin to see results in the near term and create value over time?
The group was able to exploit its institutional and individual differences, using them
to flesh out alternatives and implications, and to identify the intersections of ambitious, realistic, meaningful, and sustainable solutions, based on interests and compromise, rather than positions and claiming. Many of these key tensions are discernible
within the structure and letter of the GNI, some largely resolved, others to be informed
by future learning—an expectation built into the GNI. While the participants brought
92
Colin M. Maclay