nent of a censorship apparatus. Filtering at the OSP level blocks content from reaching
both local and international audiences, allowing more thorough control of online content. The phenomenon is most developed in China, in part because existing Internet
filtering strategies drive local users to publish on locally hosted sites, and in part because linguistic constraints drive Chinese-speaking users to a particular set of tools. If
filtering and language constraints drive users in the Middle East toward locally hosted
tools, we might expect to see similar systems of OSP-based filtering emerge.
As users around the world look to online services hosted in less controlled countries
to find unfiltered venues to publish their content, other forms of content filtering are
emerging. Online service providers have compelling financial incentives not to host
content likely to provoke DDoS attacks or raise complex legal issues. While clarification
of relevant regulations may help reduce uncertainty about what content can and cannot be hosted, there is a danger that OSPs will stop providing services to some users.
This tendency needs to be counterbalanced by the sorts of public protest that called
attention to BlueHost’s and LinkedIn’s actions, but user’s rights will only be guaranteed by an affirmation of common carrier status that explicitly protects rights to publish on these platforms.
Notes
1. Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘‘Tunisian Online Protest Blocked,’’ Global Voices, October 4, 2005,
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2005/10/04/tunisian-online-protest-blocked/.
2. Ben Charny, ‘‘Chinese Partner Censors Skype Text Messages,’’ PCmag.com, April 20, 2006,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1951637,00.asp.
3. Nart Villeneuve, ‘‘Breaching Trust: An Analysis of Surveillance and Security Practices on
China’s TOM-Skype Platform’’ (Information Warfare Monitor/ONI Asia, October 1, 2008), http://
www.nartv.org/mirror/breachingtrust.pdf.
4. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Information Supplied by Yahoo! Helped Journalist Shi Tao Get 10
Years in Prison,’’ September 6, 2005, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14884.
5. Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edleman, ‘‘Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China’’
(Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School, March 2003), http://cyber.law
.harvard.edu/filtering/china/.
6. Mat Honan, ‘‘Little Red Blogs,’’ Salon, June 4, 2004, http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/
2004/06/04/china_blogs/index.html.
7. OpenNet Initiative, ‘‘OpenNet Initiative: Bulletin 008, Filtering by Domestic Blog Providers in
China,’’ January 20, 2005, http://opennet.net/bulletins/008/.
8. Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘‘Screenshots of Censorship,’’ RConversation Blog, June 17, 2005, http://
rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2005/06/screenshots_of_.html.
Intermediary Censorship
83
both local and international audiences, allowing more thorough control of online content. The phenomenon is most developed in China, in part because existing Internet
filtering strategies drive local users to publish on locally hosted sites, and in part because linguistic constraints drive Chinese-speaking users to a particular set of tools. If
filtering and language constraints drive users in the Middle East toward locally hosted
tools, we might expect to see similar systems of OSP-based filtering emerge.
As users around the world look to online services hosted in less controlled countries
to find unfiltered venues to publish their content, other forms of content filtering are
emerging. Online service providers have compelling financial incentives not to host
content likely to provoke DDoS attacks or raise complex legal issues. While clarification
of relevant regulations may help reduce uncertainty about what content can and cannot be hosted, there is a danger that OSPs will stop providing services to some users.
This tendency needs to be counterbalanced by the sorts of public protest that called
attention to BlueHost’s and LinkedIn’s actions, but user’s rights will only be guaranteed by an affirmation of common carrier status that explicitly protects rights to publish on these platforms.
Notes
1. Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘‘Tunisian Online Protest Blocked,’’ Global Voices, October 4, 2005,
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2005/10/04/tunisian-online-protest-blocked/.
2. Ben Charny, ‘‘Chinese Partner Censors Skype Text Messages,’’ PCmag.com, April 20, 2006,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1951637,00.asp.
3. Nart Villeneuve, ‘‘Breaching Trust: An Analysis of Surveillance and Security Practices on
China’s TOM-Skype Platform’’ (Information Warfare Monitor/ONI Asia, October 1, 2008), http://
www.nartv.org/mirror/breachingtrust.pdf.
4. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Information Supplied by Yahoo! Helped Journalist Shi Tao Get 10
Years in Prison,’’ September 6, 2005, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14884.
5. Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edleman, ‘‘Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China’’
(Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School, March 2003), http://cyber.law
.harvard.edu/filtering/china/.
6. Mat Honan, ‘‘Little Red Blogs,’’ Salon, June 4, 2004, http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/
2004/06/04/china_blogs/index.html.
7. OpenNet Initiative, ‘‘OpenNet Initiative: Bulletin 008, Filtering by Domestic Blog Providers in
China,’’ January 20, 2005, http://opennet.net/bulletins/008/.
8. Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘‘Screenshots of Censorship,’’ RConversation Blog, June 17, 2005, http://
rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2005/06/screenshots_of_.html.
Intermediary Censorship
83