compliance being the delineation procedure before the CLCS.
145 For that, coastal
states must be aware that any unlawful exercise of right in an area that turns out not
be part of their outer continental shelf will trigger international responsibility.
146
Then what are the benefits for the coastal state of delineating the outer limits of the
continental shelf?
First of all, gradual delineation in accordance with UNCLOS provisions and on
the basis of CLCS recommendations contributes to the determination of maritime
boundaries worldwide, especially between coastal states’ shelves, and between
coastal states and the international res communis, the Area. That is a condition
sine qua non for investments in and further exploration of the world’s oceans. In this
regard, UNCLOS achieved the great deed of defining all maritime zones and
establishing scientific criteria for the definition of what is perhaps the most complicated zone to define: the continental shelf. As attested by Brown back in 1971, “a
definite boundary cannot but contribute to a dispute-free climate for submarine
research and development and exploitation of the resources of the seabed”.
147
Here, without definite and legally certain boundaries, discussions on the regimes
applicable to the continental shelf and the Area could easily be taken for pointless.
Secondly, legal certainty can only be obtained via coastal state compliance with
the procedure set forward at Art. 76 UNCLOS. Only then the internationally
recognized outer limits of the continental shelf form the state’s maritime boundaries.
148 Once the maritime borders are known, orderly development of natural
resources within and beyond national jurisdiction, in pursuance with UNCLOS
pertinent provisions, will be made possible. Thus far, there is no reason to question
the orderly and peaceful implementation of Art. 76, with coastal states drawing the
outer limits of their continental shelves on the basis of the Commission’s
recommendations.
149
States know it is in their best interest to follow UNCLOS with regard to
continental shelf jurisdictional assertions and have done so with laudable regularity
thus far. Such widespread acceptance of Art. 76 has prompted the International
145 Of a similar view, see Armas-Pfirter (2010), p. 493.
146 For a detailed analysis on coastal states rights over the outer continental shelf prior to CLCS
recommendations, see Churchill (2016), p. 137.
147 Brown (1971), p. 3.
148 To say that is not equivalent to defending that the maritime zone of the continental shelf equals
the state’s territory. Here, on must make use of a rather restrictive concept of territory, that is, the
physical medium in which the state exercises full sovereignty, and not merely functional jurisdiction. That is not, however, what the Brazilian Navy has been doing. According to that institution,
delineating the outer limits of the continental shelf is setting the final border of the “Brazilian
territory”, as in the Navy-edited book “Brazilian Blue Amazon: the last frontier of Brazilian
territory”. See generally Marinha do Brasil (2013). The Navy establishes an analogy between the
delimitation of terrestrial boundaries in the Amazon tropical forest and the delineation of maritime
boundaries in the “Brazilian Blue Amazon”. Legally, it wrong to refer to the Blue Amazon both as
“Brazilian territory” and “Brazilian sea” or “seas belonging to Brazil”. In the waters beyond 12nm,
the coastal States has neither full imperium (power to rule) nor dominium (ownership).
149 Koivurova (2011), p. 221.
78
3 The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 nm: Innovations in Art. 76 UNCLOS
145 For that, coastal
states must be aware that any unlawful exercise of right in an area that turns out not
be part of their outer continental shelf will trigger international responsibility.
146
Then what are the benefits for the coastal state of delineating the outer limits of the
continental shelf?
First of all, gradual delineation in accordance with UNCLOS provisions and on
the basis of CLCS recommendations contributes to the determination of maritime
boundaries worldwide, especially between coastal states’ shelves, and between
coastal states and the international res communis, the Area. That is a condition
sine qua non for investments in and further exploration of the world’s oceans. In this
regard, UNCLOS achieved the great deed of defining all maritime zones and
establishing scientific criteria for the definition of what is perhaps the most complicated zone to define: the continental shelf. As attested by Brown back in 1971, “a
definite boundary cannot but contribute to a dispute-free climate for submarine
research and development and exploitation of the resources of the seabed”.
147
Here, without definite and legally certain boundaries, discussions on the regimes
applicable to the continental shelf and the Area could easily be taken for pointless.
Secondly, legal certainty can only be obtained via coastal state compliance with
the procedure set forward at Art. 76 UNCLOS. Only then the internationally
recognized outer limits of the continental shelf form the state’s maritime boundaries.
148 Once the maritime borders are known, orderly development of natural
resources within and beyond national jurisdiction, in pursuance with UNCLOS
pertinent provisions, will be made possible. Thus far, there is no reason to question
the orderly and peaceful implementation of Art. 76, with coastal states drawing the
outer limits of their continental shelves on the basis of the Commission’s
recommendations.
149
States know it is in their best interest to follow UNCLOS with regard to
continental shelf jurisdictional assertions and have done so with laudable regularity
thus far. Such widespread acceptance of Art. 76 has prompted the International
145 Of a similar view, see Armas-Pfirter (2010), p. 493.
146 For a detailed analysis on coastal states rights over the outer continental shelf prior to CLCS
recommendations, see Churchill (2016), p. 137.
147 Brown (1971), p. 3.
148 To say that is not equivalent to defending that the maritime zone of the continental shelf equals
the state’s territory. Here, on must make use of a rather restrictive concept of territory, that is, the
physical medium in which the state exercises full sovereignty, and not merely functional jurisdiction. That is not, however, what the Brazilian Navy has been doing. According to that institution,
delineating the outer limits of the continental shelf is setting the final border of the “Brazilian
territory”, as in the Navy-edited book “Brazilian Blue Amazon: the last frontier of Brazilian
territory”. See generally Marinha do Brasil (2013). The Navy establishes an analogy between the
delimitation of terrestrial boundaries in the Amazon tropical forest and the delineation of maritime
boundaries in the “Brazilian Blue Amazon”. Legally, it wrong to refer to the Blue Amazon both as
“Brazilian territory” and “Brazilian sea” or “seas belonging to Brazil”. In the waters beyond 12nm,
the coastal States has neither full imperium (power to rule) nor dominium (ownership).
149 Koivurova (2011), p. 221.
78
3 The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 nm: Innovations in Art. 76 UNCLOS