case in its current composition (2017–2020), in which approximately two thirds of
its members are representatives of developing countries, such as Angola, Brazil,
Madagascar, Oman, and others. However, when it comes to the presence of nationals
from broad-margin states, a quick look into the Commission’s composition shows
that the only representative of a narrow-margin state that has no submission pending
before the Commission is Chilean.
89 In other words, twenty out of twenty-one seats
of the Commission are occupied by experts from broad-margin states, a number that
could raise some eyebrows as to the impartiality of the Commission’s
recommendations.
3.3.2.3 Transparency and Confidentiality: A Classical Trade-Off
By now, it should come with no novelty that the procedure for delineating the outer
limits of a continental shelf be somehow opaque, firstly due to the complex criteria
accommodated in Art. 76 UNCLOS.
90 Secondly, given the exceptionally delicate
information about submitting states at stake, such as geodesic and bathymetric data
of the ocean floor, which may hint at the existence of mineral and hydrocarbon
resources within national jurisdiction; thirdly, the lack of adequate regulation in the
Convention as to the matter of publicity of CLCS recommendations.
91 The latter
attracts most of the criticisms against the opacity of the delineation process, a
situation that could theoretically impair the overall credibility of the process,
resulting in permanent skepticism as to Commission’s trustworthiness by the international community.
For the Commission’s recommendations to fulfill their task, it is necessary for
them to be made public. Should that not happen, other states would be left in the
dark, having no other means of assessing whether certain outer limits were determined indeed on the basis of the recommendations.
92 Hence, if other states cannot
defend their legitimate interests before an international body, the likelihood of
compliance with the recommendations of that same body is limited. This could
even put a question mark as to the “final and binding” nature of the CLCS
89 Data available at the Commission’s website.
90 Specialists have identified ambiguity in several provisions of Art. 76, such as the test of
appurtenance of the continental shelf to the land territory (via morphological and geological
review); determining the foot of the continental slope; applying the formulae of Art. 76; and
determining the cutoff limits. All those steps in the procedure of delineating the outer limits are
subject to questions by scientists, what would allegedly make the procedure ambiguous and
somewhat blurred. See Macnab (2004), pp. 3–11.
91 According to the 2006 ILA Report on the outer limits of the continental shelf, “the Convention
does not address the publication of information concerning the submission of a coastal State or the
recommendations issued by the Commission”. See ILA (2006), p. 23.
92 It is the case of Macnab (2004), p. 1.
3.3 Delineating: The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
65
its members are representatives of developing countries, such as Angola, Brazil,
Madagascar, Oman, and others. However, when it comes to the presence of nationals
from broad-margin states, a quick look into the Commission’s composition shows
that the only representative of a narrow-margin state that has no submission pending
before the Commission is Chilean.
89 In other words, twenty out of twenty-one seats
of the Commission are occupied by experts from broad-margin states, a number that
could raise some eyebrows as to the impartiality of the Commission’s
recommendations.
3.3.2.3 Transparency and Confidentiality: A Classical Trade-Off
By now, it should come with no novelty that the procedure for delineating the outer
limits of a continental shelf be somehow opaque, firstly due to the complex criteria
accommodated in Art. 76 UNCLOS.
90 Secondly, given the exceptionally delicate
information about submitting states at stake, such as geodesic and bathymetric data
of the ocean floor, which may hint at the existence of mineral and hydrocarbon
resources within national jurisdiction; thirdly, the lack of adequate regulation in the
Convention as to the matter of publicity of CLCS recommendations.
91 The latter
attracts most of the criticisms against the opacity of the delineation process, a
situation that could theoretically impair the overall credibility of the process,
resulting in permanent skepticism as to Commission’s trustworthiness by the international community.
For the Commission’s recommendations to fulfill their task, it is necessary for
them to be made public. Should that not happen, other states would be left in the
dark, having no other means of assessing whether certain outer limits were determined indeed on the basis of the recommendations.
92 Hence, if other states cannot
defend their legitimate interests before an international body, the likelihood of
compliance with the recommendations of that same body is limited. This could
even put a question mark as to the “final and binding” nature of the CLCS
89 Data available at the Commission’s website.
90 Specialists have identified ambiguity in several provisions of Art. 76, such as the test of
appurtenance of the continental shelf to the land territory (via morphological and geological
review); determining the foot of the continental slope; applying the formulae of Art. 76; and
determining the cutoff limits. All those steps in the procedure of delineating the outer limits are
subject to questions by scientists, what would allegedly make the procedure ambiguous and
somewhat blurred. See Macnab (2004), pp. 3–11.
91 According to the 2006 ILA Report on the outer limits of the continental shelf, “the Convention
does not address the publication of information concerning the submission of a coastal State or the
recommendations issued by the Commission”. See ILA (2006), p. 23.
92 It is the case of Macnab (2004), p. 1.
3.3 Delineating: The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
65