regulate all uses of the oceans is not consonant with reality. Admitting the inherent
complicatedness of the process, due to the multiplicity of opposing interests at stake
and the great variety of stakeholders, is a first step towards drawing effective
strategies for the oceans.
In order to make that point, this work considered the Portuguese National Ocean
Strategy and its vibrant objective to turn the Portuguese seas into a national project,
i.e. to implement action plans capable of mobilizing stakeholders around crucial
questions pertaining to the management of Portuguese maritime spaces. Such a clear
objective is not easily extractable from the Brazilian ocean governance edifice—and
this shows how a decentralized web of policies, plans and actions may blur essential
goals. Brazil could certainly benefit from such a symbolism of raising the Brazilian
seas to the status of a “national project”, instead of a destiny, some sort of fate and
predestination.
Noteworthy is also that the Portuguese strategy is not centered on the aspect of
national sovereignty, defense and security, thus embracing “refreshed” objectives,
such as innovation, technology, stimuli to the blue economy and marine environmental conservation. Brazil, on the other side, has been criticized by the literature for
designing its national ocean policy from a stark military perspective—with some
truth to it.
Regarding the effectiveness of the integrated ocean management in Brazil, the
comprehensive package of laws and policies formally integrating all levels of
government—municipal, state and federal—has been met with incipient implementation. The more incisive laws in relation to ocean and coastal management have the
form of resolutions and not decrees or acts, thus hinting at the presumption of a weak
system by those required to abide by the resolutions and recommendations. Besides,
the policies are excessively concentrated in the Executive branch of government,
which does not facilitate the effective regulation of marine issues at the national
level. Furthermore, insufficient dialogue at the national level usually jeopardizes the
selection of national interests which will make it to oceans policies—not interests
picked in hermitically isolated offices in the Brazilian capital. Finally, the deficient
flow of financial resources to ground-force agencies is also a reason for low
implementation rates.
This work went on to scrutinize the extended Blue Amazon and the current status
of the Brazilian submissions for outer continental shelf limits in the South Atlantic
Ocean. For that purpose, Chap. 9 relied on concepts of a legal and international
relations’ nature. Following the implementation of the Continental Shelf Survey
Plan (LEPLAC), Brazil forwarded three submissions for outer continental shelf
limits to the CLCS. The first submission dated 2004 and claimed sovereign rights
over approximately 911,000 km
2 of extended continental shelf. The CLCS agreed
with approximately 79% of the claimed limits, what prompted Brazil to forward
revised partial submissions in 2015, 2017 and 2018. Thus far, only the executive
summaries of the Brazilian submissions have been made public, as part of the
strategy chosen by the Brazilian delegation, pursuant to Rules 48 and 49 of the
CLCS, in order to safeguard sensitive information on the Brazilian submarine areas
from the eyes of third states.
366
11 Conclusions
complicatedness of the process, due to the multiplicity of opposing interests at stake
and the great variety of stakeholders, is a first step towards drawing effective
strategies for the oceans.
In order to make that point, this work considered the Portuguese National Ocean
Strategy and its vibrant objective to turn the Portuguese seas into a national project,
i.e. to implement action plans capable of mobilizing stakeholders around crucial
questions pertaining to the management of Portuguese maritime spaces. Such a clear
objective is not easily extractable from the Brazilian ocean governance edifice—and
this shows how a decentralized web of policies, plans and actions may blur essential
goals. Brazil could certainly benefit from such a symbolism of raising the Brazilian
seas to the status of a “national project”, instead of a destiny, some sort of fate and
predestination.
Noteworthy is also that the Portuguese strategy is not centered on the aspect of
national sovereignty, defense and security, thus embracing “refreshed” objectives,
such as innovation, technology, stimuli to the blue economy and marine environmental conservation. Brazil, on the other side, has been criticized by the literature for
designing its national ocean policy from a stark military perspective—with some
truth to it.
Regarding the effectiveness of the integrated ocean management in Brazil, the
comprehensive package of laws and policies formally integrating all levels of
government—municipal, state and federal—has been met with incipient implementation. The more incisive laws in relation to ocean and coastal management have the
form of resolutions and not decrees or acts, thus hinting at the presumption of a weak
system by those required to abide by the resolutions and recommendations. Besides,
the policies are excessively concentrated in the Executive branch of government,
which does not facilitate the effective regulation of marine issues at the national
level. Furthermore, insufficient dialogue at the national level usually jeopardizes the
selection of national interests which will make it to oceans policies—not interests
picked in hermitically isolated offices in the Brazilian capital. Finally, the deficient
flow of financial resources to ground-force agencies is also a reason for low
implementation rates.
This work went on to scrutinize the extended Blue Amazon and the current status
of the Brazilian submissions for outer continental shelf limits in the South Atlantic
Ocean. For that purpose, Chap. 9 relied on concepts of a legal and international
relations’ nature. Following the implementation of the Continental Shelf Survey
Plan (LEPLAC), Brazil forwarded three submissions for outer continental shelf
limits to the CLCS. The first submission dated 2004 and claimed sovereign rights
over approximately 911,000 km
2 of extended continental shelf. The CLCS agreed
with approximately 79% of the claimed limits, what prompted Brazil to forward
revised partial submissions in 2015, 2017 and 2018. Thus far, only the executive
summaries of the Brazilian submissions have been made public, as part of the
strategy chosen by the Brazilian delegation, pursuant to Rules 48 and 49 of the
CLCS, in order to safeguard sensitive information on the Brazilian submarine areas
from the eyes of third states.
366
11 Conclusions