contrary, the purpose is to offer collective action and cooperation a powerful
complement, that of coastal states’ domestic action, given those states’ immediate
susceptibility to marine environmental harms and, thus, their direct interest in the
overall quality of the seas washing their shores. After all, coastal states have been
attributed by UNCLOS the role of “keepers” of common, diffuse and collective
concerns, particularly the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
They are, in the eyes of the Convention, part of the solution and not just part of the
problem.
Building on that idea, Chap. 8 assessed coastal states’ material jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce rules on marine environmental matters. The premise underlying this chapter was that UNCLOS, as a product of its epoch, has limitations and
only vaguely contains provision on the prescriptive and enforcement powers of
coastal states on the continental shelf, both within and beyond 200 nm.
On the prescriptive environmental jurisdiction to conserve marine living
resources, this work noted that the concept of “living organisms” is expressly limited
to the sedentary species of Art. 77 (4) UNCLOS, thus not including general benthic
fauna such as fishes that just eventually touch the seafloor. Besides, coastal states are
attributed solely sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring the continental shelf
and exploiting its resources. A literal interpretation of the Convention in this regard
could prompt to the conclusion that the management and conservation of sedentary
species of the outer continental shelf are left outside coastal states’ sovereign rights,
an interpretation that would not make justice to coastal states’ environmental powers
and obligations. In fact, it is illogical that provisions applicable to sedentary species
within the 200-nm zone are not be valid for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
Coastal states have the obligation to protect the biodiversity of the continental
shelf, both within and beyond 200 nm. Regarding fisheries’ regulation, for instance,
whenever living resources exist under the jurisdiction of the coastal state, there is
municipal jurisdiction to protect, preserve and stimulate the sustainable and rational
use of those resources. That is essentially an environmental power which flows from
a holistic interpretation of UNCLOS Part XII and provisions of the CBD, such as
Art. 4 (a), which can be read in such way as to impose conservation obligations
vis-à-vis sedentary species.
A thorny question standing at the spotlight since the adoption of UNCLOS relates
to the regime applicable to genetic resources. Here, this book favored the view which
does not rule out the application of the CBD to the management and conservation of
marine living resources within national jurisdiction, including genetic resources. In
fact, the CBD concepts of “ecosystem” and “functional unit” are of particular
relevance when determining the living resources of the outer continental shelf over
which coastal states may exercise environmental jurisdiction. That is particularly
relevant, for instance, for the fragile and pristine ecosystems of hydrothermal vents.
On the prescriptive environmental jurisdiction regarding the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, it was shown that UNCLOS outlines coastal
states’ general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment and defines
the obligation to take all measures consistent with the Convention that are necessary
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment—Arts. 192 and
362
11 Conclusions
complement, that of coastal states’ domestic action, given those states’ immediate
susceptibility to marine environmental harms and, thus, their direct interest in the
overall quality of the seas washing their shores. After all, coastal states have been
attributed by UNCLOS the role of “keepers” of common, diffuse and collective
concerns, particularly the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
They are, in the eyes of the Convention, part of the solution and not just part of the
problem.
Building on that idea, Chap. 8 assessed coastal states’ material jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce rules on marine environmental matters. The premise underlying this chapter was that UNCLOS, as a product of its epoch, has limitations and
only vaguely contains provision on the prescriptive and enforcement powers of
coastal states on the continental shelf, both within and beyond 200 nm.
On the prescriptive environmental jurisdiction to conserve marine living
resources, this work noted that the concept of “living organisms” is expressly limited
to the sedentary species of Art. 77 (4) UNCLOS, thus not including general benthic
fauna such as fishes that just eventually touch the seafloor. Besides, coastal states are
attributed solely sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring the continental shelf
and exploiting its resources. A literal interpretation of the Convention in this regard
could prompt to the conclusion that the management and conservation of sedentary
species of the outer continental shelf are left outside coastal states’ sovereign rights,
an interpretation that would not make justice to coastal states’ environmental powers
and obligations. In fact, it is illogical that provisions applicable to sedentary species
within the 200-nm zone are not be valid for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
Coastal states have the obligation to protect the biodiversity of the continental
shelf, both within and beyond 200 nm. Regarding fisheries’ regulation, for instance,
whenever living resources exist under the jurisdiction of the coastal state, there is
municipal jurisdiction to protect, preserve and stimulate the sustainable and rational
use of those resources. That is essentially an environmental power which flows from
a holistic interpretation of UNCLOS Part XII and provisions of the CBD, such as
Art. 4 (a), which can be read in such way as to impose conservation obligations
vis-à-vis sedentary species.
A thorny question standing at the spotlight since the adoption of UNCLOS relates
to the regime applicable to genetic resources. Here, this book favored the view which
does not rule out the application of the CBD to the management and conservation of
marine living resources within national jurisdiction, including genetic resources. In
fact, the CBD concepts of “ecosystem” and “functional unit” are of particular
relevance when determining the living resources of the outer continental shelf over
which coastal states may exercise environmental jurisdiction. That is particularly
relevant, for instance, for the fragile and pristine ecosystems of hydrothermal vents.
On the prescriptive environmental jurisdiction regarding the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, it was shown that UNCLOS outlines coastal
states’ general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment and defines
the obligation to take all measures consistent with the Convention that are necessary
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment—Arts. 192 and
362
11 Conclusions