an increased conscience environmentale. Maritime states with particular security
interests are the most unenthusiastic about coastal states’ exercise of environmental
jurisdiction on the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nm. In this regard, such
outdated opposition between maritime security and environmental concerns needs to
be overcome and make way to the more encompassing concept of “environmental
security jurisdiction”, so that coastal states may adopt protective environmental
measures which may partially restrict specific freedoms of the high seas, provided
such measures are justifiable and scientifically based.
Vessel-source pollution in the EEZ and continental shelf, for instance, is a
dimension in which coastal states have reasons to bargain for expanded environmental jurisdiction. Similarly, hydrocarbon pollution and oil slicks following hydrocarbons’ exploitation on the outer shelf, or damages to the seabed following bottom
fishing or mining the deep ocean floor are also dimensions in which coastal states
may exercise marine environmental jurisdiction—in accordance not only to
UNCLOS but also to other international law instruments. Despite fears by naval
powers of coastal states camouflaging abusive enclosures of the oceans as environmental concerns, coastal states’ measures which aim at increasing the environmental
security and quality of the maritime zones under national jurisdiction are not to be a
priori dismissed as abusive and contrary to UNCLOS. An analysis of the particular
context, as well as the rules other than UNCLOS, such as the Convention on
Biological Diversity, should follow suit.
For the rest, i.e. the other environment-grounded measures which openly disguise
trade or geopolitical interests—such as in the case of the Japanese scientific whaling
program or the Chinese jurisdictional aspirations in the South China Sea, it should be
noted that every push towards a jurisdiction expansion seaward triggers an equally
powerful reaction from the international community. In this sense, it is risky and
costly for coastal states to unilaterally advance abusive self-interests disguised as the
protection of global commons, particularly so in the current moment, when the
international community accepts that universal problems require negotiated
solutions.
Having dismissed a priori criticisms to the exercise of marine environmental
jurisdiction by coastal states, Chap. 7 set out to assess the nature and material extent
of such environmental jurisdiction on the continental shelf—and there only. One of
the most important findings of this work was that, due to a long-established narrative
in the law of the sea contrary to coastal states’ jurisdictional expansion seawards,
coastal states’ environmental jurisdiction on the continental shelf has been said to be
significantly more limited than it actually is.
In the “battle of ethoses” for the interpretation of UNCLOS, this work sided with
the call which insists not only on an environment-oriented interpretation of
UNCLOS provisions, but also on the combined application of the Convention and
CBD in areas within national jurisdiction. To this task, the theory of UNCLOS as a
“living treaty” has greatly inspired the points argued in this work. Taken as a living
instrument, UNCLOS is capable of changing and accommodating new challenges to
the world oceans. It is undeniable that the international law of the sea, as any branch
of law, undergoes permanent evolution and progressive development that is linked to
11 Conclusions
359
interests are the most unenthusiastic about coastal states’ exercise of environmental
jurisdiction on the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nm. In this regard, such
outdated opposition between maritime security and environmental concerns needs to
be overcome and make way to the more encompassing concept of “environmental
security jurisdiction”, so that coastal states may adopt protective environmental
measures which may partially restrict specific freedoms of the high seas, provided
such measures are justifiable and scientifically based.
Vessel-source pollution in the EEZ and continental shelf, for instance, is a
dimension in which coastal states have reasons to bargain for expanded environmental jurisdiction. Similarly, hydrocarbon pollution and oil slicks following hydrocarbons’ exploitation on the outer shelf, or damages to the seabed following bottom
fishing or mining the deep ocean floor are also dimensions in which coastal states
may exercise marine environmental jurisdiction—in accordance not only to
UNCLOS but also to other international law instruments. Despite fears by naval
powers of coastal states camouflaging abusive enclosures of the oceans as environmental concerns, coastal states’ measures which aim at increasing the environmental
security and quality of the maritime zones under national jurisdiction are not to be a
priori dismissed as abusive and contrary to UNCLOS. An analysis of the particular
context, as well as the rules other than UNCLOS, such as the Convention on
Biological Diversity, should follow suit.
For the rest, i.e. the other environment-grounded measures which openly disguise
trade or geopolitical interests—such as in the case of the Japanese scientific whaling
program or the Chinese jurisdictional aspirations in the South China Sea, it should be
noted that every push towards a jurisdiction expansion seaward triggers an equally
powerful reaction from the international community. In this sense, it is risky and
costly for coastal states to unilaterally advance abusive self-interests disguised as the
protection of global commons, particularly so in the current moment, when the
international community accepts that universal problems require negotiated
solutions.
Having dismissed a priori criticisms to the exercise of marine environmental
jurisdiction by coastal states, Chap. 7 set out to assess the nature and material extent
of such environmental jurisdiction on the continental shelf—and there only. One of
the most important findings of this work was that, due to a long-established narrative
in the law of the sea contrary to coastal states’ jurisdictional expansion seawards,
coastal states’ environmental jurisdiction on the continental shelf has been said to be
significantly more limited than it actually is.
In the “battle of ethoses” for the interpretation of UNCLOS, this work sided with
the call which insists not only on an environment-oriented interpretation of
UNCLOS provisions, but also on the combined application of the Convention and
CBD in areas within national jurisdiction. To this task, the theory of UNCLOS as a
“living treaty” has greatly inspired the points argued in this work. Taken as a living
instrument, UNCLOS is capable of changing and accommodating new challenges to
the world oceans. It is undeniable that the international law of the sea, as any branch
of law, undergoes permanent evolution and progressive development that is linked to
11 Conclusions
359