perception of the importance of the sea and the willingness to use its potential in a
sustainable way, thus making such concerns blip on the Navy’s radar. In this sense,
IUU fishing in jurisdictional waters and marine environmental crimes—clear marine
environment-related threats, have been identified as two of the greatest challenges to
the Brazilian Navy.
155
However, a maritime mentality alone may not be enough for the effective
conservation or sustainable exploitation of marine resources, if the country in
question has an ill-suited legal and institutional framework for implementing adequate environmental standards to the maritime zones under national jurisdiction. The
environment-related threats listed by the Brazilian Navy as particularly challenging
demand a clear legislative framework, suitable monitoring/enforcement powers and
the need to promote increased cooperation between national agencies with some
degree of ocean responsibility. For that reason, the next chapter investigates the
marine environmental regulatory framework applicable in Brazil, with a focus on the
continental shelf. The objective is to assess Brazil’s legal adequateness to cater for
the sustainable exploitation of the country’s continental shelf, as well as the consistency of marine environmental domestic legislation with international binding
instruments, particularly UNCLOS and the CBD.
The situation of Brazilian agencies engaged in marine conservation efforts did not
look promising in the last years. Since 2014, a domestic political crisis has added to
the unfavorable international context, thus shaking Brazilian economics and politics
and throwing the country into a calamity that is referred to by scholars as the
international “rollback” of Brazil.
156 According to an accurate analysis by Andres
Malamoud,
The rise of Vice President Michel Temer to the presidential office, which followed the
ousting of Rousseff through congressional impeachment, was the last nail in the coffin of a
twenty-year period of international prestige. Not only was Brazil nowhere to be seen when
most of the Latin American presidents and several world leaders convened in Colombia to
witness the signature of the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, but a
few months later Temer declared that he would not attend the 2017 summit of the G20 in
Germany due to domestic issues. On the international stage, Brazil no longer bites, nor does
it kiss.
157
More acutely, the impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff, in 2016, and
the shift towards an ultraliberal economic model lies also on the roots of the
international rollback—the country’s economy is in coma and current policies do
not register much recovery. The Presidency of Michel Temer approved in Parliament
a constitutional amendment to halt public spending to 2015 nominal amounts for the
upcoming 20 years. The PEC 241 (Project of Constitutional Amendment) has
already limited investment in social programs and cut funds to environmental
agencies, taken as less relevant in light of the country’s historic problem with
155 Moreira (2017).
156 Malamud (2017), p. 164.
157 Id. 163.
9.2 The Brazilian Extended Continental Shelf: A Larger Blue Amazon
291
sustainable way, thus making such concerns blip on the Navy’s radar. In this sense,
IUU fishing in jurisdictional waters and marine environmental crimes—clear marine
environment-related threats, have been identified as two of the greatest challenges to
the Brazilian Navy.
155
However, a maritime mentality alone may not be enough for the effective
conservation or sustainable exploitation of marine resources, if the country in
question has an ill-suited legal and institutional framework for implementing adequate environmental standards to the maritime zones under national jurisdiction. The
environment-related threats listed by the Brazilian Navy as particularly challenging
demand a clear legislative framework, suitable monitoring/enforcement powers and
the need to promote increased cooperation between national agencies with some
degree of ocean responsibility. For that reason, the next chapter investigates the
marine environmental regulatory framework applicable in Brazil, with a focus on the
continental shelf. The objective is to assess Brazil’s legal adequateness to cater for
the sustainable exploitation of the country’s continental shelf, as well as the consistency of marine environmental domestic legislation with international binding
instruments, particularly UNCLOS and the CBD.
The situation of Brazilian agencies engaged in marine conservation efforts did not
look promising in the last years. Since 2014, a domestic political crisis has added to
the unfavorable international context, thus shaking Brazilian economics and politics
and throwing the country into a calamity that is referred to by scholars as the
international “rollback” of Brazil.
156 According to an accurate analysis by Andres
Malamoud,
The rise of Vice President Michel Temer to the presidential office, which followed the
ousting of Rousseff through congressional impeachment, was the last nail in the coffin of a
twenty-year period of international prestige. Not only was Brazil nowhere to be seen when
most of the Latin American presidents and several world leaders convened in Colombia to
witness the signature of the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, but a
few months later Temer declared that he would not attend the 2017 summit of the G20 in
Germany due to domestic issues. On the international stage, Brazil no longer bites, nor does
it kiss.
157
More acutely, the impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff, in 2016, and
the shift towards an ultraliberal economic model lies also on the roots of the
international rollback—the country’s economy is in coma and current policies do
not register much recovery. The Presidency of Michel Temer approved in Parliament
a constitutional amendment to halt public spending to 2015 nominal amounts for the
upcoming 20 years. The PEC 241 (Project of Constitutional Amendment) has
already limited investment in social programs and cut funds to environmental
agencies, taken as less relevant in light of the country’s historic problem with
155 Moreira (2017).
156 Malamud (2017), p. 164.
157 Id. 163.
9.2 The Brazilian Extended Continental Shelf: A Larger Blue Amazon
291