Brazil intends to support an emerging South Atlantic system of maritime traffic by
expanding its own data platforms (SISTRAM). These already integrate Uruguay and
Argentina via Regional Centre of Maritime Traffic of South Atlantic Area (CRT-AMAS).
An ultimate stage of surveillance and control of Brazil’s coasts is the Blue Amazon
Management System (SISGAAZ). This involves a more comprehensive multi-platform
surveillance system (vessels, radars, satellites and drones) and an integrated data processing
and communication capability.
135
In so doing, the country expects to exercise a prominent geopolitical influence in
the region, thus keeping the South Atlantic Ocean undisturbed by maritime powers.
For instance, the country realizes the massive influence and impact of the British
presence in the South Atlantic—through a “belt” of several islands in that Ocean—a
situation which has been prompting Brazilian concentrated efforts to reaffirm itself
as a regional reference in terms of cooperation for the states bordering the South
Atlantic, so that this Ocean remain free from the presence of “the North”—or at least
that this presence “does not jeopardize the interests of the South in general and of
Brazil in particular”.
136
Nonetheless, from an international relations perspective, the Brazilian efforts
towards increased South-South cooperation do not go unquestioned or
uncriticized—no matter how romantic such intentions may sound. Thus far, some
limitations have hindered the process of designing unisonous cooperation schemes
and common defense strategies for the South Atlantic Ocean. A possible reason
explaining such difficulties is the unilaterality of the Brazilian narrative on the
relevance of the South Atlantic Ocean, which at some point could be mistaken for
the attempt to impose a hegemonic will in the entire region. In this sense, scholars
have identified the need to hear West African and South American states’ perceptions on the South Atlantic Ocean,
137 to ensure the pursue of a more or less uniform
strategy by those coastal states. Only so could Brazil exercise real geopolitical
influence in the region and keep other maritime powers quiet in nudging the region
without amounting to a traditional hegemon that holds secretive self-interests and
abuses its regional partners to achieve such goals.
9.2.3.2 Economic Dimension
On the economic dimension, it should be clear upfront that the Blue Amazon has
living and non-living resource potentialities which have gone unexploited thus far.
The living resources may be summed up to natural offshore fisheries, such as the
Mullet or the Southern Atlantic Tuna off the Brazilian coast.
138 Fishing activities are
of great importance for local seaside communities, but the practice lacks in public
surveillance and control. That renders necessary the daily struggle against predatory
135 Duarte (2016), p. 105.
136 Wiesebron (2013), p. 118.
137 Such a claim is formulated by Pedro Seabra (2017), p. 325.
138 See Executive Report of the REVIZEE Program (2006) note supra.
284
9 The Environmental Dimension of the “Brazilian Blue...
expanding its own data platforms (SISTRAM). These already integrate Uruguay and
Argentina via Regional Centre of Maritime Traffic of South Atlantic Area (CRT-AMAS).
An ultimate stage of surveillance and control of Brazil’s coasts is the Blue Amazon
Management System (SISGAAZ). This involves a more comprehensive multi-platform
surveillance system (vessels, radars, satellites and drones) and an integrated data processing
and communication capability.
135
In so doing, the country expects to exercise a prominent geopolitical influence in
the region, thus keeping the South Atlantic Ocean undisturbed by maritime powers.
For instance, the country realizes the massive influence and impact of the British
presence in the South Atlantic—through a “belt” of several islands in that Ocean—a
situation which has been prompting Brazilian concentrated efforts to reaffirm itself
as a regional reference in terms of cooperation for the states bordering the South
Atlantic, so that this Ocean remain free from the presence of “the North”—or at least
that this presence “does not jeopardize the interests of the South in general and of
Brazil in particular”.
136
Nonetheless, from an international relations perspective, the Brazilian efforts
towards increased South-South cooperation do not go unquestioned or
uncriticized—no matter how romantic such intentions may sound. Thus far, some
limitations have hindered the process of designing unisonous cooperation schemes
and common defense strategies for the South Atlantic Ocean. A possible reason
explaining such difficulties is the unilaterality of the Brazilian narrative on the
relevance of the South Atlantic Ocean, which at some point could be mistaken for
the attempt to impose a hegemonic will in the entire region. In this sense, scholars
have identified the need to hear West African and South American states’ perceptions on the South Atlantic Ocean,
137 to ensure the pursue of a more or less uniform
strategy by those coastal states. Only so could Brazil exercise real geopolitical
influence in the region and keep other maritime powers quiet in nudging the region
without amounting to a traditional hegemon that holds secretive self-interests and
abuses its regional partners to achieve such goals.
9.2.3.2 Economic Dimension
On the economic dimension, it should be clear upfront that the Blue Amazon has
living and non-living resource potentialities which have gone unexploited thus far.
The living resources may be summed up to natural offshore fisheries, such as the
Mullet or the Southern Atlantic Tuna off the Brazilian coast.
138 Fishing activities are
of great importance for local seaside communities, but the practice lacks in public
surveillance and control. That renders necessary the daily struggle against predatory
135 Duarte (2016), p. 105.
136 Wiesebron (2013), p. 118.
137 Such a claim is formulated by Pedro Seabra (2017), p. 325.
138 See Executive Report of the REVIZEE Program (2006) note supra.
284
9 The Environmental Dimension of the “Brazilian Blue...