CLCS Chair to the 28th SPLOS, in which the Commission assured the hearing of
“presentations on new, amended or revised submissions made by several States since
the previous Meeting of States Parties, namely, Brazil, in respect of the Brazilian
equatorial margin (partial revised submission)”. Finally, on 7 December 2018, the
Brazilian delegation ledged the third partial revised submission, related to the
Brazilian Oriental and Meridional Margin. As of April 2020, the Commission had
approved recommendations concerning the first Brazilian revised submission, on the
Southern Continental Margin.
The Brazilian strategy seems to be one of slicing the revised submissions in parts,
so as to increase the likelihood of obtaining positive recommendations by adapting
posterior partial revisions to the approach adopted by the CLCS during the analysis
of the previous ones. An inherent risk of walking this path is to end up in an endless
“ping-pong” match with the Commission, given the amount of Brazilian partial
revised submissions and the lack of a formal restriction on states resubmitting
infinite revised applications for outer continental shelf limits to the CLCS.
107
9.2.3 The Brazilian Blue Amazon: A Political Concept
with Legal Implications
The ocean has been occupying a crucial place in Brazilian history since colonial
times. Yet, only in the second half of the Twentieth century did the country start
nurturing special interests in maintaining a certain level of geopolitical influence
over the South Atlantic Ocean, in order to keep the region secure and untroubled by
Northern maritime powers. Episodes such as the “Lobster War” against France—a
Northern naval power—over the fishing rights of lobsters and other crustaceans on
the Brazilian continental shelf, in 1963, highlight the relevance attributed by Brazilian authorities to the country’s maritime aspirations—which sometimes took the
shape of unilateral jurisdictional assertions.
108
Moreover, Brazil’s active participation in the Third Conference, as one of the
leaders of the Group of 77—which then rendered Brazil the fame of “leader of
territorialists”, is also an emphatical evidence of the value that the country attributed
to a new order for the oceans. Prioritizing negotiations over shows of force and
“gunboat diplomacy” has been historically a means for weaker countries to advance
an agenda favorable to their interests at the international stage. For that reason,
the implementation of the provisions of Article 76 UNCLOS, as well as three appendices on the data
obtained by LEPLAC Phase 2, the description of the foot of the continental slope points and the
description of the points with 1% sedimentary thickness used when defining the outer limits. See
Brazilian Executive Summary, “Continental Shelf and UNCLOS”, presented to the CLCS,
8 September 2017.
107 That risk was highlighted, among others, by Silva (2012), p. 117.
108 Azzam (1964), p. 1453.
276
9 The Environmental Dimension of the “Brazilian Blue...
“presentations on new, amended or revised submissions made by several States since
the previous Meeting of States Parties, namely, Brazil, in respect of the Brazilian
equatorial margin (partial revised submission)”. Finally, on 7 December 2018, the
Brazilian delegation ledged the third partial revised submission, related to the
Brazilian Oriental and Meridional Margin. As of April 2020, the Commission had
approved recommendations concerning the first Brazilian revised submission, on the
Southern Continental Margin.
The Brazilian strategy seems to be one of slicing the revised submissions in parts,
so as to increase the likelihood of obtaining positive recommendations by adapting
posterior partial revisions to the approach adopted by the CLCS during the analysis
of the previous ones. An inherent risk of walking this path is to end up in an endless
“ping-pong” match with the Commission, given the amount of Brazilian partial
revised submissions and the lack of a formal restriction on states resubmitting
infinite revised applications for outer continental shelf limits to the CLCS.
107
9.2.3 The Brazilian Blue Amazon: A Political Concept
with Legal Implications
The ocean has been occupying a crucial place in Brazilian history since colonial
times. Yet, only in the second half of the Twentieth century did the country start
nurturing special interests in maintaining a certain level of geopolitical influence
over the South Atlantic Ocean, in order to keep the region secure and untroubled by
Northern maritime powers. Episodes such as the “Lobster War” against France—a
Northern naval power—over the fishing rights of lobsters and other crustaceans on
the Brazilian continental shelf, in 1963, highlight the relevance attributed by Brazilian authorities to the country’s maritime aspirations—which sometimes took the
shape of unilateral jurisdictional assertions.
108
Moreover, Brazil’s active participation in the Third Conference, as one of the
leaders of the Group of 77—which then rendered Brazil the fame of “leader of
territorialists”, is also an emphatical evidence of the value that the country attributed
to a new order for the oceans. Prioritizing negotiations over shows of force and
“gunboat diplomacy” has been historically a means for weaker countries to advance
an agenda favorable to their interests at the international stage. For that reason,
the implementation of the provisions of Article 76 UNCLOS, as well as three appendices on the data
obtained by LEPLAC Phase 2, the description of the foot of the continental slope points and the
description of the points with 1% sedimentary thickness used when defining the outer limits. See
Brazilian Executive Summary, “Continental Shelf and UNCLOS”, presented to the CLCS,
8 September 2017.
107 That risk was highlighted, among others, by Silva (2012), p. 117.
108 Azzam (1964), p. 1453.
276
9 The Environmental Dimension of the “Brazilian Blue...