national project,
75 i.e. to implement action plans capable of mobilizing stakeholders
around crucial questions pertaining to the management of Portuguese maritime
spaces. Such a clear objective is not easily extractable from the Brazilian marine
governance edifice—and this shows how a decentralized web of policies, plans and
actions may blur essential goals. Brazil could certainly benefit from such a symbolism of raising the Brazilian seas to the status of a “national project”, instead of a
destiny, some sort of fate and predestination.
Noteworthy is that, in the Portuguese strategy, little is discussed in terms of
national defense and security, with but specific measures on the need to promote the
national interest in matters of national defense, security and alertness, both domestically and in relation to the international sphere.
76 Even so, references to “security
and national defense” are often accompanied by preoccupation with equipping the
Portuguese ocean-related agencies to monitor the seas, prepare for natural hazards,
and combat marine pollution, as in this section:
No national strategy for the sea can be effectively implemented without an efficient
integrated surveillance, security and national defense system that has the means to enable
effective and coordinated maritime surveillance, safeguarding against natural hazards and
combating pollution.
77
Such a relative freedom from national defense considerations is, perhaps, due to
the relative restrain or political clout of the national Navies in each context. In the
Portuguese case, it is not farfetched to picture a Navy that avoids the spotlight and
exercising pressure on other stakeholders when the issue is marine conservation
policies. One of the consequences of such a balance between interested parties is a
refreshed national strategy that focuses less on security and defense issues, being
given ample maneuver room to regulate issues on innovation, technology, impulses
to the blue economy, marine environmental conservation, and others, not necessarily
subject to a militaristic viewpoint. Brazil, on the other side, has been criticized by
literature for designing its national ocean policy from a stark military perspective.
78
This issue, on the role of Navies is shaping national ocean policies and legislation,
would render another investigation of its own, and falls beyond the scope of this
chapter.
On to the second challenge identified above, the difficulties of implementing the
“integrated ocean management” plans should not be underestimated. Obstacles exist,
which hinder the much-needed leap from academic awareness of the virtues of the
75 Ministério da Defesa Nacional, Portugal, 7.
76 Id. 13, 22, 23, 29. Interestingly, “safety” and “security” are represented by the same word in
Portuguese: “segurança”. Hence, for the purposes of the analysis in the current item, concerns such
as “safety of navigation” are disregarded in favor of “national defense and security” considerations,
even though both relate, in Portuguese, to the same concern: “segurança”.
77 Id. 23. All that even though the National Strategy for the Oceans was published by the “Mission
Structure for Maritime Affairs”, a body under the purview of the Ministry for National Defense.
78 According to Erik Franckx, Brazil’s military inputs in domestic ocean policies are not as stark as
in Russia but do still inform plenty of the measures and goals therein. For more on this particular
criticism, see Franckx (2009), p. 15.
268
9 The Environmental Dimension of the “Brazilian Blue...
75 i.e. to implement action plans capable of mobilizing stakeholders
around crucial questions pertaining to the management of Portuguese maritime
spaces. Such a clear objective is not easily extractable from the Brazilian marine
governance edifice—and this shows how a decentralized web of policies, plans and
actions may blur essential goals. Brazil could certainly benefit from such a symbolism of raising the Brazilian seas to the status of a “national project”, instead of a
destiny, some sort of fate and predestination.
Noteworthy is that, in the Portuguese strategy, little is discussed in terms of
national defense and security, with but specific measures on the need to promote the
national interest in matters of national defense, security and alertness, both domestically and in relation to the international sphere.
76 Even so, references to “security
and national defense” are often accompanied by preoccupation with equipping the
Portuguese ocean-related agencies to monitor the seas, prepare for natural hazards,
and combat marine pollution, as in this section:
No national strategy for the sea can be effectively implemented without an efficient
integrated surveillance, security and national defense system that has the means to enable
effective and coordinated maritime surveillance, safeguarding against natural hazards and
combating pollution.
77
Such a relative freedom from national defense considerations is, perhaps, due to
the relative restrain or political clout of the national Navies in each context. In the
Portuguese case, it is not farfetched to picture a Navy that avoids the spotlight and
exercising pressure on other stakeholders when the issue is marine conservation
policies. One of the consequences of such a balance between interested parties is a
refreshed national strategy that focuses less on security and defense issues, being
given ample maneuver room to regulate issues on innovation, technology, impulses
to the blue economy, marine environmental conservation, and others, not necessarily
subject to a militaristic viewpoint. Brazil, on the other side, has been criticized by
literature for designing its national ocean policy from a stark military perspective.
78
This issue, on the role of Navies is shaping national ocean policies and legislation,
would render another investigation of its own, and falls beyond the scope of this
chapter.
On to the second challenge identified above, the difficulties of implementing the
“integrated ocean management” plans should not be underestimated. Obstacles exist,
which hinder the much-needed leap from academic awareness of the virtues of the
75 Ministério da Defesa Nacional, Portugal, 7.
76 Id. 13, 22, 23, 29. Interestingly, “safety” and “security” are represented by the same word in
Portuguese: “segurança”. Hence, for the purposes of the analysis in the current item, concerns such
as “safety of navigation” are disregarded in favor of “national defense and security” considerations,
even though both relate, in Portuguese, to the same concern: “segurança”.
77 Id. 23. All that even though the National Strategy for the Oceans was published by the “Mission
Structure for Maritime Affairs”, a body under the purview of the Ministry for National Defense.
78 According to Erik Franckx, Brazil’s military inputs in domestic ocean policies are not as stark as
in Russia but do still inform plenty of the measures and goals therein. For more on this particular
criticism, see Franckx (2009), p. 15.
268
9 The Environmental Dimension of the “Brazilian Blue...