such a way as to grant legal ground to coastal states’ exercising of enforcement
jurisdiction over vessels in the waters above the outer shelf. In fact, two circumstances come to mind: enforcement over ships that violate the safety zones around
artificial islands, installations and structures above the outer shelf, pursuant to Art.
80 UNCLOS; and the right of hot pursuit for violations on the extended continental
shelf, as allowed by Art. 111 (2) UNCLOS. Likewise, fishing vessels engaged in
destructive bottom-sea techniques that have the potential to harm habitats and
sedentary species of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm may also be targeted by
coastal states’ environmental jurisdiction.
Those are but a few concrete scenarios in which coastal states may exercise
environmental jurisdiction on the outer continental shelf. Regardless of their right to
do so, coastal states are permanently bound by the obligation to act in good faith, as
prescribed by Art. 300 UNCLOS. In addition to that, it is always advisable that
coastal states engage in previous consultations with affected states (such as
researching or flag sates) prior to enacting legislation or enforcing environmental
rules which may negatively impact on certain high seas freedoms. After all, jurisdiction in the maritime context has changed from an exclusive to an inclusive model
of enforcement, one performed in combination with other interested states, with the
utmost goal of upholding an ordre publique océanique grounded on healthy oceans.
8.3 Partial Conclusions
A common problem with global treaties, such as UNCLOS, is the high level of
compromise in negotiations, which results in the adoption of the lowest common
denominator. In the case of Part VI and the provisions on the extended continental
shelf, the international community could not have anticipated the possibility of legal
conflicts stemming from the delineation of outer continental shelves and the
conflicting uses of that area, enabled by rapid technological development. The result
was the adoption of rather general provisions on the continental shelf (as a single
unit), despite the possibility of conflicts relating to the rights of the coastal state over
the seafloor beyond 200 nm. A case in point is the regulation of activities above the
shelf on environmental grounds. Or the potential for conflict between clauses on the
protection of biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction and the rights of
coastal states over the shelf lying below waters that are already beyond national
jurisdiction. Potential for overlap is there, as shown throughout the chapter.
Although excesses and abuses in coastal state actions may exist, such as
camouflaging encroachments on other state’s rights and interests as environmentfriendly measures, not every restriction to high seas freedoms will amount to a
violation of the Convention. UNCLOS leaves enough maneuver room for a
ponderation of values and principles, and the protection of the marine environment
is certainly one quite high in that moral and conventional ranking. Besides, every
measure that restricts freedoms of the high seas may contested at the international
level—such is the spirit of international relations and the underpinning philosophy
244
8 Material Extent of Coastal States’ Environmental Jurisdiction on the. . .
jurisdiction over vessels in the waters above the outer shelf. In fact, two circumstances come to mind: enforcement over ships that violate the safety zones around
artificial islands, installations and structures above the outer shelf, pursuant to Art.
80 UNCLOS; and the right of hot pursuit for violations on the extended continental
shelf, as allowed by Art. 111 (2) UNCLOS. Likewise, fishing vessels engaged in
destructive bottom-sea techniques that have the potential to harm habitats and
sedentary species of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm may also be targeted by
coastal states’ environmental jurisdiction.
Those are but a few concrete scenarios in which coastal states may exercise
environmental jurisdiction on the outer continental shelf. Regardless of their right to
do so, coastal states are permanently bound by the obligation to act in good faith, as
prescribed by Art. 300 UNCLOS. In addition to that, it is always advisable that
coastal states engage in previous consultations with affected states (such as
researching or flag sates) prior to enacting legislation or enforcing environmental
rules which may negatively impact on certain high seas freedoms. After all, jurisdiction in the maritime context has changed from an exclusive to an inclusive model
of enforcement, one performed in combination with other interested states, with the
utmost goal of upholding an ordre publique océanique grounded on healthy oceans.
8.3 Partial Conclusions
A common problem with global treaties, such as UNCLOS, is the high level of
compromise in negotiations, which results in the adoption of the lowest common
denominator. In the case of Part VI and the provisions on the extended continental
shelf, the international community could not have anticipated the possibility of legal
conflicts stemming from the delineation of outer continental shelves and the
conflicting uses of that area, enabled by rapid technological development. The result
was the adoption of rather general provisions on the continental shelf (as a single
unit), despite the possibility of conflicts relating to the rights of the coastal state over
the seafloor beyond 200 nm. A case in point is the regulation of activities above the
shelf on environmental grounds. Or the potential for conflict between clauses on the
protection of biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction and the rights of
coastal states over the shelf lying below waters that are already beyond national
jurisdiction. Potential for overlap is there, as shown throughout the chapter.
Although excesses and abuses in coastal state actions may exist, such as
camouflaging encroachments on other state’s rights and interests as environmentfriendly measures, not every restriction to high seas freedoms will amount to a
violation of the Convention. UNCLOS leaves enough maneuver room for a
ponderation of values and principles, and the protection of the marine environment
is certainly one quite high in that moral and conventional ranking. Besides, every
measure that restricts freedoms of the high seas may contested at the international
level—such is the spirit of international relations and the underpinning philosophy
244
8 Material Extent of Coastal States’ Environmental Jurisdiction on the. . .