One must not lose sight of the epoch in which the treaty was negotiated, a time when
environmental concerns were just beginning to be taken seriously at the global level,
and the marine environmental issues par excellence were overfishing and ocean
pollution from vessels and land. Still, the Convention is certainly to praise for its
avant-gardist philosophies and pioneering provisions on ecological matters, namely
the motivation to establish a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate
the conservation of living resources and the study, protection and preservation of the
marine environment. It is claimed here that every continental shelf activity match
either one or both of the supra-mentioned dimensions of marine environmental
considerations.
The second layer relates to the procedural nature of powers and duties allocated to
states, so that conservation of living resources and control of marine pollution may
happen, i.e. legislative and enforcement powers. Given that international instruments
per se are of limited help in shaping state behavior, the Convention contains several
provisions ascribing rights and duties to states, especially linked with the incorporation of UNCLOS and its obligations into the domestic order. In other words, the
drafters expected the signing-parties not only to ratify the text, but also to undertake
efforts to equip the municipal legal order in a way adequate to fulfilling the
Convention’s goals. For that, states are granted prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction domestically, so as to arrive at the desired state behavior and fulfillment of
such goals.
4
Thus, the following investigation of the rights and duties of coastal states on the
continental shelf takes those two layers into account, in order to: assess the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of coastal states both with respect to the conservation of marine biodiversity and the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution of the seabed under national jurisdiction.
problem (such as geoengineering methods, as ocean iron fertilization) take place and affect
primarily the water column and not the seafloor.
4 The aspect of rights is undoubtedly more relevant than that of duty. States perceive the negotiation
of international standards and adoption of domestic legislation allegedly as part of their right to do
so granted by the Convention, not a normative duty. For that reason, it is questionable whether the
duty to adopt standards or to enact municipal legislation has played a relevant role in configuring
current rules on, say, pollution from offshore oil and gas extraction. Robin Churchill considers with
skepticism that “there is little evidence that the LOSC has had much influence on their adoption”.
See Churchill (2015), p. 30. A laudable exception to Churchill’s skepticism relates to the autonomous development of environmental regulations for mining the Area (Part XI UNCLOS), i.e.,
regulations which came from within the Convention and by its normative thrust.
222
8 Material Extent of Coastal States’ Environmental Jurisdiction on the. . .
environmental concerns were just beginning to be taken seriously at the global level,
and the marine environmental issues par excellence were overfishing and ocean
pollution from vessels and land. Still, the Convention is certainly to praise for its
avant-gardist philosophies and pioneering provisions on ecological matters, namely
the motivation to establish a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate
the conservation of living resources and the study, protection and preservation of the
marine environment. It is claimed here that every continental shelf activity match
either one or both of the supra-mentioned dimensions of marine environmental
considerations.
The second layer relates to the procedural nature of powers and duties allocated to
states, so that conservation of living resources and control of marine pollution may
happen, i.e. legislative and enforcement powers. Given that international instruments
per se are of limited help in shaping state behavior, the Convention contains several
provisions ascribing rights and duties to states, especially linked with the incorporation of UNCLOS and its obligations into the domestic order. In other words, the
drafters expected the signing-parties not only to ratify the text, but also to undertake
efforts to equip the municipal legal order in a way adequate to fulfilling the
Convention’s goals. For that, states are granted prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction domestically, so as to arrive at the desired state behavior and fulfillment of
such goals.
4
Thus, the following investigation of the rights and duties of coastal states on the
continental shelf takes those two layers into account, in order to: assess the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of coastal states both with respect to the conservation of marine biodiversity and the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution of the seabed under national jurisdiction.
problem (such as geoengineering methods, as ocean iron fertilization) take place and affect
primarily the water column and not the seafloor.
4 The aspect of rights is undoubtedly more relevant than that of duty. States perceive the negotiation
of international standards and adoption of domestic legislation allegedly as part of their right to do
so granted by the Convention, not a normative duty. For that reason, it is questionable whether the
duty to adopt standards or to enact municipal legislation has played a relevant role in configuring
current rules on, say, pollution from offshore oil and gas extraction. Robin Churchill considers with
skepticism that “there is little evidence that the LOSC has had much influence on their adoption”.
See Churchill (2015), p. 30. A laudable exception to Churchill’s skepticism relates to the autonomous development of environmental regulations for mining the Area (Part XI UNCLOS), i.e.,
regulations which came from within the Convention and by its normative thrust.
222
8 Material Extent of Coastal States’ Environmental Jurisdiction on the. . .