by scientists, let alone by jurists.
7 There is a clear need for more attention to deepwater ecosystems, in particular hydrothermal vents, which are known to occur in
great quantities throughout the Area, as enough evidence suggests that such vents
host plural marine ecosystems.
8 Besides, the ocean is an interconnected whole, in
which an alteration in a particular ecosystem can stir changes of incalculable proportions in several other ecosystems. Thirdly, it remains a coastal state duty
according to international law to protect and preserve the marine environment,
both within and beyond national jurisdiction. Those are reasons strong enough for
coastal states to take protective measures off their coasts. Finally, due to the need for
greater and more detailed understanding of the exact regulatory maneuver room of
coastal states on issues related to the protection of the marine environment—so as to
delimit the scope of environmental prescription and enforcement over the continental shelf, particularly beyond 200 nm. Such clarity is paramount for broad-margin
states to grasp what is expected from them upon the delineation of outer continental
shelf limits and how far their national legislations may reach in the protection of the
marine environment without damaging uncontested rights and duties of other states.
Unilateral action by a state member to UNCLOS on a remote area such as the
outer continental shelf may spark controversies concerning the rights and interests of
other states in overlapping and neighboring maritime zones. In fact, controversies in
the law of the sea are inevitable, particularly in light of the permanent trichotomy
between the core principles of territorial sovereignty, freedom of the seas and
common heritage of mankind. Consequently, national measures aimed at protecting
the marine environment that somehow restrict high seas freedoms (such as fishing or
researching) may be both perceived as laudable initiatives towards increased marine
ecological conservation (Art. 192 UNCLOS) and, paradoxically, as violations of the
principle of freedom of the seas (Art. 87 (1) UNCLOS). For no less, it has been said
that “the balance between the freedom of navigation and the protection of the
environment is not always easy to achieve and often does not meet current environmental challenges”.
9 As explained throughout this chapter, the blackletter of the
Convention does not sufficiently safeguard that balance, due among others to the
option made by the Treaty’s drafters for broadness and comprehensiveness—the
so-called package deal approach.
In early 1990s, there were signs of strain in the Convention’s compromises on
environmental jurisdiction, at a time when the text had not even entered into force.
At stake were provisions regarding the enforcement of vessel-source pollution rules
by coastal and port states, and the apparent conflict with freedom of navigation.
10
7 It can be said with relative security that fragile ecosystems, such as coral reefs, are expected to
occur close to the baselines of coastal states, continental or island nations. There are known cases of
reefs in the EEZ, but “it is expected that these are proportionally far fewer than those that lie within
and straddle the boundaries between internal waters and territorial seas”. See Goodwin
(2011), p. 59.
8 Van Dover (2014), p. 60.
9 Ribeiro (2014), p. 457.
10 See Bodansky (1991), p. 720.
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191
7 There is a clear need for more attention to deepwater ecosystems, in particular hydrothermal vents, which are known to occur in
great quantities throughout the Area, as enough evidence suggests that such vents
host plural marine ecosystems.
8 Besides, the ocean is an interconnected whole, in
which an alteration in a particular ecosystem can stir changes of incalculable proportions in several other ecosystems. Thirdly, it remains a coastal state duty
according to international law to protect and preserve the marine environment,
both within and beyond national jurisdiction. Those are reasons strong enough for
coastal states to take protective measures off their coasts. Finally, due to the need for
greater and more detailed understanding of the exact regulatory maneuver room of
coastal states on issues related to the protection of the marine environment—so as to
delimit the scope of environmental prescription and enforcement over the continental shelf, particularly beyond 200 nm. Such clarity is paramount for broad-margin
states to grasp what is expected from them upon the delineation of outer continental
shelf limits and how far their national legislations may reach in the protection of the
marine environment without damaging uncontested rights and duties of other states.
Unilateral action by a state member to UNCLOS on a remote area such as the
outer continental shelf may spark controversies concerning the rights and interests of
other states in overlapping and neighboring maritime zones. In fact, controversies in
the law of the sea are inevitable, particularly in light of the permanent trichotomy
between the core principles of territorial sovereignty, freedom of the seas and
common heritage of mankind. Consequently, national measures aimed at protecting
the marine environment that somehow restrict high seas freedoms (such as fishing or
researching) may be both perceived as laudable initiatives towards increased marine
ecological conservation (Art. 192 UNCLOS) and, paradoxically, as violations of the
principle of freedom of the seas (Art. 87 (1) UNCLOS). For no less, it has been said
that “the balance between the freedom of navigation and the protection of the
environment is not always easy to achieve and often does not meet current environmental challenges”.
9 As explained throughout this chapter, the blackletter of the
Convention does not sufficiently safeguard that balance, due among others to the
option made by the Treaty’s drafters for broadness and comprehensiveness—the
so-called package deal approach.
In early 1990s, there were signs of strain in the Convention’s compromises on
environmental jurisdiction, at a time when the text had not even entered into force.
At stake were provisions regarding the enforcement of vessel-source pollution rules
by coastal and port states, and the apparent conflict with freedom of navigation.
10
7 It can be said with relative security that fragile ecosystems, such as coral reefs, are expected to
occur close to the baselines of coastal states, continental or island nations. There are known cases of
reefs in the EEZ, but “it is expected that these are proportionally far fewer than those that lie within
and straddle the boundaries between internal waters and territorial seas”. See Goodwin
(2011), p. 59.
8 Van Dover (2014), p. 60.
9 Ribeiro (2014), p. 457.
10 See Bodansky (1991), p. 720.
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191