for states. Indeed, lately there have been shifts in power struggles on the international
stage, raising awareness towards complex matters such as environmental protection,
climate change, ocean acidification etc.
Despite the current trend towards the consolidation of marine environmental
jurisdiction (both prescriptive and to enforce), the goal has never been to attack
freedom of navigation as a general legal principle. Ribeiro, therefore, denies the
version that environmental jurisdiction may represent a Trojan horse against the
freedom-centered normative structure of UNCLOS.
176 In this regard, the international community is faced with the need to strike a renewed balance that makes
justice for both most interested categories of states, that is between the prerogatives
and expectations of flag-states and the legal possibility for coastal states to defend
the marine environment off their shores.
177 Even though coastal states pursue marine
environmental defense in their own interests, such action should imply benefits to all
humankind.
That trend does not entail a complete reversion in trajectory of the law of the sea
thus far, but simply an adaptation, with the contribution of representatives from
maritime and coastal states alike. Current state practice on enlarging environmental
jurisdiction may ensure the formation of customary rules in opposition of certain
UNCLOS provisions. Hence, the international community would have to opt
between amending the Convention or accepting the partial revoking of its provisions
due to disuse. Either the Convention internalizes this “dynamics of territorialization”
or faces its partial revoking.
178
While it is true that individual coastal state initiatives have been condemned and
often frustrated whereas multilateral action has proven to be more effective, the
“threat of unilateralism seems to have become both the weapon of choice and the
best available means to reach a mutually acceptable solution on the global level”.
179
Ultimately, all interested parties realize that universal problems, such as the marine
environment-related ones, require universal solutions. On the one hand, coastal
states are aware they are not expected to act on a unilateral manner. On the other,
they know the bargaining power that such action (or indication of action) exercises
over other states in the international community, particularly if the action is wellgrounded on an environmental rationale.
Finally, the clash between the principle of freedom of the seas and territorial
sovereignty is due to continue. In the universe of law, it is reasonable to expect that
coastal states reach diverse interpretations of UNCLOS jurisdictional provisions, or
176 Ribeiro (2013), p. 803 ff.
177 In this renewed balance, the practice of some degree of creeping jurisdiction is almost inevitable.
Chiefly in the case of MPAs in the EEZ and continental shelf, the protected areas have “vocation” to
be agents of creeping jurisdiction. The international community has acquiesced to some controlling
powers of coastal states over maritime zones under some degree of their jurisdiction. Hence, Ribeiro
claims that, at least in the case of the regime of MPAs beyond the territorial sea, the balance between
coastal state powers and third state rights must be reassessed and updated. Id. 805 ff.
178 Losa et al. (2003), p. 71.
179 See generally Gavouneli (2006).
180
6 Creeping Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea: Threat to Navigational Freedoms or. . .
stage, raising awareness towards complex matters such as environmental protection,
climate change, ocean acidification etc.
Despite the current trend towards the consolidation of marine environmental
jurisdiction (both prescriptive and to enforce), the goal has never been to attack
freedom of navigation as a general legal principle. Ribeiro, therefore, denies the
version that environmental jurisdiction may represent a Trojan horse against the
freedom-centered normative structure of UNCLOS.
176 In this regard, the international community is faced with the need to strike a renewed balance that makes
justice for both most interested categories of states, that is between the prerogatives
and expectations of flag-states and the legal possibility for coastal states to defend
the marine environment off their shores.
177 Even though coastal states pursue marine
environmental defense in their own interests, such action should imply benefits to all
humankind.
That trend does not entail a complete reversion in trajectory of the law of the sea
thus far, but simply an adaptation, with the contribution of representatives from
maritime and coastal states alike. Current state practice on enlarging environmental
jurisdiction may ensure the formation of customary rules in opposition of certain
UNCLOS provisions. Hence, the international community would have to opt
between amending the Convention or accepting the partial revoking of its provisions
due to disuse. Either the Convention internalizes this “dynamics of territorialization”
or faces its partial revoking.
178
While it is true that individual coastal state initiatives have been condemned and
often frustrated whereas multilateral action has proven to be more effective, the
“threat of unilateralism seems to have become both the weapon of choice and the
best available means to reach a mutually acceptable solution on the global level”.
179
Ultimately, all interested parties realize that universal problems, such as the marine
environment-related ones, require universal solutions. On the one hand, coastal
states are aware they are not expected to act on a unilateral manner. On the other,
they know the bargaining power that such action (or indication of action) exercises
over other states in the international community, particularly if the action is wellgrounded on an environmental rationale.
Finally, the clash between the principle of freedom of the seas and territorial
sovereignty is due to continue. In the universe of law, it is reasonable to expect that
coastal states reach diverse interpretations of UNCLOS jurisdictional provisions, or
176 Ribeiro (2013), p. 803 ff.
177 In this renewed balance, the practice of some degree of creeping jurisdiction is almost inevitable.
Chiefly in the case of MPAs in the EEZ and continental shelf, the protected areas have “vocation” to
be agents of creeping jurisdiction. The international community has acquiesced to some controlling
powers of coastal states over maritime zones under some degree of their jurisdiction. Hence, Ribeiro
claims that, at least in the case of the regime of MPAs beyond the territorial sea, the balance between
coastal state powers and third state rights must be reassessed and updated. Id. 805 ff.
178 Losa et al. (2003), p. 71.
179 See generally Gavouneli (2006).
180
6 Creeping Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea: Threat to Navigational Freedoms or. . .