Finally, the latest episode of creeping jurisdiction on the EEZ was performed by
developed states, in which Portugal, Spain and France, following the Prestige
incident, took unilateral action in order to ban single-hull oil tankers from entering
their EEZs. Those are certainly some of the most discussed measures in the recent
history of the law of the sea, and it escapes the aim this book to provide a thorough
description of the incident’s minutiae.
105 In short, the single-hulled tanker Prestige
sent a distress call offshore the region of Galicia, Spain, carrying 77,000 metric tons
of heavy fuel oil. Spanish authorities denied refuge to the tanker, who was towed
away to some 130 miles off the Spanish coast, where it broke apart and sank, causing
disastrous harm to peoples, businesses and the marine environment of the countries
by the Bay of Biscay. The decision to ban old single-hull tankers was faced with
opposition by international shipping associations and parcel of academia.
106
The primary consequence of that oil slick was the adoption of the regional Málaga
Agreement in 2002, containing preventive measures of a “not in my backyard”
nature. The affected states banned single-hull tankers over 15 years-old and claimed
the right to escort out from their respective EEZs all vessels transporting hydrocarbons that did not abide by international rules, including ships in transit.
107 Enforcement of those prescriptions was ruthless,
108 having met opposition both of the
international community, due to its inconsistency with UNCLOS, and international
legal scholars,
109 to whom the decision would not lead to improved environmental
protection.
110
With regard to excessive jurisdictional assertions to the continental shelf, risks
presented by the “territorial temptation” are apparently manifold and stem from a
variety of claims. Barbara Kwiatkowska alerted against the potential “erosion of
UNCLOS’ balanced system”, should the creeping of jurisdiction over the high seas
prevail.
111 In particular, that delicate balance was put at stake the moment coastal
states decided to claim rights over the territory of the continental margin, instead of
breach of laws and regulations referred to in the part of the Convention that deals with the
contiguous zone. Those states claimed to have jurisdiction to decide also on heritage found on
the continental shelf, i.e. beyond 24 nm. See generally Kwiatkowska (1991).
105 A detailed account of the Prestige incident can be read at Nordquist (2007).
106 Galiano (2003), p. 113.
107 See Frank (2005), p. 9.
108 According to the Lloyd’s List (05 June 2003, p. 1), in the six months following the Prestige
accident a total of 81 ships were expelled from the French and Spanish EEZs.
109 For Galiano, the ban would hardly represent a major advance in tackling oil spills. In fact, it
would not be as effective as better inspection and maintenance would. Apart from that, there were
also criticisms to the unilateral banning of single-hull tankers without previous consultation before
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), since navigation-related measures beyond 12 nm
must be grounded on scientific and technical evidence and, above all, approved by the IMO Plenary
body. See Galiano (2003), p. 123.
110 Concerning the negative repercussion of the measure, see Losa et al. (2003), p. 52.
111 Kwiatkowska (1991), p. 163.
6.3 Reasons for Alarm?
161
developed states, in which Portugal, Spain and France, following the Prestige
incident, took unilateral action in order to ban single-hull oil tankers from entering
their EEZs. Those are certainly some of the most discussed measures in the recent
history of the law of the sea, and it escapes the aim this book to provide a thorough
description of the incident’s minutiae.
105 In short, the single-hulled tanker Prestige
sent a distress call offshore the region of Galicia, Spain, carrying 77,000 metric tons
of heavy fuel oil. Spanish authorities denied refuge to the tanker, who was towed
away to some 130 miles off the Spanish coast, where it broke apart and sank, causing
disastrous harm to peoples, businesses and the marine environment of the countries
by the Bay of Biscay. The decision to ban old single-hull tankers was faced with
opposition by international shipping associations and parcel of academia.
106
The primary consequence of that oil slick was the adoption of the regional Málaga
Agreement in 2002, containing preventive measures of a “not in my backyard”
nature. The affected states banned single-hull tankers over 15 years-old and claimed
the right to escort out from their respective EEZs all vessels transporting hydrocarbons that did not abide by international rules, including ships in transit.
107 Enforcement of those prescriptions was ruthless,
108 having met opposition both of the
international community, due to its inconsistency with UNCLOS, and international
legal scholars,
109 to whom the decision would not lead to improved environmental
protection.
110
With regard to excessive jurisdictional assertions to the continental shelf, risks
presented by the “territorial temptation” are apparently manifold and stem from a
variety of claims. Barbara Kwiatkowska alerted against the potential “erosion of
UNCLOS’ balanced system”, should the creeping of jurisdiction over the high seas
prevail.
111 In particular, that delicate balance was put at stake the moment coastal
states decided to claim rights over the territory of the continental margin, instead of
breach of laws and regulations referred to in the part of the Convention that deals with the
contiguous zone. Those states claimed to have jurisdiction to decide also on heritage found on
the continental shelf, i.e. beyond 24 nm. See generally Kwiatkowska (1991).
105 A detailed account of the Prestige incident can be read at Nordquist (2007).
106 Galiano (2003), p. 113.
107 See Frank (2005), p. 9.
108 According to the Lloyd’s List (05 June 2003, p. 1), in the six months following the Prestige
accident a total of 81 ships were expelled from the French and Spanish EEZs.
109 For Galiano, the ban would hardly represent a major advance in tackling oil spills. In fact, it
would not be as effective as better inspection and maintenance would. Apart from that, there were
also criticisms to the unilateral banning of single-hull tankers without previous consultation before
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), since navigation-related measures beyond 12 nm
must be grounded on scientific and technical evidence and, above all, approved by the IMO Plenary
body. See Galiano (2003), p. 123.
110 Concerning the negative repercussion of the measure, see Losa et al. (2003), p. 52.
111 Kwiatkowska (1991), p. 163.
6.3 Reasons for Alarm?
161