state to unilaterally determine the breadth of the zone or zones to which the extension
of jurisdiction applies. Some of the main aspects standing out of the pre-UNCLOS
Latin American contribution were, on the one hand, coastal states’ central interest in
exploiting marine resources in larger areas for the purposes of domestic socioeconomic development, and, on the other, the subsequent decision to push jurisdiction
seawards to the amount necessary for coastal states to achieve those objectives.
76
While it would be inappropriate to refer to a united Latin American stance, it
would not be entirely wrong to refer to a systematic regional disapproval of the
classical allocation of jurisdictional rights over the oceans. According to GarciaAmador, the trend to “move away from the legal regime which has traditionally
governed the territorial sea reflects a concept of ‘plurality of regimes’ for that
area.”
77 A broader collective signal was being issued, one grounded on the idea
that littoral states should be entitled to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over renewable
and nonrenewable natural resources in the waters, seabed, and subsoil of maritime
spaces adjacent to the coast. Such expansionist message was, thus, not interrupted by
UNCLOS I and II, which committed the gravest sin of not hearing the voices of
newly independent states.
78 In fact, that message was to impregnate negotiations
during the Third Conference.
6.3.2 Post-UNCLOS State Practice
One of the goals of several states upon the signature of UNCLOS was the disruption
of burgeoning unilateral assertions of jurisdiction over the high seas,
79 thereby
halting the process of “territorial expansion of coastal States sovereignty, sovereign
rights and jurisdiction” seaward.
80 There was a sense of need to impose strict limits
on the extent of state jurisdiction over maritime areas.
81 Particularly with regard to
the EEZ and the continental shelf, negotiating parties sought to make sure that those
are not zones of national jurisdiction, but zones with some degree of national
jurisdiction,
82 the essence of which lies in the substantive balance between rights
of coastal States and rights of the international community. A balance that had been
struck not by repressing coastal states’ territorialist demands prior to UNCLOS, but
by incorporating several of those demands in a new equilibrium between state
sovereignty and freedom of the seas.
76 Id. 50.
77 Id. 46.
78 Between 1943 and 1969, sixty-nine countries declared independence. Of those, fifty-five were
coastal states.
79 Knauss (1985), p. 209.
80 Türk (2012), p. 159.
81 Townsend-Gault (2014), p. 84.
82 Türk (2012), p. 161.
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6 Creeping Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea: Threat to Navigational Freedoms or. . .
of jurisdiction applies. Some of the main aspects standing out of the pre-UNCLOS
Latin American contribution were, on the one hand, coastal states’ central interest in
exploiting marine resources in larger areas for the purposes of domestic socioeconomic development, and, on the other, the subsequent decision to push jurisdiction
seawards to the amount necessary for coastal states to achieve those objectives.
76
While it would be inappropriate to refer to a united Latin American stance, it
would not be entirely wrong to refer to a systematic regional disapproval of the
classical allocation of jurisdictional rights over the oceans. According to GarciaAmador, the trend to “move away from the legal regime which has traditionally
governed the territorial sea reflects a concept of ‘plurality of regimes’ for that
area.”
77 A broader collective signal was being issued, one grounded on the idea
that littoral states should be entitled to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over renewable
and nonrenewable natural resources in the waters, seabed, and subsoil of maritime
spaces adjacent to the coast. Such expansionist message was, thus, not interrupted by
UNCLOS I and II, which committed the gravest sin of not hearing the voices of
newly independent states.
78 In fact, that message was to impregnate negotiations
during the Third Conference.
6.3.2 Post-UNCLOS State Practice
One of the goals of several states upon the signature of UNCLOS was the disruption
of burgeoning unilateral assertions of jurisdiction over the high seas,
79 thereby
halting the process of “territorial expansion of coastal States sovereignty, sovereign
rights and jurisdiction” seaward.
80 There was a sense of need to impose strict limits
on the extent of state jurisdiction over maritime areas.
81 Particularly with regard to
the EEZ and the continental shelf, negotiating parties sought to make sure that those
are not zones of national jurisdiction, but zones with some degree of national
jurisdiction,
82 the essence of which lies in the substantive balance between rights
of coastal States and rights of the international community. A balance that had been
struck not by repressing coastal states’ territorialist demands prior to UNCLOS, but
by incorporating several of those demands in a new equilibrium between state
sovereignty and freedom of the seas.
76 Id. 50.
77 Id. 46.
78 Between 1943 and 1969, sixty-nine countries declared independence. Of those, fifty-five were
coastal states.
79 Knauss (1985), p. 209.
80 Türk (2012), p. 159.
81 Townsend-Gault (2014), p. 84.
82 Türk (2012), p. 161.
156
6 Creeping Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea: Threat to Navigational Freedoms or. . .