values, based on the premise that coastal states represent “trustees” of common
concerns of mankind, such as the oceans and marine environmental protection.
2
This work does not intend to exhaust reflections on this topic, but merely to
provide an arena for the exchange of ideas on the development of the law of the sea.
The ultimate goal is to make the scholarship of this fascinating field of international
law permeable to critiques, inputs and insights from all distant corners of the world.
With that end in mind, this part analyzes the concept of “creeping jurisdiction” both
in the pre- and post-UNCLOS eras, in relation to the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction not only on security, but also on marine environmental matters. In the
first part, this title defines and identifies the context in which the expression
“creeping jurisdiction” is coined and spread. Then, it goes on to analyze state
practice prior to and after the adoption of UNCLOS, in order to answer to the
question whether there is serious ground for raising alarms against an alleged
enclosure of the oceans.
3
6.1 Context of the Practice Known as “Creeping
Jurisdiction”
The law of the sea has been shaped by the not always peaceful opposition of interests
between sovereign states. On the one hand, the maritime powers, on the other,
developing coastal states.
4 Maritime states, or dominant naval powers, usually
acted on an individual basis, advancing interests that usually broke down to preserving freedom of navigation throughout the world oceans.
5 Take, for instance, the
past two hegemonic maritime powers in history, the United Kingdom and the United
States. During the glory days of the British Empire, in the first half of the nineteenth
century, the so-called Pax Britannica, the Royal Navy had 335 warships navigating
every inch of the world.
6 More recently, the United States Navy sailed 274 vessels as
part of its battle force fleet as of December 2016, including ten aircraft carriers,
2 Ribeiro (2013), p. 64.
3 Part of this chapter was published in the Brazilian Journal of International Law, in a thematic issue
dedicated to the “Southern narrative of international law”. See Ventura (2018), p. 161.
4 A similar classification between states has been used in other law of the sea works. See Valencia
(1987), p. 541.
5 Marta Chantal Ribeiro refers to “states most prone to commercial interests”. See Ribeiro
(2013), p. 64.
6 In 1810, the Royal Navy had 183 cruisers (then known as “frigates”) and 152 battleships. Those
are solely large warships and exclude a plethora of sloops, brigs and corvettes flying the ensign of
King George III. See generally Fenton (2007).
142
6 Creeping Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea: Threat to Navigational Freedoms or. . .
concerns of mankind, such as the oceans and marine environmental protection.
2
This work does not intend to exhaust reflections on this topic, but merely to
provide an arena for the exchange of ideas on the development of the law of the sea.
The ultimate goal is to make the scholarship of this fascinating field of international
law permeable to critiques, inputs and insights from all distant corners of the world.
With that end in mind, this part analyzes the concept of “creeping jurisdiction” both
in the pre- and post-UNCLOS eras, in relation to the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction not only on security, but also on marine environmental matters. In the
first part, this title defines and identifies the context in which the expression
“creeping jurisdiction” is coined and spread. Then, it goes on to analyze state
practice prior to and after the adoption of UNCLOS, in order to answer to the
question whether there is serious ground for raising alarms against an alleged
enclosure of the oceans.
3
6.1 Context of the Practice Known as “Creeping
Jurisdiction”
The law of the sea has been shaped by the not always peaceful opposition of interests
between sovereign states. On the one hand, the maritime powers, on the other,
developing coastal states.
4 Maritime states, or dominant naval powers, usually
acted on an individual basis, advancing interests that usually broke down to preserving freedom of navigation throughout the world oceans.
5 Take, for instance, the
past two hegemonic maritime powers in history, the United Kingdom and the United
States. During the glory days of the British Empire, in the first half of the nineteenth
century, the so-called Pax Britannica, the Royal Navy had 335 warships navigating
every inch of the world.
6 More recently, the United States Navy sailed 274 vessels as
part of its battle force fleet as of December 2016, including ten aircraft carriers,
2 Ribeiro (2013), p. 64.
3 Part of this chapter was published in the Brazilian Journal of International Law, in a thematic issue
dedicated to the “Southern narrative of international law”. See Ventura (2018), p. 161.
4 A similar classification between states has been used in other law of the sea works. See Valencia
(1987), p. 541.
5 Marta Chantal Ribeiro refers to “states most prone to commercial interests”. See Ribeiro
(2013), p. 64.
6 In 1810, the Royal Navy had 183 cruisers (then known as “frigates”) and 152 battleships. Those
are solely large warships and exclude a plethora of sloops, brigs and corvettes flying the ensign of
King George III. See generally Fenton (2007).
142
6 Creeping Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea: Threat to Navigational Freedoms or. . .