short-margin states. On the one corner, countries such as Brazil, Argentina,
Australia, Canada and others sided for a continental shelf extending beyond
200 nm, based on the principle of sovereignty over the landmass that shares sediment
affinity with the submerged areas offshore. On the other corner, African and Arab
countries, along with land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states opposed
vehemently an extended continental shelf on several grounds.
Short-margin countries rejected proposals of an outer shelf on the ground that Art.
76 and its complex formulae attributed “too large a portion of the sea-bed to coastal
States, to the detriment of the international sea-bed area, thus depriving mankind of
the extensive maritime space which should be part of its common heritage”.
50 In
other words, any extension of the national jurisdiction of the coastal state with
respect to the exploitation and exploration of the natural resources of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nm effectively reduced the common heritage of mankind.
51 For
those countries, two conditions were quintessential to the approval of an outer
continental shelf regime: first, the Convention should stipulate a “common heritage
fund”, with a mandate to assist third world development, to protect the marine
environment, to foster the transfer of marine technology, amongst other purposes;
secondly, the outer limits of the continental shelf should be determined by a clear,
simple and unambiguous formula—not the ones approved in Art. 76.
52
Moreover, opposition to the outer continental shelf insisted that Art. 82, providing
for payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nm, seemed to indicate a certain guilty conscience. If the parties
would endorse the outer continental shelf, not even the revenue-sharing arrangements would compensate for the large losses of the international community.
53 As
such, not even unilateral action taken by certain countries to exploit seabed resources
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was extremely serious, despite the assurances that such exploitation would not begin before the entry into force of the
Convention.
54
An illustrative list of states opposing the outer continental shelf includes Zaire,
55
Swaziland, to whom Art. 76 “severely truncated the concept of the common heritage
50 Sweden, A/CONF.62/SR.105 105th Plenary meeting, para 63.
51 Nepal, A/CONF.62/SR.125 125th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIII, para 10. Malta also who claimed
for more safeguards against the “shrinkage of the common heritage of mankind”. See A/CONF.62/
SR.105 105th Plenary meeting, para 36.
52 To Bulgaria, the formulae contained in Art. 76 tended to “accentuate inequalities” and to affirm a
doctrine of appropriation based on geopolitical advantages”. See A/CONF.62/SR.103, 103rd
Plenary meeting, para. 56.
53 Position defended by the Romanian delegation, A/CONF.62/SR.125, 125th Plenary meeting,
para 26.
54 A/CONF.62/SR.140, 140th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIV, para 12.
55 A/CONF.62/SR.138, 138th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIV, para 92.
5.3 The Outer Continental Shelf and the Area
121
Australia, Canada and others sided for a continental shelf extending beyond
200 nm, based on the principle of sovereignty over the landmass that shares sediment
affinity with the submerged areas offshore. On the other corner, African and Arab
countries, along with land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states opposed
vehemently an extended continental shelf on several grounds.
Short-margin countries rejected proposals of an outer shelf on the ground that Art.
76 and its complex formulae attributed “too large a portion of the sea-bed to coastal
States, to the detriment of the international sea-bed area, thus depriving mankind of
the extensive maritime space which should be part of its common heritage”.
50 In
other words, any extension of the national jurisdiction of the coastal state with
respect to the exploitation and exploration of the natural resources of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nm effectively reduced the common heritage of mankind.
51 For
those countries, two conditions were quintessential to the approval of an outer
continental shelf regime: first, the Convention should stipulate a “common heritage
fund”, with a mandate to assist third world development, to protect the marine
environment, to foster the transfer of marine technology, amongst other purposes;
secondly, the outer limits of the continental shelf should be determined by a clear,
simple and unambiguous formula—not the ones approved in Art. 76.
52
Moreover, opposition to the outer continental shelf insisted that Art. 82, providing
for payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nm, seemed to indicate a certain guilty conscience. If the parties
would endorse the outer continental shelf, not even the revenue-sharing arrangements would compensate for the large losses of the international community.
53 As
such, not even unilateral action taken by certain countries to exploit seabed resources
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was extremely serious, despite the assurances that such exploitation would not begin before the entry into force of the
Convention.
54
An illustrative list of states opposing the outer continental shelf includes Zaire,
55
Swaziland, to whom Art. 76 “severely truncated the concept of the common heritage
50 Sweden, A/CONF.62/SR.105 105th Plenary meeting, para 63.
51 Nepal, A/CONF.62/SR.125 125th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIII, para 10. Malta also who claimed
for more safeguards against the “shrinkage of the common heritage of mankind”. See A/CONF.62/
SR.105 105th Plenary meeting, para 36.
52 To Bulgaria, the formulae contained in Art. 76 tended to “accentuate inequalities” and to affirm a
doctrine of appropriation based on geopolitical advantages”. See A/CONF.62/SR.103, 103rd
Plenary meeting, para. 56.
53 Position defended by the Romanian delegation, A/CONF.62/SR.125, 125th Plenary meeting,
para 26.
54 A/CONF.62/SR.140, 140th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIV, para 12.
55 A/CONF.62/SR.138, 138th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIV, para 92.
5.3 The Outer Continental Shelf and the Area
121