competences of the coastal state respect an inherent economic purpose and do not
infringe upon the rights and duties of other states in the same zone.
82 In this sense,
some authors refer also to “resource jurisdiction” when discussing the continental
shelf and EEZ regimes, in a rather clear reference to the economics behind the
competences of coastal states in those spaces.
83
This “functional” character allows for coastal states to select specific functions
they wish to exercise within the default 200 nm, examples being the Ecological
Protection Zone, Fisheries Protection Zone, Exclusive Fisheries Zones or the full
Economic Exclusive Zone.
84 From the analysis of the EEZs in the Mediterranean
Sea, Gavouneli concluded that the concept of the EEZ has acquired a certain
flexibility concerning spatial delimitation (the exact length of the zone may vary
from state to state, never exceeding 200 nm)
85 and substantive content.
86 That
flexibility enables states to claim jurisdiction relating either to fisheries, or to
ecological protection, or to the entirety of rights awarded by the Convention in
that zone. It is not the case with the continental shelf regime, which is
(i) geographically more limited than the EEZ and (ii) rather rigorous in the sort of
jurisdiction exercisable over the seabed, according to Art. 77 (1), UNCLOS.
In the EEZ and on the continental shelf adjacent to the territorial sea, coastal states
has authority over certain activities, notably with respect to the management,
exploration and exploitation of natural resources therein. The jurisdiction, in this
case, is not strictly territorial.
87 Coastal states do not have unlimited jurisdiction
over resources and foreign persons, ships and activities, but merely a tempered
jurisdiction to regulate activities directly affecting the seafloor, in the case of the
continental shelf. In this sense, the continental shelf is not to be considered as
territory of the coastal state, but a maritime space where the state exercises limited
rights and is bound by specific duties. An interesting, although legally questionable
opinion is formulated by Virginie Tassin, to whom the continental shelf may be
considered an “accessory territory” of the coastal state.
88
Finally, it should be reminded that sovereign rights and jurisdiction must be
expressly attributed by international law.
89 This is a legalist approach to jurisdiction
in the international law of the sea, according to which states (and other subjects) may
only act in certain maritime zones where a provision permits action. In this regard,
states are guided by the principle of administrative legality, as applied in domestic
82 Gavouneli (2007), p. 68.
83 Kaye (2006), p. 347.
84 For further details on the different functional zones within 200 nm, see Gavouneli (2007),
pp. 93–96.
85 The Kingdom of Spain, for instance, declared a 37nm-long Fisheries Protection Zone in 1997.
Real Decreto 1.315 de 1 agosto 1997, BOE no. 204 de 26 agosto 1997.
86 Gavouneli (2007), p. 93.
87 Oxman (2007) online.
88 Tassin (2013), p. 31.
89 Molenaar (2015), p. 297.
4.3 From Sovereignty to Progressive Jurisdiction in the New Law of the Sea
105
infringe upon the rights and duties of other states in the same zone.
82 In this sense,
some authors refer also to “resource jurisdiction” when discussing the continental
shelf and EEZ regimes, in a rather clear reference to the economics behind the
competences of coastal states in those spaces.
83
This “functional” character allows for coastal states to select specific functions
they wish to exercise within the default 200 nm, examples being the Ecological
Protection Zone, Fisheries Protection Zone, Exclusive Fisheries Zones or the full
Economic Exclusive Zone.
84 From the analysis of the EEZs in the Mediterranean
Sea, Gavouneli concluded that the concept of the EEZ has acquired a certain
flexibility concerning spatial delimitation (the exact length of the zone may vary
from state to state, never exceeding 200 nm)
85 and substantive content.
86 That
flexibility enables states to claim jurisdiction relating either to fisheries, or to
ecological protection, or to the entirety of rights awarded by the Convention in
that zone. It is not the case with the continental shelf regime, which is
(i) geographically more limited than the EEZ and (ii) rather rigorous in the sort of
jurisdiction exercisable over the seabed, according to Art. 77 (1), UNCLOS.
In the EEZ and on the continental shelf adjacent to the territorial sea, coastal states
has authority over certain activities, notably with respect to the management,
exploration and exploitation of natural resources therein. The jurisdiction, in this
case, is not strictly territorial.
87 Coastal states do not have unlimited jurisdiction
over resources and foreign persons, ships and activities, but merely a tempered
jurisdiction to regulate activities directly affecting the seafloor, in the case of the
continental shelf. In this sense, the continental shelf is not to be considered as
territory of the coastal state, but a maritime space where the state exercises limited
rights and is bound by specific duties. An interesting, although legally questionable
opinion is formulated by Virginie Tassin, to whom the continental shelf may be
considered an “accessory territory” of the coastal state.
88
Finally, it should be reminded that sovereign rights and jurisdiction must be
expressly attributed by international law.
89 This is a legalist approach to jurisdiction
in the international law of the sea, according to which states (and other subjects) may
only act in certain maritime zones where a provision permits action. In this regard,
states are guided by the principle of administrative legality, as applied in domestic
82 Gavouneli (2007), p. 68.
83 Kaye (2006), p. 347.
84 For further details on the different functional zones within 200 nm, see Gavouneli (2007),
pp. 93–96.
85 The Kingdom of Spain, for instance, declared a 37nm-long Fisheries Protection Zone in 1997.
Real Decreto 1.315 de 1 agosto 1997, BOE no. 204 de 26 agosto 1997.
86 Gavouneli (2007), p. 93.
87 Oxman (2007) online.
88 Tassin (2013), p. 31.
89 Molenaar (2015), p. 297.
4.3 From Sovereignty to Progressive Jurisdiction in the New Law of the Sea
105