Sexing the Internet
73
information exchange, discourse proliferation, and expression was being recognized.
Consequently, it has become anchored to the state machineries responsible for both
the “ hard ” aspects of intelligence and state propaganda (information) and the “ soft ”
aspects of arts and culture. This change also means that the minister who presently
holds such a wide ambit of power is also responsible and much empowered under the
MCMA.
The second strategy involved attempts to create a sense of moral legitimacy for
Internet regulation by infusing it with a paternalistic framework of sexuality. Again,
this strategy was attempted because other tactics of state censorship were met with
harsh public criticism. In the early months of 2009 there were increased prosecutions
under various pieces of legislation including the MCMA for the publication of materials online. Section 233 of the MCMA makes it an offense to transmit, create, or solicit
any content that is “ obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with
the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person. ”
52 For the fi rst time in
its history, it was used to convict an Internet user for posting a comment on a Web
site that was deemed insulting to the monarchy. A hefty fi ne of MYR 10,000 (USD
3,000) was imposed with the expressed rationale of acting as a deterrent and warning
to members of the public from freely posting their thoughts online.
53 In view of the
political transformations during that period, this fi ne signifi cantly challenged the
credibility of the act.
At the same time, a huge public debate was raised on the issue of online privacy
in response to an incident where private photographs of a popular female public
offi cial from the opposition party were posted online as a tactic to shame or discredit
her, an increasingly common practice in the “ Web 2.0 ” context in many parts of the
world.
54 The incident rendered visible the lack of laws against sexual harassment (both
online and offl ine). However, instead of taking any steps to fi nally legislate on a sexual
harassment bill or a data protection act — both having been in the pipeline for almost
a decade — the same Section 233 of the MCMA was put forward as providing viable
legal remedy for the protection of women against online sexual harassment, or blackmail by spouses who threaten to publish private and sexualized photographs online.
55
This disregard for the actual recommendation by women ’ s rights groups,
56 together
with the wide interpretation of the law, indicate that the goal is not so much to realize
and protect women ’ s rights on the Internet as to strengthen the scope of the MCMA
and to recover its moral legitimacy. It is also interesting to note that censorship was
being proposed as a viable measure to counter the public invasion of a woman ’ s
privacy. After being mooted since 1998, the Personal Data Protection Bill 2010 was
fi nally passed on April 5. However, the scope of the law is limited to the processing
of personal data in commercial transactions, and the government is exempted from
its purview. This provision effectively compromises its potential to act as an effective
counterbalance to the impact of surveillance and self-censorship.
73
information exchange, discourse proliferation, and expression was being recognized.
Consequently, it has become anchored to the state machineries responsible for both
the “ hard ” aspects of intelligence and state propaganda (information) and the “ soft ”
aspects of arts and culture. This change also means that the minister who presently
holds such a wide ambit of power is also responsible and much empowered under the
MCMA.
The second strategy involved attempts to create a sense of moral legitimacy for
Internet regulation by infusing it with a paternalistic framework of sexuality. Again,
this strategy was attempted because other tactics of state censorship were met with
harsh public criticism. In the early months of 2009 there were increased prosecutions
under various pieces of legislation including the MCMA for the publication of materials online. Section 233 of the MCMA makes it an offense to transmit, create, or solicit
any content that is “ obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with
the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person. ”
52 For the fi rst time in
its history, it was used to convict an Internet user for posting a comment on a Web
site that was deemed insulting to the monarchy. A hefty fi ne of MYR 10,000 (USD
3,000) was imposed with the expressed rationale of acting as a deterrent and warning
to members of the public from freely posting their thoughts online.
53 In view of the
political transformations during that period, this fi ne signifi cantly challenged the
credibility of the act.
At the same time, a huge public debate was raised on the issue of online privacy
in response to an incident where private photographs of a popular female public
offi cial from the opposition party were posted online as a tactic to shame or discredit
her, an increasingly common practice in the “ Web 2.0 ” context in many parts of the
world.
54 The incident rendered visible the lack of laws against sexual harassment (both
online and offl ine). However, instead of taking any steps to fi nally legislate on a sexual
harassment bill or a data protection act — both having been in the pipeline for almost
a decade — the same Section 233 of the MCMA was put forward as providing viable
legal remedy for the protection of women against online sexual harassment, or blackmail by spouses who threaten to publish private and sexualized photographs online.
55
This disregard for the actual recommendation by women ’ s rights groups,
56 together
with the wide interpretation of the law, indicate that the goal is not so much to realize
and protect women ’ s rights on the Internet as to strengthen the scope of the MCMA
and to recover its moral legitimacy. It is also interesting to note that censorship was
being proposed as a viable measure to counter the public invasion of a woman ’ s
privacy. After being mooted since 1998, the Personal Data Protection Bill 2010 was
fi nally passed on April 5. However, the scope of the law is limited to the processing
of personal data in commercial transactions, and the government is exempted from
its purview. This provision effectively compromises its potential to act as an effective
counterbalance to the impact of surveillance and self-censorship.