34
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
Responses to this incident have yet to unfold, but seem certain to fuel more urgent
calls to police cyberspace and control anonymity.
Driver 5: The Political Economy of Cyber Security
The assertion of state power in cyberspace is feeding into and in turn being driven by
a massively exploding market for cyber security products and services. The size of this
market is diffi cult to pinpoint with precision, in part because it is stretched across so
many different economic sectors but also in part because a great deal of it is hidden
within military and intelligence “ black budgets ” and withheld from public scrutiny.
There are estimates that the global cyber security market is anywhere between USD
80 and 140 billion annually.
49 The market has triggered a major business restructuring
and the emergence of a new cyber industrial complex, particularly in the United States
where the market for products and services is the largest. Traditional military industrial
giants like Northrup Grunman, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin have shifted to the cyber
security markets, alongside a wide range of new niche players providing specialized
services and tools.
It is important to underline that the political economy of cyber security not only
responds to market demands, but is also a constitutive force that shapes and affects
the realm of the possible, including strategic policy. New products and services, such
as those providing deep packet inspection, surveillance and reconnaissance, data
mining and analysis, fi ltering and throttling, and even computer network attack and
exploitation present new opportunities for authorities and other actors that might
never have been imagined. OpenNet Initiative research has tracked the sale of fi ltering
technologies to authoritarian regimes for many years, but the market has expanded
considerably.
50 Companies like Narus, for example, market products and technologies
that allow precise identifi cation and throttling of packets and protocols, including
those used by censorship-circumvention projects and services. One of its products,
Hone, parses through massive amounts of social networking data from disparate
sources to connect individuals to separate accounts.
51 Its services came under scrutiny
when it was revealed that its products were being employed to track dissidents and
activists in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
52 A growing number of fi rms now offer offensive
computer network attack capabilities, which are being marketed as “ solutions ” for
states and corporations.
53 Not surprisingly, the market can encourage the type of
offensive actions against adversaries outlined earlier that push the boundaries of
acceptable behavior online. For example, a Bollywood studio in India contracted a
cyber security fi rm to engage in DDoS attacks against fi lm download and torrent fi le
trading sites.
54 As this type of market continues to expand, we should expect tools and
services such as these to inform and drive state control practices.
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
Responses to this incident have yet to unfold, but seem certain to fuel more urgent
calls to police cyberspace and control anonymity.
Driver 5: The Political Economy of Cyber Security
The assertion of state power in cyberspace is feeding into and in turn being driven by
a massively exploding market for cyber security products and services. The size of this
market is diffi cult to pinpoint with precision, in part because it is stretched across so
many different economic sectors but also in part because a great deal of it is hidden
within military and intelligence “ black budgets ” and withheld from public scrutiny.
There are estimates that the global cyber security market is anywhere between USD
80 and 140 billion annually.
49 The market has triggered a major business restructuring
and the emergence of a new cyber industrial complex, particularly in the United States
where the market for products and services is the largest. Traditional military industrial
giants like Northrup Grunman, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin have shifted to the cyber
security markets, alongside a wide range of new niche players providing specialized
services and tools.
It is important to underline that the political economy of cyber security not only
responds to market demands, but is also a constitutive force that shapes and affects
the realm of the possible, including strategic policy. New products and services, such
as those providing deep packet inspection, surveillance and reconnaissance, data
mining and analysis, fi ltering and throttling, and even computer network attack and
exploitation present new opportunities for authorities and other actors that might
never have been imagined. OpenNet Initiative research has tracked the sale of fi ltering
technologies to authoritarian regimes for many years, but the market has expanded
considerably.
50 Companies like Narus, for example, market products and technologies
that allow precise identifi cation and throttling of packets and protocols, including
those used by censorship-circumvention projects and services. One of its products,
Hone, parses through massive amounts of social networking data from disparate
sources to connect individuals to separate accounts.
51 Its services came under scrutiny
when it was revealed that its products were being employed to track dissidents and
activists in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
52 A growing number of fi rms now offer offensive
computer network attack capabilities, which are being marketed as “ solutions ” for
states and corporations.
53 Not surprisingly, the market can encourage the type of
offensive actions against adversaries outlined earlier that push the boundaries of
acceptable behavior online. For example, a Bollywood studio in India contracted a
cyber security fi rm to engage in DDoS attacks against fi lm download and torrent fi le
trading sites.
54 As this type of market continues to expand, we should expect tools and
services such as these to inform and drive state control practices.