ONI Country Profi le
393
on FPT Telecom. The inconsistencies in the level of fi ltering between VNPT and FPT
Telecom refl ect previous fi ndings from ONI testing in 2007 – 2008.
Both ISPs blocked signifi cantly more political Web sites than social or confl ict and
security sites. FPT Telecom fi ltered only one Web site per category. The Web sites of
the Vietnamese Youth Foundation ( http://vnyouth.com ) and the Federation of Associations of the Republic of Vietnam Navy and Merchant Marine ( http://vietnamnavy.
com ) were found to be blocked on FPT Telecom. None of these Web sites were blocked
in the 2007 – 2008 round of ONI testing. In the social category, Viettel blocked the Web
site of the Vietnamese Youth Foundation ( http://vnyouth.com ) and Ng u’ ó’ i Vi ê
˙
t, a
local language news site ( http://nguoi-viet.com ). Viettel blocked two Web sites with
content relating to the military and two Web sites with detailed content related to the
Vietnamese navy and marines, http://vietnamnavy.com and http://tqlcvn.org . Neither
ISP blocked pornographic content.
In the Internet tools category, both ISPs blocked Facebook ( http://facebook.com ). Both
ISPs also targeted circumvention Web sites for fi ltering but differed in the specifi c sites
they were blocking. For instance, Viettel fi ltered http://anonymizer.com , http://the
-cloak.com , http://anonymouse.org/, https://megaproxy.com , http://proxyweb.net/ ,
and http://inetprivacy.com , while FPT fi ltered only http://inetprivacy.com .
Conclusion
The government of Vietnam has committed to the advancement of ICTs as part of the
country ’ s development project. Internet penetration in Vietnam is expanding rapidly,
with many citizens connecting to the Internet at home and through mobile phones.
As the penetration rate continues to grow, the government is taking steps to ensure
that the Internet is not being used in a way that can cause domestic instability. These
controls are being accomplished through a robust legal and regulatory framework that
lays down Internet use rules for private users and Internet services. The state further
controls Internet use by monitoring users and fi ltering Web sites that contain questionable content.
Despite restrictions to free access, Vietnamese netizens continue to take advantage
of the Internet as a space for expressing criticisms of the state. As a result, Vietnamese
cyberspace has increasingly become a contested space among various actors, as illustrated by the cases of increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks launched against groups
critical of the state.
Notes
1. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Vietnam , November 30, 2010, http://www.state
.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm .
393
on FPT Telecom. The inconsistencies in the level of fi ltering between VNPT and FPT
Telecom refl ect previous fi ndings from ONI testing in 2007 – 2008.
Both ISPs blocked signifi cantly more political Web sites than social or confl ict and
security sites. FPT Telecom fi ltered only one Web site per category. The Web sites of
the Vietnamese Youth Foundation ( http://vnyouth.com ) and the Federation of Associations of the Republic of Vietnam Navy and Merchant Marine ( http://vietnamnavy.
com ) were found to be blocked on FPT Telecom. None of these Web sites were blocked
in the 2007 – 2008 round of ONI testing. In the social category, Viettel blocked the Web
site of the Vietnamese Youth Foundation ( http://vnyouth.com ) and Ng u’ ó’ i Vi ê
˙
t, a
local language news site ( http://nguoi-viet.com ). Viettel blocked two Web sites with
content relating to the military and two Web sites with detailed content related to the
Vietnamese navy and marines, http://vietnamnavy.com and http://tqlcvn.org . Neither
ISP blocked pornographic content.
In the Internet tools category, both ISPs blocked Facebook ( http://facebook.com ). Both
ISPs also targeted circumvention Web sites for fi ltering but differed in the specifi c sites
they were blocking. For instance, Viettel fi ltered http://anonymizer.com , http://the
-cloak.com , http://anonymouse.org/, https://megaproxy.com , http://proxyweb.net/ ,
and http://inetprivacy.com , while FPT fi ltered only http://inetprivacy.com .
Conclusion
The government of Vietnam has committed to the advancement of ICTs as part of the
country ’ s development project. Internet penetration in Vietnam is expanding rapidly,
with many citizens connecting to the Internet at home and through mobile phones.
As the penetration rate continues to grow, the government is taking steps to ensure
that the Internet is not being used in a way that can cause domestic instability. These
controls are being accomplished through a robust legal and regulatory framework that
lays down Internet use rules for private users and Internet services. The state further
controls Internet use by monitoring users and fi ltering Web sites that contain questionable content.
Despite restrictions to free access, Vietnamese netizens continue to take advantage
of the Internet as a space for expressing criticisms of the state. As a result, Vietnamese
cyberspace has increasingly become a contested space among various actors, as illustrated by the cases of increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks launched against groups
critical of the state.
Notes
1. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Vietnam , November 30, 2010, http://www.state
.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm .