ONI Country Profi le
375
Web sites.
26 Furthermore, since 2008, an automatic URL fi ltering system has been
installed at IIGs under CAT Telecom to fi lter objectionable materials, with l è se-majest é
content being the prime target.
27
L è se-majest é , which refers to punishment for any negative public remarks about
the monarchy, is strongly enforced in Thailand. The Thai criminal code specifi es that
whoever “ defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the heir-apparent or the
Regent ” can be jailed for three to 15 years.
28 Although l è se-majest é was not included
as a deterrent to Internet content in the law, it was incorporated under the broad
provision of national security because the Thai nation-state is understood to rest on
three pillars — the nation, the Buddhist religion, and the monarchy.
29 For this reason
and because of the social divide between supporters of the monarchy and supporters
of Thaksin Shinawatra, l è se-majest é has been increasingly invoked to censor Web sites.
According to recent research, there was one court order to block two URLs in 2007,
whereas in 2008 there were 13 court orders to block 2,071 URLs.
30 There were 64 orders
in 2009 resulting in 28,705 Web sites ordered blocked. The number of Web sites
ordered to be blocked rose to 43,908 in 2010.
31 Within three years after the enforcement of the Computer Crime Act, there have been 117 court orders to block access
to 74,686 URLs.
32 Given the far-reaching power of this act, there is increasing evidence
that this law is being employed as a political tool.
33
A recent notable case of l è se-majest é being used to prosecute individuals for online
actions is that of Chiranuch Premchaiporn, Web master of the popular online news
portal Prachatai. Chiranuch was fi rst charged in March 2009 under Section 15 of the
Computer-Related Offenses act for intermediary liability or consent/negligence of
operators for offenses to be committed. These charges were brought down because
of alleged l è se-majest é comments posted on the Prachatai forum by users, which
Chiranuch claims were removed immediately following the fi rst notice from police.
In September 2010, she was arrested and served new charges following reentry into
Thailand after attending a Google-sponsored conference on Internet liberty. These
further charges included l è se-majest é offenses for publishing an interview on Prachatai with a Thai man who was arrested and charged with l è se-majest é for refusing to
stand during the royal anthem in a cinema.
34 A trial started in February 2011, with
a verdict expected in April 2011. Chiranuch faces ten separate charges, each of which
carries a maximum sentence of fi ve years in jail. This case is a stark example of Thai
legislation used to prosecute individuals for intermediary liability for l è se-majest é
content and has raised concerns for freedom of expression in communities across
the world.
35
To bypass Internet censorship, many activists and dissidents use anonymizers and
circumvention software.
36 With the recent enforcement of the State of Emergency
Decree, online users and online service providers (OSPs) also self-censor or strictly
monitor content to avoid prosecution under the Computer Crime Act. Public
375
Web sites.
26 Furthermore, since 2008, an automatic URL fi ltering system has been
installed at IIGs under CAT Telecom to fi lter objectionable materials, with l è se-majest é
content being the prime target.
27
L è se-majest é , which refers to punishment for any negative public remarks about
the monarchy, is strongly enforced in Thailand. The Thai criminal code specifi es that
whoever “ defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the heir-apparent or the
Regent ” can be jailed for three to 15 years.
28 Although l è se-majest é was not included
as a deterrent to Internet content in the law, it was incorporated under the broad
provision of national security because the Thai nation-state is understood to rest on
three pillars — the nation, the Buddhist religion, and the monarchy.
29 For this reason
and because of the social divide between supporters of the monarchy and supporters
of Thaksin Shinawatra, l è se-majest é has been increasingly invoked to censor Web sites.
According to recent research, there was one court order to block two URLs in 2007,
whereas in 2008 there were 13 court orders to block 2,071 URLs.
30 There were 64 orders
in 2009 resulting in 28,705 Web sites ordered blocked. The number of Web sites
ordered to be blocked rose to 43,908 in 2010.
31 Within three years after the enforcement of the Computer Crime Act, there have been 117 court orders to block access
to 74,686 URLs.
32 Given the far-reaching power of this act, there is increasing evidence
that this law is being employed as a political tool.
33
A recent notable case of l è se-majest é being used to prosecute individuals for online
actions is that of Chiranuch Premchaiporn, Web master of the popular online news
portal Prachatai. Chiranuch was fi rst charged in March 2009 under Section 15 of the
Computer-Related Offenses act for intermediary liability or consent/negligence of
operators for offenses to be committed. These charges were brought down because
of alleged l è se-majest é comments posted on the Prachatai forum by users, which
Chiranuch claims were removed immediately following the fi rst notice from police.
In September 2010, she was arrested and served new charges following reentry into
Thailand after attending a Google-sponsored conference on Internet liberty. These
further charges included l è se-majest é offenses for publishing an interview on Prachatai with a Thai man who was arrested and charged with l è se-majest é for refusing to
stand during the royal anthem in a cinema.
34 A trial started in February 2011, with
a verdict expected in April 2011. Chiranuch faces ten separate charges, each of which
carries a maximum sentence of fi ve years in jail. This case is a stark example of Thai
legislation used to prosecute individuals for intermediary liability for l è se-majest é
content and has raised concerns for freedom of expression in communities across
the world.
35
To bypass Internet censorship, many activists and dissidents use anonymizers and
circumvention software.
36 With the recent enforcement of the State of Emergency
Decree, online users and online service providers (OSPs) also self-censor or strictly
monitor content to avoid prosecution under the Computer Crime Act. Public