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Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
lay out the major driving forces of cyberspace contests: the continued rapid expansion
of cyberspace throughout all aspects of society, including the rapid rise of mobile
access devices; a demographic shift from the North and West to the South and East
as a new generation of digital natives outside the industrialized West logs on and
brings with them a new set of values and interests and resistance to state and privatesector controls; the increasingly dynamic competition among states for infl uence in
and through cyberspace, manifest in the creation of dedicated cyber armed forces and
an arms race in cyberspace; and more aggressive measures taken by authoritarian and
democratically challenged states to counter antiregime mobilization through offensive
activities.
The contests we outline cannot be categorized in simple dualisms, but refl ect
a patchwork of competing interests and values. These contests are reaching down
into the very inner workings of cyberspace, into areas previously assumed to be
noncontroversial and immutable components of its core operating infrastructure.
Everything is up for grabs as cyberspace opens itself up to intense debate, negotiation, and competitive struggle. Principles and rules that were once cherished and
sacred have been questioned and challenged: from network neutrality, to basic
peering and routing arrangements, to the legitimacy of denial-of-service and other
offensive computer attacks. The contests in cyberspace that we outline, therefore,
represent a serious crisis of political authority and legitimacy of existing norms,
rules, and principles, as the emerging domain, along with the largely privatesector-controlled infrastructure on which it rests, clashes with the territorially based
system of sovereign rule and widely varying perceptions of national interest and
identity.
We conclude, however, on a relatively optimistic note. The crisis of authority in
the domain opened up by contestation throws into question that entire edifi ce of
cyberspace governance — from the infrastructure, to the code, to the regulatory
realms. But in doing so, it also turns everything inside out, so to speak, laid bare for
everyone to examine and begin again anew. Of course, such an opening presents
serious risks for long-cherished principles and norms. But as they are questioned, an
opportunity opens up for a comprehensive discussion of fi rst principles: how the
space should be defi ned and constituted, what behavior is appropriate for this space,
and what should be the relationship, responsibilities, and rights of the actors who
control it and the political jurisdictions through which it is embedded. Out of the
rubble and chaos left in the wake of the perfect storm may arise an opportunity to
rethink some conventional wisdom and assumptions that for too long have been
taken for granted — not only about cyberspace, but also about the relationship
between private and public authority, territory and political rule, and the character
of global governance.
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