ONI Country Profi le
345
views and dialogue are promoted, except “ in situations where the content poses a
security risk or violated religious, social or cultural values, ” or disseminates blasphemous material, in which case the government has the ability to “ take steps to block
such traffi c, ” and “ necessary legislation would be enacted, as necessary, to support the
aforementioned goals. ”
42 The fi nal version of the policy was slated for release in
December 2010; at the time of this writing it had not yet been released.
Surveillance
Internet surveillance in Pakistan is primarily conducted by the PIE under the auspices
of the PTA. The PIE monitors all incoming and outgoing Internet traffi c from Pakistan,
as well as e-mail and keywords, and stores data for a specifi ed amount of time.
43 Law
enforcement agencies such as the FIA can be asked by the government to conduct
surveillance and monitor content. Under PECO, ISPs are required to retain traffi c data
for a minimum of 90 days and may also be required to collect real-time data and
record information while keeping their involvement with the government confi dential.
44 The ordinance does not specify what kinds of actions constitute grounds for
data collection and surveillance.
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative testing was conducted on two major ISPs: PTCL and CyberNet
Internet Services. Consistent with 2007 – 2008 testing results, ONI testing found no
uniform method of blocking between the two ISPs. Pakistan continues to fi lter content
that is considered to threaten the country ’ s internal security. This includes content
relating to the Baluchi confl ict and independence movement as well as religious
content deemed blasphemous. Filtering in Pakistan is inconsistent between ISPs and
is often intermittent.
Internet users on PTCL who attempt to access blocked content receive a block page
informing them that the site in question is restricted, while CyberNet users attempting
to access blocked content receive a network error page indicating that there are “ no
DNS records ” for the site. This error page gives users the impression that the Web sites
are inaccessible as a result of network errors or that they simply no longer exist. Technical analysis revealed that these errors were the result of a DNS look-up failure, which
is consistent with 2007 and 2008 testing fi ndings.
A form of collateral fi ltering, the blocking of additional content that is unintended
and caused by imprecise fi ltering methods,
45 has long been a feature of Internet censorship in Pakistan. For example, in March 2007, in an attempt to comply with a
Supreme Court order to fi lter blasphemous content “ at all costs, ” the PTCL implemented a blanket IP address block at their Karachi PIE exchange that lasted for four
345
views and dialogue are promoted, except “ in situations where the content poses a
security risk or violated religious, social or cultural values, ” or disseminates blasphemous material, in which case the government has the ability to “ take steps to block
such traffi c, ” and “ necessary legislation would be enacted, as necessary, to support the
aforementioned goals. ”
42 The fi nal version of the policy was slated for release in
December 2010; at the time of this writing it had not yet been released.
Surveillance
Internet surveillance in Pakistan is primarily conducted by the PIE under the auspices
of the PTA. The PIE monitors all incoming and outgoing Internet traffi c from Pakistan,
as well as e-mail and keywords, and stores data for a specifi ed amount of time.
43 Law
enforcement agencies such as the FIA can be asked by the government to conduct
surveillance and monitor content. Under PECO, ISPs are required to retain traffi c data
for a minimum of 90 days and may also be required to collect real-time data and
record information while keeping their involvement with the government confi dential.
44 The ordinance does not specify what kinds of actions constitute grounds for
data collection and surveillance.
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative testing was conducted on two major ISPs: PTCL and CyberNet
Internet Services. Consistent with 2007 – 2008 testing results, ONI testing found no
uniform method of blocking between the two ISPs. Pakistan continues to fi lter content
that is considered to threaten the country ’ s internal security. This includes content
relating to the Baluchi confl ict and independence movement as well as religious
content deemed blasphemous. Filtering in Pakistan is inconsistent between ISPs and
is often intermittent.
Internet users on PTCL who attempt to access blocked content receive a block page
informing them that the site in question is restricted, while CyberNet users attempting
to access blocked content receive a network error page indicating that there are “ no
DNS records ” for the site. This error page gives users the impression that the Web sites
are inaccessible as a result of network errors or that they simply no longer exist. Technical analysis revealed that these errors were the result of a DNS look-up failure, which
is consistent with 2007 and 2008 testing fi ndings.
A form of collateral fi ltering, the blocking of additional content that is unintended
and caused by imprecise fi ltering methods,
45 has long been a feature of Internet censorship in Pakistan. For example, in March 2007, in an attempt to comply with a
Supreme Court order to fi lter blasphemous content “ at all costs, ” the PTCL implemented a blanket IP address block at their Karachi PIE exchange that lasted for four