330
Malaysia
Evidence of ISP compliance with governmental interception requests stretches as
far back as 1998, when the Malaysian government swiftly identifi ed perpetrators
behind an e-mail hoax with the cooperation of ISPs.
74 The government was spurred
into action because the e-mail circulated a false but not implausible rumor that racial
riots in neighboring Indonesia had spilled over to Malaysia, resulting in mass panic
and binge buying of supplies in anticipation of a curfew.
75 More recently, a 2008 DNS
block by the largest Malaysian ISP, TMNet, of the controversial Malaysia Today site
demonstrates a degree of continued ISP compliance with governmental requests.
76
Subsequently, the site administrator, Raja Petra Kamarudin, has reported repeated
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks between 2009 and 2010.
77 The most recent
incident in September 2010 suggests pervasive (but unconfi rmed) governmental
monitoring — access to Malaysia Today was denied immediately after Raja Petra released
documents illustrating rampant corruption within the federal government.
78 The rapid
attack corroborates a 2010 announcement that the Malaysian government has created
a specially designated cyber “ task force ” charged with monitoring the Internet for
“ blog postings deemed harmful to national unity. ”
79
Although there are governmental plans to require ISPs to keep detailed records of
their subscribers, as evidenced by a consultation paper and report issued by the
MCMC, no rules appear to have been published to date.
80 In April 2011, the government announced the “ 1Malaysia ” e-mail project, a “ voluntary ” service for all correspondence between the public and the state.
81 This project has been heavily
criticized as expensive, superfl uous, and a potential tool for state surveillance.
82 The
public is well attuned to the government ’ s heightened interest in the Internet, especially after the successful online coordination of fi ve large rallies by means of blogs
in 2007. This awareness of governmental monitoring is exemplifi ed in precautions
taken in 2010 by administrators of a Facebook protest page against governmental
plans to build a MYR 5 billion (approximately USD 1.6 billion) 100-story tower in
Malaysia. In organizing cake parties to mark the 263,000-member-strong page ’ s onemonth anniversary, they expressly advised against having banners, slogans, or leaders
at each location to avoid arrest under the exceedingly broad Police Act.
83 These
admonishments proved prescient, for university offi cials issued warnings to students
who intended to host one such party, and security personnel dispersed another
gathering.
84
In general, Malaysians are accustomed to monitoring and surveillance by the government. Registration requirements are pervasive — each citizen is required by law to
carry an identifi cation card at all times,
85 and in 2006 registration was made compulsory for all prepaid mobile phone users under the CMA.
86 In 1998 the Malaysian
government briefl y toyed with requiring registration of all Internet caf é users but lifted
this rule in 1999.
87 Today, the rule is arguably unnecessary because the combined effect
of closed circuit television cameras installed after a spate of violent crimes
88 and the
Malaysia
Evidence of ISP compliance with governmental interception requests stretches as
far back as 1998, when the Malaysian government swiftly identifi ed perpetrators
behind an e-mail hoax with the cooperation of ISPs.
74 The government was spurred
into action because the e-mail circulated a false but not implausible rumor that racial
riots in neighboring Indonesia had spilled over to Malaysia, resulting in mass panic
and binge buying of supplies in anticipation of a curfew.
75 More recently, a 2008 DNS
block by the largest Malaysian ISP, TMNet, of the controversial Malaysia Today site
demonstrates a degree of continued ISP compliance with governmental requests.
76
Subsequently, the site administrator, Raja Petra Kamarudin, has reported repeated
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks between 2009 and 2010.
77 The most recent
incident in September 2010 suggests pervasive (but unconfi rmed) governmental
monitoring — access to Malaysia Today was denied immediately after Raja Petra released
documents illustrating rampant corruption within the federal government.
78 The rapid
attack corroborates a 2010 announcement that the Malaysian government has created
a specially designated cyber “ task force ” charged with monitoring the Internet for
“ blog postings deemed harmful to national unity. ”
79
Although there are governmental plans to require ISPs to keep detailed records of
their subscribers, as evidenced by a consultation paper and report issued by the
MCMC, no rules appear to have been published to date.
80 In April 2011, the government announced the “ 1Malaysia ” e-mail project, a “ voluntary ” service for all correspondence between the public and the state.
81 This project has been heavily
criticized as expensive, superfl uous, and a potential tool for state surveillance.
82 The
public is well attuned to the government ’ s heightened interest in the Internet, especially after the successful online coordination of fi ve large rallies by means of blogs
in 2007. This awareness of governmental monitoring is exemplifi ed in precautions
taken in 2010 by administrators of a Facebook protest page against governmental
plans to build a MYR 5 billion (approximately USD 1.6 billion) 100-story tower in
Malaysia. In organizing cake parties to mark the 263,000-member-strong page ’ s onemonth anniversary, they expressly advised against having banners, slogans, or leaders
at each location to avoid arrest under the exceedingly broad Police Act.
83 These
admonishments proved prescient, for university offi cials issued warnings to students
who intended to host one such party, and security personnel dispersed another
gathering.
84
In general, Malaysians are accustomed to monitoring and surveillance by the government. Registration requirements are pervasive — each citizen is required by law to
carry an identifi cation card at all times,
85 and in 2006 registration was made compulsory for all prepaid mobile phone users under the CMA.
86 In 1998 the Malaysian
government briefl y toyed with requiring registration of all Internet caf é users but lifted
this rule in 1999.
87 Today, the rule is arguably unnecessary because the combined effect
of closed circuit television cameras installed after a spate of violent crimes
88 and the