Access Contested
17
their disagreement with the state ’ s decision to increase the incidence of Internet blocking.
23 China ’ s mandate that hardware providers install Green Dam fi ltering software
on new computers before they shipped met with substantial resistance and was pulled
back.
24 The Malaysian state has publicly struggled with political pressure to start fi ltering.
25 Plans to institute state-mandated fi ltering in Australia were shelved after extensive public pushback.
26 The last chapter has yet to be written in the back-and-forth
between Google and China about whether unfi ltered search results can be presented
to Chinese Internet users. And in contrast to most other examples, there appears to
be vocal public support in favor of pornography fi ltering in Indonesia.
27 These and
many other contests like them will play out in the years to come.
The perspective of most states on Internet regulation has changed substantially
from where it began in the open-commons era. The premise today is not whether the
Internet can be regulated, but rather how it must be regulated and how that regulation
should be carried out most effectively. States have also come to realize that the activities of other states online need to be constrained in various respects. State interests in
what transpires online — the activities of other states, private companies, individuals,
and groups — have become much clearer over the past decade, and the competitions
have become more intense as a result. As Deibert and Rohozinski emphasize, there is
an arms race in cyberspace today between states and their adversaries.
The early theorizing about Internet regulation centered on the extent to which
states could, and would, regulate the activities of individuals in cyberspace. This kind
of state-to-individual regulation is a given today. Contests now concentrate not only
on other kinds of regulation in which states are involved but also on those exercised
by a multitude of other actors with a stake in cyberspace policies and practices. It is
important to remember that most of cyberspace is owned and operated by private
parties, and its protocols are developed and refi ned through processes that straddle
the public and the private. As the frontline operators of the network, these actors are
being asked or otherwise compelled to regulate the spaces they own and operate in
ways that constitute a de facto exercise of authority. Not surprisingly, many of these
companies are moving into spaces of public policy deliberation where such policies
are likely to become more prominent features. It is not too far-fetched to think of
companies like Google, Facebook, and Research in Motion having foreign policies.
The same could be said of networks of civil society groups across all parts of the political spectrum. Cyberspace contestation is made up of a complex patchwork of competing interests and actors of all types. A key feature of the access-contested period will
be the interplay and clash between these often-competing interests and values.
These contests among private and public actors reach deep into the heart of the
very foundational principles upon which the Internet was formed. Almost everything
is now up for grabs and open for debate. Refl ecting the essentially contested nature
of the space, some have even gone so far as to argue that the Internet itself should be
17
their disagreement with the state ’ s decision to increase the incidence of Internet blocking.
23 China ’ s mandate that hardware providers install Green Dam fi ltering software
on new computers before they shipped met with substantial resistance and was pulled
back.
24 The Malaysian state has publicly struggled with political pressure to start fi ltering.
25 Plans to institute state-mandated fi ltering in Australia were shelved after extensive public pushback.
26 The last chapter has yet to be written in the back-and-forth
between Google and China about whether unfi ltered search results can be presented
to Chinese Internet users. And in contrast to most other examples, there appears to
be vocal public support in favor of pornography fi ltering in Indonesia.
27 These and
many other contests like them will play out in the years to come.
The perspective of most states on Internet regulation has changed substantially
from where it began in the open-commons era. The premise today is not whether the
Internet can be regulated, but rather how it must be regulated and how that regulation
should be carried out most effectively. States have also come to realize that the activities of other states online need to be constrained in various respects. State interests in
what transpires online — the activities of other states, private companies, individuals,
and groups — have become much clearer over the past decade, and the competitions
have become more intense as a result. As Deibert and Rohozinski emphasize, there is
an arms race in cyberspace today between states and their adversaries.
The early theorizing about Internet regulation centered on the extent to which
states could, and would, regulate the activities of individuals in cyberspace. This kind
of state-to-individual regulation is a given today. Contests now concentrate not only
on other kinds of regulation in which states are involved but also on those exercised
by a multitude of other actors with a stake in cyberspace policies and practices. It is
important to remember that most of cyberspace is owned and operated by private
parties, and its protocols are developed and refi ned through processes that straddle
the public and the private. As the frontline operators of the network, these actors are
being asked or otherwise compelled to regulate the spaces they own and operate in
ways that constitute a de facto exercise of authority. Not surprisingly, many of these
companies are moving into spaces of public policy deliberation where such policies
are likely to become more prominent features. It is not too far-fetched to think of
companies like Google, Facebook, and Research in Motion having foreign policies.
The same could be said of networks of civil society groups across all parts of the political spectrum. Cyberspace contestation is made up of a complex patchwork of competing interests and actors of all types. A key feature of the access-contested period will
be the interplay and clash between these often-competing interests and values.
These contests among private and public actors reach deep into the heart of the
very foundational principles upon which the Internet was formed. Almost everything
is now up for grabs and open for debate. Refl ecting the essentially contested nature
of the space, some have even gone so far as to argue that the Internet itself should be