ONI Country Profi le
317
whether content other than pornography was being fi ltered. High-impact local Web
sites included sites that contained political or religious content, as well as social media
sites (e.g., blogs and Facebook groups) and circumvention and anonymizer sites.
Testing revealed that out of the URLs tested, IndosatM2 blocked a small number
of blogs containing political criticism and commentary, religious conversion commentary, and religious criticism (e.g., http://indonbodoh.blogspot.com , http://
beritamuslim.wordpress.com , and http://komiknabimuhammad.blogspot.com ). It was
found that XL Axiata was not blocking any of the tested URLs. While ONI testing
determined that fi ltering was implemented by IndosatM2 and XL Axiata through
HTTP proxy blocking, it was unable to ascertain whether the ISPs were using the Trust
Positive fi ltering program.
Conclusion
Although the government of Indonesia holds a positive view about the Internet as a
means for economic development, it has become increasingly concerned over the
impact of access to information and has demonstrated an interest in increasing its
control over offensive online content. The government regulates such content through
legal and regulatory frameworks and through partnerships with ISPs and Internet
caf é s. During the “ Peterporn ” crisis in 2010, state offi cials expressed the need to protect
the nation from offensive online content, and the government has since been developing and promoting mechanisms to ensure that Web content is adequately regulated.
Although the government is tightening control over Web content, it is taking precautions to ensure that regulations abide by existing laws and that regulations are transparent. For example, databases of blacklisted Web sites are made available to the
public. OpenNet Initiative testing found that ISP fi ltering heavily targets pornographic
Web sites. However, fi ltering is unsystematic and inconsistent, as demonstrated by the
differences in fi ltering among ISPs. It will be interesting to track how Internet fi ltering
in Indonesia changes as the government develops more mechanisms to control Web
content.
Notes
1. Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960 – 1968 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); “ US Propped Up Suharto Despite
Rights Abuses: Documents, ” Agence France-Presse, January 28, 2008, http://afp.google.com/
article/ALeqM5gBus6P_G-L_m9i0uYBcRgEtt9Pvw .
2. Donald Greenlees, “ Suharto ’ s Legacy of Development and Corruption, ” New York Times , January 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/world/asia/28iht-suharto.1.9542684.html ;
Governance and Social Development Resource Center, Helpdesk Research Report: Indonesian Finan-
317
whether content other than pornography was being fi ltered. High-impact local Web
sites included sites that contained political or religious content, as well as social media
sites (e.g., blogs and Facebook groups) and circumvention and anonymizer sites.
Testing revealed that out of the URLs tested, IndosatM2 blocked a small number
of blogs containing political criticism and commentary, religious conversion commentary, and religious criticism (e.g., http://indonbodoh.blogspot.com , http://
beritamuslim.wordpress.com , and http://komiknabimuhammad.blogspot.com ). It was
found that XL Axiata was not blocking any of the tested URLs. While ONI testing
determined that fi ltering was implemented by IndosatM2 and XL Axiata through
HTTP proxy blocking, it was unable to ascertain whether the ISPs were using the Trust
Positive fi ltering program.
Conclusion
Although the government of Indonesia holds a positive view about the Internet as a
means for economic development, it has become increasingly concerned over the
impact of access to information and has demonstrated an interest in increasing its
control over offensive online content. The government regulates such content through
legal and regulatory frameworks and through partnerships with ISPs and Internet
caf é s. During the “ Peterporn ” crisis in 2010, state offi cials expressed the need to protect
the nation from offensive online content, and the government has since been developing and promoting mechanisms to ensure that Web content is adequately regulated.
Although the government is tightening control over Web content, it is taking precautions to ensure that regulations abide by existing laws and that regulations are transparent. For example, databases of blacklisted Web sites are made available to the
public. OpenNet Initiative testing found that ISP fi ltering heavily targets pornographic
Web sites. However, fi ltering is unsystematic and inconsistent, as demonstrated by the
differences in fi ltering among ISPs. It will be interesting to track how Internet fi ltering
in Indonesia changes as the government develops more mechanisms to control Web
content.
Notes
1. Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960 – 1968 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); “ US Propped Up Suharto Despite
Rights Abuses: Documents, ” Agence France-Presse, January 28, 2008, http://afp.google.com/
article/ALeqM5gBus6P_G-L_m9i0uYBcRgEtt9Pvw .
2. Donald Greenlees, “ Suharto ’ s Legacy of Development and Corruption, ” New York Times , January 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/world/asia/28iht-suharto.1.9542684.html ;
Governance and Social Development Resource Center, Helpdesk Research Report: Indonesian Finan-