ONI Country Profi le
287
keyword detected in either the header or the content of a message triggers the blocking
mechanism and sends reset packets to both the source and destination IP addresses to
disrupt and break the Internet user ’ s connection.
The OpenNet Initiative found a lesser extent of Internet protocol (IP) blocking.
Consistent with past ONI fi ndings, transparency in Internet fi ltering remains low.
There is no publicly available list of banned sites or mechanisms for users to petition
to have a blocked site reviewed. When users attempt to access a blocked site, they
receive a network timeout error page that does not indicate if or why the site has been
blocked — it can appear to be the result of routine network errors.
Results indicate that the Chinese government continues to concentrate on blocking
content that could potentially undermine the authority of the CCP as well as its
control over social stability. It was found that CNLink Networks was extensively fi ltering Web sites critical of the ruling party. These sites include foreign and international
media reporting on China in both foreign and local languages, such as Boxun ( http://
boxun.com ), Ming Pao ( http://www.mingpao.com ), the Epoch Times ( http://
epochtimes.com ), BBC Asia Pacifi c ( http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacifi c ), the
Chinese-language BBC Zhongwen ( http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/default
.stm ), Voice of America ( http://voanews.com ), and Radio Free Asia (both the Englishand local-language versions of the site: http://rfa.org , http://rfa.org/mandarin , http://
rfa.org/uyghur , and http://rfa.org/tibetan ). Web sites belonging to human rights
groups critical of the Chinese state are also extensively fi ltered, including those belonging to Human Rights in China ( http://hrichina.org ), Amnesty International ( http://
web.amnesty.org , http://amnesty.org.hk ), Human Rights Watch ( http://hrw.org , and
http://www.hrw.org/chinese ), and the China Labour Bulletin ( http://clb.org.hk ).
The fi ltering program of CNLink Networks also heavily emphasized Web sites focusing on politically sensitive issues related to China ’ s national stability such as Uyghur,
Tibetan, and Mongolian separatism and rights protection. Although these issues are
all sensitive for the Chinese government, CNLink Networks fi ltered signifi cantly more
Web sites with content related to Tibet than the Uyghur minority or Mongolia. Among
the Web sites blocked were http://savetibet.org , http://tibetanyouthcongress.org ,
http://friendsoftibet.org , http://www.uyghuramerican.org , and http://innermongolia
.org . Falun Gong Web sites were also extensively fi ltered.
Web sites that challenge the reunifi cation policy of the PRC — such as those calling
for the formal independence of Taiwan — remain fi ltered, such as sites of the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Offi ce in New York ( http://www.taipei.org ), New Taiwan, Ilha
Formosa, Taiwan Organization in the United States ( http://taiwandc.org ), and the
main portal of the Taiwanese government ( http://gov.tw ). Web sites pertaining to
politically sensitive events are also targeted, such as content related to Tiananmen
Square (e.g., http://64memo.com , http://tiananmenvigil.org , and http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989 ).
287
keyword detected in either the header or the content of a message triggers the blocking
mechanism and sends reset packets to both the source and destination IP addresses to
disrupt and break the Internet user ’ s connection.
The OpenNet Initiative found a lesser extent of Internet protocol (IP) blocking.
Consistent with past ONI fi ndings, transparency in Internet fi ltering remains low.
There is no publicly available list of banned sites or mechanisms for users to petition
to have a blocked site reviewed. When users attempt to access a blocked site, they
receive a network timeout error page that does not indicate if or why the site has been
blocked — it can appear to be the result of routine network errors.
Results indicate that the Chinese government continues to concentrate on blocking
content that could potentially undermine the authority of the CCP as well as its
control over social stability. It was found that CNLink Networks was extensively fi ltering Web sites critical of the ruling party. These sites include foreign and international
media reporting on China in both foreign and local languages, such as Boxun ( http://
boxun.com ), Ming Pao ( http://www.mingpao.com ), the Epoch Times ( http://
epochtimes.com ), BBC Asia Pacifi c ( http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacifi c ), the
Chinese-language BBC Zhongwen ( http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/default
.stm ), Voice of America ( http://voanews.com ), and Radio Free Asia (both the Englishand local-language versions of the site: http://rfa.org , http://rfa.org/mandarin , http://
rfa.org/uyghur , and http://rfa.org/tibetan ). Web sites belonging to human rights
groups critical of the Chinese state are also extensively fi ltered, including those belonging to Human Rights in China ( http://hrichina.org ), Amnesty International ( http://
web.amnesty.org , http://amnesty.org.hk ), Human Rights Watch ( http://hrw.org , and
http://www.hrw.org/chinese ), and the China Labour Bulletin ( http://clb.org.hk ).
The fi ltering program of CNLink Networks also heavily emphasized Web sites focusing on politically sensitive issues related to China ’ s national stability such as Uyghur,
Tibetan, and Mongolian separatism and rights protection. Although these issues are
all sensitive for the Chinese government, CNLink Networks fi ltered signifi cantly more
Web sites with content related to Tibet than the Uyghur minority or Mongolia. Among
the Web sites blocked were http://savetibet.org , http://tibetanyouthcongress.org ,
http://friendsoftibet.org , http://www.uyghuramerican.org , and http://innermongolia
.org . Falun Gong Web sites were also extensively fi ltered.
Web sites that challenge the reunifi cation policy of the PRC — such as those calling
for the formal independence of Taiwan — remain fi ltered, such as sites of the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Offi ce in New York ( http://www.taipei.org ), New Taiwan, Ilha
Formosa, Taiwan Organization in the United States ( http://taiwandc.org ), and the
main portal of the Taiwanese government ( http://gov.tw ). Web sites pertaining to
politically sensitive events are also targeted, such as content related to Tiananmen
Square (e.g., http://64memo.com , http://tiananmenvigil.org , and http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989 ).