Access Contested
13
agreements. Not surprisingly, these decisions can be inconsistent, ad hoc, and sometimes discriminatory against marginal or radical groups.
Disabling or attacking critical information assets at key moments in time — during
elections or public demonstrations, for example — may be one of the most effective
tools for infl uencing political outcomes in cyberspace. Today, computer-network
attacks, including the use of distributed denial-of-service attacks, can be easily marshaled and targeted against key sources of information, especially in the developing
world, where networks and infrastructure tend to be fragile and prone to disruption.
The tools used to mount botnet attacks thrive in the peer-to-peer architectures of
insecure servers, personal computers, and social-networking platforms. Botnets can be
activated against any target by anyone willing to pay a fee. There are cruder methods
of just-in-time blocking as well, such as shutting off power in the buildings where
servers are located or tampering with domain-name registration so that information
is not routed to its proper destination. This kind of just-in-time blocking has been
empirically documented by the ONI in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Nepal, Burma,
and most recently in Egypt.
14
The attraction of just-in-time blocking to regulators is that information is disabled
at key moments only, thus avoiding charges of Internet censorship and allowing for
the perpetrators ’ plausible denial. In regions where Internet connectivity can be intermittent and unreliable, just-in-time blocking can be easily passed off as just another
technical glitch with the Internet. When such attacks are contracted out to criminal
organizations, it is nearly impossible to identify those responsible.
One unusual and important characteristic of cyberspace is that individuals can take
creative actions — sometimes against perceived threats to their country ’ s national interest — that have system-wide effects. Citizens may bristle at outside interference in their
country ’ s internal affairs or take offense at criticism directed at their governments,
however illegitimate those governments may appear to outsiders. Those individuals
who possess the necessary technical skills have at times taken it upon themselves to
attack adversarial sources of information, often leaving provocative messages and
warnings behind.
Such actions make it diffi cult to determine the provenance of the attacks. Are they
the work of the government or of citizens acting independently? Or are they perhaps
some combination of the two? Muddying the waters further, some government security
services informally encourage or tacitly approve of the actions of patriotic groups. In
China, for example, the Wu Mao Dang , or Fifty Cent Party (named for the amount of
money its members are supposedly paid for each Internet post), patrols chat rooms and
online forums, posting information favorable to the regime and chastising its critics.
15
In Russia, it is widely believed that the security services regularly coax hacker groups to
fi ght for the motherland in cyberspace and may plant instructions on prominent
nationalist Web sites and forums for hacking attacks.
16 In late 2009 in Iran, a shadowy
13
agreements. Not surprisingly, these decisions can be inconsistent, ad hoc, and sometimes discriminatory against marginal or radical groups.
Disabling or attacking critical information assets at key moments in time — during
elections or public demonstrations, for example — may be one of the most effective
tools for infl uencing political outcomes in cyberspace. Today, computer-network
attacks, including the use of distributed denial-of-service attacks, can be easily marshaled and targeted against key sources of information, especially in the developing
world, where networks and infrastructure tend to be fragile and prone to disruption.
The tools used to mount botnet attacks thrive in the peer-to-peer architectures of
insecure servers, personal computers, and social-networking platforms. Botnets can be
activated against any target by anyone willing to pay a fee. There are cruder methods
of just-in-time blocking as well, such as shutting off power in the buildings where
servers are located or tampering with domain-name registration so that information
is not routed to its proper destination. This kind of just-in-time blocking has been
empirically documented by the ONI in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Nepal, Burma,
and most recently in Egypt.
14
The attraction of just-in-time blocking to regulators is that information is disabled
at key moments only, thus avoiding charges of Internet censorship and allowing for
the perpetrators ’ plausible denial. In regions where Internet connectivity can be intermittent and unreliable, just-in-time blocking can be easily passed off as just another
technical glitch with the Internet. When such attacks are contracted out to criminal
organizations, it is nearly impossible to identify those responsible.
One unusual and important characteristic of cyberspace is that individuals can take
creative actions — sometimes against perceived threats to their country ’ s national interest — that have system-wide effects. Citizens may bristle at outside interference in their
country ’ s internal affairs or take offense at criticism directed at their governments,
however illegitimate those governments may appear to outsiders. Those individuals
who possess the necessary technical skills have at times taken it upon themselves to
attack adversarial sources of information, often leaving provocative messages and
warnings behind.
Such actions make it diffi cult to determine the provenance of the attacks. Are they
the work of the government or of citizens acting independently? Or are they perhaps
some combination of the two? Muddying the waters further, some government security
services informally encourage or tacitly approve of the actions of patriotic groups. In
China, for example, the Wu Mao Dang , or Fifty Cent Party (named for the amount of
money its members are supposedly paid for each Internet post), patrols chat rooms and
online forums, posting information favorable to the regime and chastising its critics.
15
In Russia, it is widely believed that the security services regularly coax hacker groups to
fi ght for the motherland in cyberspace and may plant instructions on prominent
nationalist Web sites and forums for hacking attacks.
16 In late 2009 in Iran, a shadowy