274
China
result of discontent among Uighur citizens following the murder of several Uighur
workers in a Guangdong toy factory.
12 Though it is unclear what sparked the violence,
confl ict quickly erupted between Han and Uighur residents, leading to at least 197
deaths and more than 1,600 injuries.
13
The Urumqi riots, China ’ s most serious case of civil unrest in decades, led to severe
and calculated clampdowns on local and national media and telecommunication
networks. Unlike the case of the Tibetan protests of 2008, the Chinese government
allowed — and even encouraged — foreign media coverage of the Xinjiang riots. However,
journalists were confi ned to the city of Urumqi and permitted to cover violence instigated by Uighur citizens only. They were forbidden from reporting on the aftermath
of the incidents, including the widespread and systematic interrogations and arrests
of Uighurs, as well as the unexplained disappearance of dozens of detained suspects.
14
There were also cases of Chinese journalists being verbally and physically harassed
while attempting to cover the news objectively.
15 Even more extreme, however, were
the government ’ s actions regarding Internet and telephone communications. The riots
in Urumqi led immediately to drastic tightening of Internet censorship nationwide,
including the blocking of Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites, as well as a
complete cutoff of all Internet and telephone access within the province of
Xinjiang.
16
Offi cials justifi ed the Internet blocks as safety precautions, claiming, “ We cut Internet connection in some areas of Urumqi in order to quench the riot quickly and
prevent violence from spreading to other places. ”
17 They further asserted that the
central government believed that World Uighur Congress Leader, Rebiya Kadeer, had
“ used the Internet and other means of communication to mastermind the riot, ” necessitating greater restrictions on the Internet to avoid further collaboration between
separatist forces.
18 Although telephone communication and access to 31 state-sponsored Web sites were slowly restored, Xinjiang ’ s Internet access remained effectively
severed for ten months following the July 2009 riots.
19
In January 2010, Google made a bold move by announcing it would no longer
comply with the legal requirements of content fi ltering imposed on companies operating within the PRC.
20 Following a series of cyber attacks that targeted Google ’ s infrastructure and the e-mail accounts of several Chinese human rights activists, Google
publicly stated that it would seek to discuss the establishment of an unfi ltered search
engine in China, or else offi cially close down China-based Google.cn.
21 The attacks,
which also hit a number of other Silicon Valley technology fi rms, led to responses
from the central government that were largely dismissive of Google ’ s accusations.
Offi cial reactions condemned the move as “ fi nancially driven, ” because of Google ’ s
inability to surpass Baidu.com as the number-one search engine in China.
22 Minister
of the State Council Information Offi ce Wang Chen defended China ’ s censorship policies, maintaining that “ properly guiding Internet opinion is a major measure for
China
result of discontent among Uighur citizens following the murder of several Uighur
workers in a Guangdong toy factory.
12 Though it is unclear what sparked the violence,
confl ict quickly erupted between Han and Uighur residents, leading to at least 197
deaths and more than 1,600 injuries.
13
The Urumqi riots, China ’ s most serious case of civil unrest in decades, led to severe
and calculated clampdowns on local and national media and telecommunication
networks. Unlike the case of the Tibetan protests of 2008, the Chinese government
allowed — and even encouraged — foreign media coverage of the Xinjiang riots. However,
journalists were confi ned to the city of Urumqi and permitted to cover violence instigated by Uighur citizens only. They were forbidden from reporting on the aftermath
of the incidents, including the widespread and systematic interrogations and arrests
of Uighurs, as well as the unexplained disappearance of dozens of detained suspects.
14
There were also cases of Chinese journalists being verbally and physically harassed
while attempting to cover the news objectively.
15 Even more extreme, however, were
the government ’ s actions regarding Internet and telephone communications. The riots
in Urumqi led immediately to drastic tightening of Internet censorship nationwide,
including the blocking of Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites, as well as a
complete cutoff of all Internet and telephone access within the province of
Xinjiang.
16
Offi cials justifi ed the Internet blocks as safety precautions, claiming, “ We cut Internet connection in some areas of Urumqi in order to quench the riot quickly and
prevent violence from spreading to other places. ”
17 They further asserted that the
central government believed that World Uighur Congress Leader, Rebiya Kadeer, had
“ used the Internet and other means of communication to mastermind the riot, ” necessitating greater restrictions on the Internet to avoid further collaboration between
separatist forces.
18 Although telephone communication and access to 31 state-sponsored Web sites were slowly restored, Xinjiang ’ s Internet access remained effectively
severed for ten months following the July 2009 riots.
19
In January 2010, Google made a bold move by announcing it would no longer
comply with the legal requirements of content fi ltering imposed on companies operating within the PRC.
20 Following a series of cyber attacks that targeted Google ’ s infrastructure and the e-mail accounts of several Chinese human rights activists, Google
publicly stated that it would seek to discuss the establishment of an unfi ltered search
engine in China, or else offi cially close down China-based Google.cn.
21 The attacks,
which also hit a number of other Silicon Valley technology fi rms, led to responses
from the central government that were largely dismissive of Google ’ s accusations.
Offi cial reactions condemned the move as “ fi nancially driven, ” because of Google ’ s
inability to surpass Baidu.com as the number-one search engine in China.
22 Minister
of the State Council Information Offi ce Wang Chen defended China ’ s censorship policies, maintaining that “ properly guiding Internet opinion is a major measure for